Why is Carney calling for changes now? 

Speaking at the University of Toronto, Carney described the current era as a “hinge moment” in Canada’s history. As “threats from a more dangerous and divided world are unraveling the rules-based international order,” Carney is doing what many leaders of all political stripes in Canada have pledged and failed to do—increase military and defense spending. 

Recognizing the increasingly volatile international security environment that Canada finds itself in, Carney announced sweeping plans for the government of Canada to increase its defense spending to the NATO target of 2 percent of its GDP by March 2026, ahead of the goal set by the government of former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. Canada’s lagging defense spending has long drawn the ire of the United States and other NATO allies and served as a target for US President Donald Trump earlier this year. Carney likely timed this announcement for this weekend’s G7 Summit, during which Trump will travel to Alberta, and in advance of the NATO Summit in the Hague later this month. 

Aside from addressing short-term priorities with this month’s summitry, Carney also framed his announcement around the threats to Canada at this moment in history, stating, “a new imperialism threatens. Middle powers must compete for interests and attention, knowing that if they’re not at the table, they’re on the menu.”

What exactly is Canada doing on defense spending? 

Canada currently spends 1.37 percent of its GDP on defense, but the low spending numbers do not tell the full story of Canada’s defense woes. Ottawa only has one operational submarine, out of four, and only half of the Canada’s maritime and land vehicles are operational. 

Questions surround Canada’s ability to ramp up its domestic defense production at a scale needed to meet Carney’s new goals. The equipment used by the Canadian Armed Forces and Canada’s broader defense production as a whole are closely integrated with the United States. Despite this, Carney has pledged to diversify future defense spending away from an overreliance on the United States and look towards new partners, including Europe, as well as boosting its own capacity for domestic production.

Where will this increased spending go? 

In fiscal year 2025-26 alone, the Carney government will invest an additional $6.5 billion across the Department of National Defence (DND), the Canadian Armed Forces, and the Communications Security Establishment (Canada’s signals intelligence agency). The Canadian government aims to increase the number of full-time armed forces members and reservists alongside investing in the civilian workforce. Part of the spending increase will also come from moving the oversight of Canadian Coast Guard from the Ministries of Fisheries and Oceans to the DND. The investment strategy calls for further modernizing Canada’s military capabilities with a focus on the Arctic, such as Canada’s recent acquisition of a new over-the horizon radar system from Australia. To further Canada’s domestic defense production and innovation, the government plans to establish BOREALIS, the Bureau of Research, Engineering, and Advanced Leadership in Science, which will focus on focus on furthering research in frontier technologies such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing.

How should the United States view Canada’s plans? 

Washington has already welcomed Ottawa’s announcement, with US Ambassador to Canada Pete Hoekstra posting on X that the plan is “an important step toward strengthening the Alliance and reinforcing our shared security.” However, a key part of Carney’s strategy is to diversify Canada’s defense investments and partnerships away from the United States. The purchase of the JORN radar system from Australia was Canberra’s biggest ever defense export and took the United States by surprise. Ottawa is considering bids from both South Korea and a joint German and Norwegian bid to purchase new submarines. Canada’s planned purchase of eighty-eight F-35 fighter jets from the United States is also being reconsidered, with the DND now potentially looking toward European suppliers. 

While Washington will welcome Ottawa’s clear, if long-delayed, commitment to investing in its national defense and security, the era when Canada buys heavily from the United States is likely over. As Carney stated, “it is time for Canada to chart its own path and assert itself on the international stage,” and Washington should not take for granted its potential role in Canada’s defense future.

The post Carney’s ‘hinge moment’ is about more than just Canadian defense spending. What does that mean for Washington? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In Season 2, Episode 11 of the Guns for Hire podcast, host Alia Brahimi is joined by international lawyer and former senior UN human rights official Craig Mokhiber to discuss Israel’s militarization of aid in Gaza and how US private military companies (PMC) and individual contractors could be held legally liable for their association with violations occurring in the Gaza Strip.

Craig offers his assessment of why the Israeli-led Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) was established, its rejection by the UN and the international aid community for weaponising hunger, as well as the international laws it is breaching. He describes the cruelties and dangers inhering in this new aid system and outlines how individuals, including PMC employees, may be held legally accountable for their participation in the GHF and their association with the IDF’s wider alleged war crimes.

Find the Guns For Hire podcast on the app of your choice

Guns for Hire podcast is a production of the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Initiative. Taking Libya as its starting point, it explores the causes and implications of the growing use of mercenaries in armed conflict.

The podcast features guests from many walks of life, from ethicists and historians to former mercenary fighters. It seeks to understand what the normalization of contract warfare tells us about the world we currently live in, the future of the international system, and what war could look like in the coming decades.

Podcast Jan 10, 2024

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Host and Nonresident Senior Fellow Alia Brahimi speaks with Iraq expert Renad Mansour about what motivates the non-state actors who are leading the bid to avenge Gazans.

Conflict Crisis Management

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Host and Nonresident Senior Fellow Alia Brahimi speaks with BBC investigative journalist Nawal Al-Maghafi about her film on American mercenaries in Yemen.

Conflict Defense Industry

Podcast Jul 30, 2024

‘I was a Blackwater mercenary in Iraq’

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Host Alia Brahimi is joined by former Blackwater contractor Morgan Lerette to reflect on Loretta’s experience a private military contractor in Iraq.

Conflict Defense Industry

Through our Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, the Atlantic Council works with allies and partners in Europe and the wider Middle East to protect US interests, build peace and security, and unlock the human potential of the region.

Learn more

The post “Yes, really”: American private military companies (back) in Gaza appeared first on Atlantic Council.

There are four steps that European nations should undertake in the near and medium term to enhance NATO’s deterrence and defense capabilities against the prospect of Russian aggression.

As the European Commission’s plan for strengthening European defense stated, “Russia will remain a fundamental threat to Europe’s security for the foreseeable future,” and one which requires a timely response inasmuch as “Russia has made it clear that according to their understanding they remain at war with the West.” Accordingly, as part of enhancing NATO defense, Europe needs to take prompt action to significantly increase:

1. the effectiveness of forces at its borders with or near Russia,
2. its capability for sea control,
3. the resilience of critical infrastructures necessary to defense operations, and
4. its defense industrial capabilities.

The importance of Europe taking such actions arises from a confluence of three factors: first, Russia’s willingness as demonstrated by its actions in Ukraine to undertake “major mechanized high-intensity warfare” to achieve its geopolitical aims; second, the challenges facing the United States military with the potential for conflict in the Indo-Pacific that could require resources that heretofore have been focused on Europe; and, third, decades of defense underinvestment by European nations that have left their militaries and defense industrial bases ill-prepared to engage in a sustained conventional conflict.

These concerns are significantly heightened because Russia, despite its more than three-year, ongoing war against Ukraine, has nonetheless been able to reconstitute its land forces and has fully maintained its air, naval, cyber, and space capabilities. In recent testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Gen. Christopher Cavoli, NATO’s supreme allied commander, described Russia’s continuing reconstitution of its military forces:

Moreover, in addition to maintaining its force structure, Russia has substantially enhanced its defense industrial capabilities. Again, per Cavoli:

Moscow is also marrying its expanded industrial prowess with more sophisticated technological capabilities. For example, Russia is investing significantly in, and having early success with, unmanned vehicle swarming capabilities.

Most significantly, Russia’s threatening activities are not limited to Ukraine. One key concern is that Russia has been building up its infrastructure near the borders of Finland and the Baltic states. As one report describes:

It is not clear, of course, whether Russia would choose to attack NATO countries. But what is clear from Cavoli’s testimony is that “Russia’s willingness to employ brutal means in pursuit of its goals,” and that the “Russian regime has refashioned its military, economic, and social structures to sustain what it describes as a long-term confrontation with the West—systemic changes that illustrate Russia’s intention to confront us into the foreseeable future.”

Estimates vary as to when Russia could sufficiently reconstitute from its conflict with Ukraine to undertake an attack against NATO. The uncertainty is rooted in the fact that the duration of the Russia-Ukraine war is itself uncertain, with substantial efforts as of this writing being taken by the United States to bring the fighting to a halt. In that event, a report from Bruegel stated: “A significantly more challenging scenario for Europe would be an unlikely peace deal accepted by Ukraine. In such a scenario, Russia is likely to continue its military build-up, creating a formidable military challenge to all of the EU in a very short period, given current Russian production. The EU and allies including the UK and Norway would need to accelerate their military build-ups immediately and massively.

Specific predictions as to the time needed for full Russian reconstitution generally range from two to five years. Norway’s senior commander has stated that two to three years would suffice; Jack Watling of the United Kingdom’s Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) has noted the importance of “ensuring that the UK’s Armed Forces are contributing to a credible deterrence posture alongside European NATO allies by the end of 2027.”  Other estimates fall into a three-to-five-year window.

Timing uncertainties—even at the higher end—should provide little comfort. As retired Maj. Gen. Gordon “Skip” Davis, a former deputy assistant secretary general at NATO, has warned, if Russia is given “two, maybe three to five years” to rebuild its forces while Europe fails to rearm at the same pace, European forces “would be at a significant disadvantage in a high-intensity fight.”

Such a scenario of NATO fighting at a substantial disadvantage is entirely plausible if Europe fails to take action. Most obviously, Russia is fully capable of large-scale warfare with its current capabilities. If full-scale conflict in Ukraine were to end, many of those capabilities could be directed against NATO—perhaps for a relatively limited operation such as against one of the Baltic countries, combined with nuclear threats to dissuade NATO from launching an effective response, or, with longer preparation, possibly a full-scale attack. Moreover, if the United States were facing or actually engaged in a conflict in the Indo-Pacific—keeping in mind that China’s President Xi Jinping has told his forces to be ready to succeed in a conflict against Taiwan by 2027—European nations should have the necessary capabilities to respond effectively against Russian aggression.

European nations are, of course, alert to these issues. As a consequence of the Russian threat, and amid growing concern over US commitments to the North Atlantic alliance, their combined defense budgets (including Canada) are now equal to just over 2 percent of their aggregated gross domestic product. Multiple nations are planning further increases: Poland expects to spend 5 percent of GDP in 2025; Germany recently voted to exempt defense spending from its “debt brake,” and the government announced support for defense spending (including relevant infrastructure and cyber capabilities) of 5 percent of GDP; France has set a target of 3.5 percent; and the United Kingdom has established a target of 2.5 percent of GDP by 2027 and 3 percent thereafter. For its part, the United States has called for “adopt[ing] a new 5-percent-of-GDP Defense Investment Plan,” which will be a central topic at the NATO summit in June.

Additionally, the European Union has determined to become a significant player in the defense arena. There is a newly created Commissioner for Defence and Space, and the EU is undertaking to provide 150 billion euros to member countries for defense. Further, the EU is planning to authorize countries to “trigger an emergency clause allowing them to make defense investments that push them over the bloc’s budgetary spending limits.” Exactly how much additional spending this would generate is not clear since, as of this writing, only twelve of the twenty-seven EU countries plan to use the emergency clause, and three of the larger countries—France, Italy, and Spain—do not plan to. Nonetheless, reporting on the European Commission’s tracking of member states’ defense plans indicates: “The European Commission is sticking to its estimate that member states could spend up to €650 billion on defence over the coming four years despite just half of governments requesting more fiscal headway to boost investments in the sector in time.”

As valuable as these actions are, it is important to recognize that even the most expansive budgetary plans do not translate into prompt, actual military capabilities. Initiatives must be transferred into actual budgets. Budgets must be approved by parliaments and then provided to defense ministries. Ministries must sign contracts. And companies with contracts must undertake production that often requires the scaling up of facilities.

Europe has a very long way to go on defense spending and capability requirements, with NATO asking “alliance members to raise their military capability targets by 30% as the organization seeks to boost its force posture, according to the [Supreme Allied Commander Transformation] in charge of defense planning at the 32-nation alliance.” Accomplishing these upgrades—to achieve a military posture credible and sufficient enough to offset Russian capabilities—demands a strategic approach that can be accomplished in a timely fashion and with a laser-like focus on the most critical and implementable capabilities. European nations are in a race against the clock and, consequently, must prioritize actions in the near and medium term to deliver capabilities that provide the greatest deterrence or, if necessary, actual military defense against a Russian threat.

To achieve this goal, NATO should focus on the four key challenges it currently faces. First, Europe has too few forces on the borders with Russia. Second, Europe, without US support, cannot marshal the forces necessary to gain sea control. Third, European nations are highly vulnerable to cyberattacks on infrastructure that is critical for sustained, effective military operations. Fourth, Europe’s defense industries lack the capacity to provide substantial amounts of effective weaponry in the near and medium term.

The NATO summit in June offers a forum for the alliance, and its constituent members, to adopt the necessary actions in response to these concerns. The required steps are set forth below.

I. Europe needs to promptly boost the efficacy of forces at its borders with or near Russia

As described above, Russia is in the process of enhancing its capabilities near the Baltic states and Finland. Doing so will provide the infrastructure and forces necessary for a conventional attack. But deterring or defeating such an attack—and especially repelling not expelling an attack—requires an effective NATO forward force posture. However, as Cavoli has stated:

To establish the necessary posture that Cavoli envisions, European nations should take the following actions, all of which can be accomplished in the near and medium term and all within existing or planned budgets. These actions should be undertaken irrespective of any decisions by the current US administration regarding American forces for Europe.

First, NATO European nations need to undertake a massive buildup of unmanned aerial vehicles. The use of drones has completely changed the nature of battle—as demonstrated by their role in the Russia-Ukraine war: Drones now kill more soldiers and destroy more armored vehicles in Ukraine than all traditional weapons of war combined, including sniper rifles, tanks, howitzers and mortars, Ukrainian commanders and officials say.

Just as the United States is planning for extensive use of unmanned vehicles in the Indo-Pacific should there be a conflict over Taiwan, and as Ukraine has done in its own defense, NATO needs to have a large and effective unmanned vehicle inventory available for use in the event of war with Russia. Ukraine is utilizing millions of unmanned vehicles. NATO needs a comparable supply. (A large-scale capacity for ammunition production is also needed—and discussed below in the defense industrial section.)

Second, NATO nations that border Russia and Belarus must establish effective obstacles—including land mines—to blunt a Russian attack. Useful lessons can be drawn from the Ukraine conflict, where mines have been utilized by both sides, and from the Korean context, where the defense of South Korea is supported by mines. Five Baltic nations—Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland—are in the process of withdrawing from the Ottawa Treaty, which bars the use of anti-personnel mines (anti-vehicle mines are allowed). The sooner mines are emplaced on the borders with Russia and Belarus, the stronger NATO deterrence and defense will be.

Third, some European forces should move forward on NATO’s eastern flank. Germany is planning to have a brigade stationed in Lithuania by 2027. The United Kingdom should position one of its brigades currently in England to Estonia, where the UK already has a brigade headquarters leading a multinational force. In Latvia, where Canada leads a multinational force, France could bring forward a brigade. There could be arrangements other than mobilizing UK or French forces, but the key point is to add forward forces ready for a conflict if necessary. These actions will be necessary to meet the requirements of the NATO Force Model calling for “well over” 100,000 forces in up to 10 days and 200,00 in 10–30 days.

Fourth, equipment for European forces needs to be prepositioned in or near the Baltics and Poland to be readily available in the event of conflict. Prepositioning could be on land—as the United States currently does in several places in Europe—or the equipment could be placed on maritime prepositioning ships, again following the US approach which worldwide includes seventeen prepositioning ships.

Fifth, Europe needs to establish an equivalent to the US Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) pursuant to which US airlines “contractually commit to . . . augment Department of Defense airlift requirements in emergencies when the need for airlift exceeds the capability of military aircraft.” Creating a European equivalent would be particularly valuable for moving personnel to fall in on prepositioned equipment as recommended above.

In terms of the proposed prepositioning and the European version of CRAF, it is worth noting that while mobility by rail and motor vehicle has long been identified as a challenge for NATO, and while the European Union has undertaken a mobility initiative that has reduced a certain amount of bureaucratic obstacles, little has been accomplished to meaningfully enhance physical mobility. For just one example, the “completion of Rail Baltica, an alternative 870km (540 miles) north-south railway link [through the Baltic states], has been postponed from 2025 to 2030 and is facing massive cost overruns.”

II. Europe needs to enhance its capability for sea control

In the event of a conflict in the Indo-Pacific, United States naval forces would play a major role, thereby calling on much or all of those forces for the European theater to be engaged in that arena. European maritime forces would therefore need to make up the resulting gaps in NATO’s four seas—Baltic, Black, Mediterranean, and North—as well as in the Atlantic and in the Barents Sea. European navies have excellent capabilities, including, for example, French and UK aircraft carriers and submarines from multiple countries extending beyond France and the United Kingdom to Norway, Sweden, and Germany, among others. As an illustration of European maritime capabilities, Cavoli testified that NATO operations in spring 2025 relied solely on approximately 20 European ships, and he had “zero U.S. ships working for [him] as SACEUR.”

The issue for NATO maritime forces, therefore, is not so much one of upgrading capabilities but rather one of mass. European navies are relatively small. That challenge is susceptible to solution, however, by utilizing unmanned maritime vehicles as part of NATO’s maritime operations. The value of unmanned surface vehicles has been demonstrated by the United States through Task Force 59 operations in the Gulf and Windward Stack (now transitioned to Southern Spear) operations in Latin America, where USVs have provided highly effective surveillance capabilities critical to maritime domain awareness. More dramatically, Ukraine has utilized USVs successfully to attack and neutralize the Russian Black Sea Fleet.

NATO itself has recognized the value of unmanned capabilities and has begun operations with unmanned surface vehicles through its Baltic Sentry activity: “NATO launched Baltic Sentry, a new military activity in the Baltic Sea which aims to improve Allies’ ability to respond to destabilising acts. The activity brings together Allied navies, maritime surveillance assets, and private sector operators to ensure real-time situational awareness and rapid response capabilities across the Baltic Sea’s vulnerable zones.”

According to media reports, approximately twenty USVs are taking part in Baltic Sentry, and NATO has established Task Force X to further these capabilities. In a conflict, much larger numbers of unmanned vehicles would be required just for maritime domain awareness—and even larger numbers would be necessary if lethal capabilities were to be included, as Ukraine is successfully doing in its conflict with Russia. Accordingly, NATO must urge nations to substantially increase their unmanned surface fleets and to add unmanned lethal capabilities to the existing surveillance capabilities.

III. Europe needs to enhance the resilience of critical infrastructures fundamental to defense operations

NATO’s military capabilities are reliant on the effective operations of key critical infrastructures, including the electric grid, pipelines, transportation capabilities (rail, seaports, and airports), and information and telecom systems. Those systems, however, are susceptible to Russian cyberattack. As the recent US Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community states: “Russia’s advanced cyber capabilities, its repeated success compromising sensitive targets for intelligence collection, and its past attempts to pre-position access on U.S. critical infrastructure make it a persistent counterintelligence and cyber attack threat. Moscow’s unique strength is the practical experience it has gained integrating cyber attacks and operations with wartime military action, almost certainly amplifying its potential to focus combined impact on U.S. targets in time of conflict.”

While the assessment focuses on US infrastructure, comparable vulnerabilities exist in Europe. Moreover, given the “no limits” relationship between Russia and China, it is entirely possible that China’s very formidable cyber capabilities could be used in support of a Russian attack against NATO.

To be sure, in a conflict, cyberattacks are unlikely to be definitive in and of themselves. Ukraine has sustained many such attacks and has continued its defense against Russia. The operational technologies running critical infrastructure are resilient in the sense that they generally get disrupted but not destroyed by a cyberattack—and so can be reconstituted.

Still, disruption can have far-reaching and even catastrophic consequences—especially in the early days of a conflict when NATO would be engaged with bringing the necessary forces into place to repel a Russian attack. Critical infrastructures companies like port or railway operators do not have the expertise to respond to a high-level cyberattack on their own. A coordinated public-private set of actions would be required.

There are currently three overlapping sets of activities intended to bring about the necessary resilient cybersecurity for European private sector infrastructures:

1. NATO formally recognized the importance of cyber as an operational domain in 2016 and has undertaken a variety of initiatives since then. At the 2023 “Vilnius Summit, Allies . . . committed to more ambitious goals to strengthen national cyber defences as a matter of priority, including for critical infrastructures.” Most recently, NATO has said it will establish the NATO Integrated Cyber Defense Center to combine NATO’s existing cyber efforts and to engage industry partners from across the alliance as well. But this activity is not expected to be complete until 2028, and it is far from clear what degree of effort it will be undertake to ensure the resilience of key critical infrastructures.
2. Twenty-three of the thirty-two NATO nations are members of the European Union and therefore subject to the EU requirements on cybersecurity. EU regulations require that “essential and important entities should adopt a wide range of basic cyber hygiene practices, such as zero-trust principles, software updates, device configuration, network segmentation, identity and access management or user awareness, organise training for their staff and raise awareness concerning cyber threats, phishing or social engineering techniques.”
3. NATO nations have national cybersecurity programs, illustrated by France’s National Cybersecurity Agency [ANSSI] and the United Kingdom’s National Cyber Defence Centre. Each of these (and the other national cyber agencies) undertakes to provide support to private sector entities, though the specifics vary according to the country. For example, the NCDC “support[s] the most critical organisations in the UK, the wider public sector, industry, SMEs as well as the general public. When incidents do occur, we provide effective incident response to minimise harm to the UK, help with recovery, and learn lessons for the future.”

A recent analysis set forth a series of key actions required to protect critical infrastructures necessary for NATO military operations. None of those actions should wait until 2028 for NATO’s establishment of its Integrated Cyber Defense Center. Most crucially: “NATO ultimately needs a mechanism for planning and implementing cyber operational collaboration among alliance members and with the private sector.”

In establishing such collaboration, NATO should “prioritize involving private sector entities that have a key operational role, including unique insights that could support operational activity as well as direct operational capabilities.” Key aspects of such collaboration would include:

• identifying and engaging the highest-priority infrastructure assets to ensure that they are sufficiently investing in resilience and have the highest level of government support in order to protect national security and economic productivity; and
• establishing “sector-specific councils or working groups that include representatives from member states, industry partners, and relevant NATO bodies. These groups could facilitate the exchange of threat intelligence and best practices, enhance collective defense capabilities, and streamline coordinated responses to cyber incidents affecting multiple NATO countries.”

Additionally, a focus on technological capabilities will be important. As the report states, “New innovations can help to provide visibility into both operational and information technology, using artificial intelligence to quickly learn what normal activity looks like and detecting anomalous behavior.”

Beyond the foregoing recommendations, four further actions will be important:

1. NATO networks as well as key critical infrastructures should all strictly adhere to the requirements for “zero trust architectures” that reduce the abilities of adversaries to compromise network capabilities. As noted above, the EU’s NIS 2 standard calls for zero trust, but it will be critically important to ensure that this requirement is being effectively put in place (including for non-EU nations). Achieving that goal will require a certification system backed up by red teaming to determine whether the particular system is in fact highly capable.
2. NATO should be ready to undertake an expanded effort akin to the United States’ “Hunt Forward” activity, which works with allies and partners to identify and eliminate malware in key cyber systems.
3. It will be necessary for NATO not only to focus on cyber defense but also to undertake to disrupt the offensive cyber capabilities that Russia would utilize against the alliance. As previously described: “The actual implementation of NATO’s cyber offensive capabilities is by nations through a process described as the ‘sovereign cyber effects provided voluntarily by allies.’ . . [Utilizing] this approach allows allies to support NATO commanders with cyberattacks, but to keep to themselves (as they choose), the particulars of their offensive cyber methods.. . . . However, in conditions of conflict, the value of wartime cyber offensive operations may benefit from broader coordination with kinetic operations.”
4. NATO should also undertake to ensure that both its own information technology systems and those of the critical infrastructures upon which it relies transition to so-called “memory safe” software inasmuch as two-thirds and more of cybersecurity issues derive from the use of unsafe code. This cannot be accomplished immediately, but the United States Defense Advanced Projects Agency has developed the “TRACTOR” program which will automate the transition from the widely used C language to the memory safe RUST language.

Achieving the NATO-private sector collaboration described above, including the necessary operational and technological changes, is crucial for wartime success. However, while it would be difficult enough to establish an effective NATO-private sector cyber relationship, there are further significant obstacles given both the national and European Union cybersecurity roles. Analytically, a NATO-EU collaboration should be achievable since all share a desired outcome: resilience to a Russian (or Chinese) cyberattack.

Practically, however, NATO-EU collaboration often devolves into multiple meetings without consequential on-the-ground impact—and NATO is not without fault as its approach to national cyber requirements has been more aspirational than operational or technical. It will be a critical test for European defense—and for the leaders of NATO, the EU, and the private sector—to see if cyber resilience can in fact be enhanced or whether it will fall prey to bureaucratic dysfunctionality.

IV. Europe needs prompt enhancement of its defense industrial capabilities

Europe’s defense industrial base needs substantial and immediate enhancement. As the Draghi report on the future of European competitiveness stated, “The defence industry is too fragmented, hindering its ability to produce at scale, and it suffers from a lack of standardisation and interoperability of equipment, weakening Europe’s ability to act as a cohesive power across the bloc.” In recognition of these deficiencies, individual European allies and the European Union have pledged to enhance their defense production and capacity. But many of those much-needed initiatives will take time—to send sufficient demand signals to industry, to ramp up industrial capacity, and to field actual capabilities to ensure allied warfighters are appropriately equipped. Time, however, is a very expensive commodity for a Europe facing a reconstituting Russia. Speed is critically important.

In the short and medium term, European allies need a sober assessment of what capabilities must be fielded quickly and which capabilities can reasonably be produced on the continent. As a first step, Europe should look to Ukraine for lessons learned on how to ramp up defense production quickly and which capabilities have been particularly effective against Russia. As discussed above, unmanned vehicles play an outsized role on the modern battlefield, and maintaining robust ammunition stockpiles is essential. Ukraine mass-produces UVs—at a volume of four million drones annually. European allies should undertake to promote defense industrial initiatives that deliver unmanned vehicle capabilities at comparable scale as promptly as possible. 

European allies could use the planned increases in defense budgets for investments in facilities for UV production. Such facilities can be stood up relatively quickly. By way of example, in the United States, Anduril is building a so-called “arsenal plant” to produce tens of thousands of autonomous weapons systems annually. The plant is expected to cost less than one billion dollars and to be operational in approximately eighteen months. Anduril is considering standing up a similar facility in the United Kingdom, but there are a number of European companies, such as Helsing in Germany or Leonardo in Italy, that could step up production of unmanned vehicles with the appropriate financial support. Investing in such facilities, and ramping up capacity across Europe, would dramatically strengthen Europe’s capabilities for any conflict on NATO’s eastern flank.

Alongside an industrial base in need of immediate and substantial enhancement, Europe is woefully low on artillery and ammunition rounds. The Ukrainian military uses approximately two million 155 mm artillery rounds annually. Through the European Act in Support of Ammunition Production, the European continent is supposed to scale up bloc-wide ammunition production efforts to produce two million 155 mm rounds a year. However, this much-hyped initiative has struggled to deliver on its promises—and even if it were able to reach this benchmark, it would still fall short of the necessary artillery production to sufficiently resource Ukraine and allied militaries while simultaneously replenishing allied stockpiles.

Europe struggles to produce the requisite number of artillery rounds, in part due to systemic industrial capacity issues but also because of a global shortage of TNT and gunpowder. In the short term, Europe should authorize around-the-clock industrial shifts in munition factories to ramp up production. Additionally, European allies should explore innovative opportunities to cast artillery rounds and other munitions rather than relying on the traditional method of forging, as proposed in a recent Center for a New American Security (CNAS) report. Forging is a time-intensive process compared to casting, which is more flexible and allows for recyclable metal to be molded in a shorter time frame. Europe has a significant foundry industry that could be redirected to produce artillery rounds and other munitions. Overcoming the global shortage of TNT will require strengthening strategic supply chains with like-minded allies and partners—most notably Japan. In the longer term, European allies should invest in new munition manufacturing facilities and expand the number of TNT production facilities beyond its reliance on the existing Nitro-Chem plant in Poland. To be sure, European munitions troubles extend beyond 155 mm artillery rounds. However, the clear vulnerabilities in this artillery production underscore the necessity for Europe to take prompt and innovative action to scale its munitions production.

The war in Ukraine has demonstrated that air defense is crucial to safeguarding civilians as well as critical infrastructure. Europe has tried to bolster its air and missile defense through collaborative procurement programs like the European Sky Shield Initiative and now the ReArm Europe plan. However, in the past, such initiatives have had mixed success, as progress stalls over political divergences. For example, France has been openly critical of the European Sky Shield Initiative for prioritizing the purchase of US weapon systems over European systems. As European allies continue to disagree on key issues related to security and defense, allies at the national level must forge ahead by buying individual capabilities that meet NATO’s interoperability standards to ensure these systems can be integrated across the alliance. Some would be US systems, such as Patriot, and some would be European, such as the NASAMS system by Kongsberg or the newer Franco-Italian SAMP/T NG.

Lastly, even if Europe were to adopt all of these approaches tomorrow—at both speed and scale—it would likely fall short of the needed industrial capacity to field sufficient capabilities to deter or defend against Russian aggression. In the short term, Europe must cooperate with its allies and partners, both in North America and the Indo-Pacific region, to fill its stocks and provide other capabilities. Despite political headwinds, the United States remains the strongest defense industrial partner of Europe: Its systems are widely used, trusted, and meet interoperability standards established by NATO. The remedy for laggard defense industrial capacity on both sides of the Atlantic is greater cooperation—not isolationism.

Where national governments diverge on approaches, European military planners and industry partners should explore other opportunities to strengthen industry-to-industry ties. This approach would match European defense industrial ambitions by supporting European efforts to meet short-term capability targets while also investing the necessary capital in facilities to grow a healthy and robust European defense industrial base in the long term. To this end, efforts to harness advantages on both sides of the Atlantic in the form of co-production and co-development facilities are heating up. For example, in December, RTX partnered with MBDA to open the first Patriot missile facility in Germany—which is slated to begin producing over a thousand Patriot missiles for NATO allies annually. Opportunities like this allow Europe to quickly scale up facilities, while allowing European industries to offset some of the steep costs associated with building out new manufacturing plants. In the short term, Europe is equipped with capabilities at an accelerated rate while at the same time developing the requisite infrastructure to create for itself a healthier and more self-sufficient defense industrial base. 

V. Conclusion

The transatlantic community agrees: Europe must do more to enhance its role in NATO. Taking the actions set forth in this issue brief will provide the necessary enhancement of European defense capabilities in the short and medium term to deter and, if necessary, defeat a reconstituted Russia.

Board director

Franklin D. Kramer

Distinguished Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

Cybersecurity Defense Policy

Staff

Kristen Taylor

Assistant Director

Transatlantic Security Initiative

Europe & Eurasia European Union

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Conflict Defense Industry

Issue Brief Feb 21, 2024

NATO multidomain operations: Near- and medium-term priority initiatives

By Franklin D. Kramer, Ann Marie Dailey, Joslyn Brodfuehrer

How can NATO improve its ability to fight as a multination coalition? These seven initiatives for NATO to take over the next five years can help.

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The Transatlantic Security Initiative, in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, shapes and influences the debate on the greatest security challenges facing the North Atlantic Alliance and its key partners.

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The post Immediate steps that Europe can take to enhance its role in NATO defense appeared first on Atlantic Council.

European policymakers have reacted to Trump’s moves with shock and doubt about the US commitment to NATO, and some have stepped up their defense pledges accordingly. “We still believe that the ‘N’ in NATO stands for North Atlantic and that our European allies should maximize their comparative advantage on the continent,” US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said last week at the Shangri-la Dialogue in Singapore. “And thanks to President Trump, they are stepping up. An alliance cannot be ironclad if in reality or perception it is seen as one-sided.”

For its part, the European Union (EU) has approved a €150 billion defense funding loan program and allowed its members to exceed normal debt limits for military expenditures. Even before the EU’s moves, allies such as Poland and the Baltic States—who Hegseth called “model allies” in Singapore—were ramping up spending and sounding the alarm over the threat they face from Russia. But too many European allies have not yet increased their defense spending sufficiently.

What explains this contrast? Leading NATO allies (France, Germany, Italy, Poland, the United Kingdom, and the United States) diverge from one another because they face different threats and levels of threat perception. These differences explain each ally’s major defense decisions (defense spending, military structure, and military posture) as well as the ally’s role in and relationship to NATO. I explore this issue more deeply in my forthcoming book on NATO, drawing from ninety-eight interviews with current and former policymakers.

NATO allies’ different threat perceptions can explain much of the current crisis within the Alliance, and they provide the backdrop for what could be a contentious summit.

The United States: China trumps Europe

The Trump administration sees China as the most significant state security threat to US interests. The 2025 Annual Threat Assessment says that “China stands out as the actor most capable of threatening US interests globally.” The administration’s Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance reportedly focuses on the threat of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan as one of two priorities for the Pentagon, along with combating drug cartels.

The Trump administration has cited the threat from China to explain its European security policy. Hegseth said in February that the United States could not remain the primary guarantor of European security, telling allied military leaders in Brussels: “The US is prioritizing deterring war with China in the Pacific, recognizing the reality of scarcity, and making the resourcing tradeoffs to ensure deterrence does not fail.” The Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance reportedly concludes that because of the focus on China, European allies must do more for their own defense.

This view of China can also explain the Trump administration’s policy toward Greenland, an autonomous territory of NATO ally Denmark. Melting sea ice means that Greenland’s location will be critical for those seeking to control Artic sea lanes and it is home to large quantities of rare-earth minerals. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has stressed that the United States would not use force to seize Greenland but only to protect it from encroachment by China.

This can also explain Trump’s significant, though inconsistent, turn toward Russia. Some have argued that the Trump administration is attempting a “reverse Kissinger,” aligning with Russia to weaken its ties to China. The Trump administration may even be turning toward Russia to pressure NATO allies into taking more responsibility for their own defense, as Victoria Coates, a former deputy national security advisor in Trump’s first term, has argued. Even though Trump has criticized Russian President Vladimir Putin, it is reasonable for European leaders to fear that a grand bargain between Washington and Moscow remains a distinct possibility.

Europe: Divided by diverse levels of threat

Europe is unable to defend itself without the United States. Europe lacks integrated air and missile defense, long-range precision strike, transport aircraft, as well as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. European allies are struggling to recruit, train, and equip sufficient troops for NATO’s new force model—doing so in the next decade without the United States would most likely be a bridge too far.

But even faced with these challenges, not every European NATO ally has shown the same level of urgency when it comes to increasing defense spending. The reason is that leading European allies face different threats and levels of threat, limiting the incentives of some allies to act. 

Meanwhile, from strategy documents and official statements, it is clear that Poland, Germany, France, and Britain all view Russia as their greatest security threat. However, they each have different levels of threat perception, which informs the differing approaches they have taken toward military spending.

Preserving a mutually beneficial relationship

The United States’ greater focus on China and push for Europeans to take more responsibility for their defense are likely irreversible trends. But the NATO Summit in The Hague later this month provides an opportunity for the United States and its European allies to reaffirm their commitments to the Alliance amid these shifting dynamics.

First, the Trump administration should use the summit to work with its European allies on a phased and structured exchange of responsibility for European security over the next decade. Under such a plan, the United States would work with European allies to develop defense capabilities they do not currently have while maintaining the commitment of the US nuclear deterrent.

Second, Trump should take the opportunity to reassure European allies. He should affirm that the United States would come to the aid of any NATO ally that is attacked. Trump should also state plainly that his administration will work with Denmark to bolster the defense of Greenland and that it does not intend to acquire the island by force.

Third, European countries should use the summit to announce further commitments on defense spending. Following through on such commitments will entail costly domestic tradeoffs. The present moment requires courage: European leaders must make the case that significantly more defense spending is necessary because of the threat Russia poses and the United States’ turn toward the Indo-Pacific. Italy’s government in particular will have a challenging task. Because Italians are focused on threats from the Mediterranean, officials in Rome will have to make the case that Russia’s threat to European security matters for Italy. European governments like Italy’s can also make a compelling case that spending more on defense may boost overall economic growth.

If NATO allies take these steps at this year’s summit, they can help build a future Europe more capable of defending itself and an Alliance that better serves both US and European interests.

Jason Davidson is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He is also a professor of political science and international affairs and director of the Security and Conflict Studies Program at the University of Mary Washington in Fredericksburg, Virginia.

The post What explains the transatlantic rift? It’s all about threat perception. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

NATO faces a growing threat from a resurgent Russia capable of hybrid and kinetic aggression across the Northeast Corridor—from Finland, the Baltic region, and Poland to the Black Sea. Currently, NATO’s defense posture relies heavily on US military support for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), strategic lift, command and control (C2), and the extended deterrence provided by the US nuclear umbrella. With the United States increasingly focused on the Indo-Pacific region and committed to burden sharing, and with growing calls for European strategic autonomy, NATO must be able to deter and respond to threats as a unified entity—one not effectively dependent on US warfighting capability and capacity. Regardless of spending levels, NATO must shift from a national-centric approach to an Alliance-wide mindset. This requires a shared engineering and analytics methodology to optimize defense resource allocations with a focus on speed, precision, and collaboration.

To assess the transatlantic geostrategic environment and explore strategic options available to NATO, MITRE and the Atlantic Council partnered to conduct a NATO Force Mix Analysis (NFMA). The findings of this analysis call for accelerated capability development, institutional reform, and operational integration under a forward-leaning, data-driven, mission-engineering framework. This framework would enable NATO to make data-informed decisions to:

• Adaptively evolve concepts, operational decision making, and assignment of authorities toward more effective strategic outcomes.
• Optimize funding investments and deliver unified capabilities that produce the best mission effects required for operational success.
• Effectively leverage technology to achieve mass.

By 2027, NATO must strengthen the Baltic Defense Line. Timely action is essential to ensure credible deterrence, reassure frontline allies, and deny Russia any opportunity to test NATO’s resolve or readiness in a high-threat environment. To achieve this, the following actions are essential:

• Prepare a warfighting burden-sharing roadmap.
• Establish a unified NATO multidomain warfare doctrine.
• Invest in multidomain C2 and ISR infrastructure.
• Establish a NATO multidomain open system architecture.
• Accelerate forward posture of heavy forces and integrated air and missile defense.
• Enhance military mobility and industrial coordination.
• Establish additional joint ISR fusion centers.
• Develop a pan-European logistics control network.
• Form multidomain operations (MDO) and cyber/influence task forces.

Together, these initiatives offer a blueprint for a more self-reliant, capable, and unified NATO in 2027—ready to meet emerging threats head-on.

Introduction

NATO’s deterrence posture in the Baltic states is undermined by an overreliance on US military capabilities. In a crisis where the United States were focused elsewhere, European NATO nations may therefore be unable to mobilize a timely, effective response. This overreliance creates both strategic and operational vulnerabilities that can be exploited by Russia to challenge the Alliance’s credibility and threaten national sovereignty.

NATO’s ability to deter or respond rapidly to Russian aggression is limited by:

• A lack of massed, ready combat forces in the theater.
• Insufficient integrated air and missile defense.
• Slow logistics and reinforcement timelines.
• A lack of organic strategic mobility with a reliance on US air and sealift.
• A reliance on US enablers for theater integrated C2, ISR, and mission networks.

Without the United States, NATO remains superior in numbers and technology on paper but lacks the operational integration, logistics, and joint force capabilities to rapidly match Russian mass and tempo near its borders. NATO must develop a force structure and a mix of capabilities that allow for the execution of regional defense plans with an emphasis on burden sharing. This modernization strategy must be objective, threat-based, and resource-informed.

The strategic context: A geopolitical landscape shaped by the orders forming around the US and China

The next few years will be pivotal for Europe and the Euro-Atlantic community, as shifting US geostrategic priorities toward the Indo-Pacific, persistent Russian threats, the rise of authoritarian powers, and a rapidly changing global order redefine the political landscape.

Alongside changing US and European Union (EU) defense priorities, the outcome of the war in Ukraine will be a critical factor in shaping NATO’s strategies. As the devolution of the post–Cold War liberal international order accelerates, with increasingly fluid relations between states, a new geopolitical landscape looms over the horizon, shaped by the bounded orders that the principal great powers, the United States and China, are forming around them. To address the challenges facing the United States in key theaters, adaptability and robust multidomain capabilities will be paramount in ensuring both regional stability and the protection of democratic values. Nowhere is this more relevant than in the Euro-Atlantic theater, as resource requirements in the Indo-Pacific region will continue to divert US resources there, making technology a key multiplier for the US European Command (EUCOM) and NATO.

Russia’s aggressive regional actions show no sign of slowing, with Moscow targeting Europe through both direct and indirect methods. As General Christopher Cavoli, EUCOM commander and the supreme allied commander Europe, recently testified before the US Senate, Russia has been and will likely remain a chronic threat to NATO. From military threats to hybrid warfare tactics—such as cyber-attacks, information campaigns, and economic pressure—Russia is further consolidating its influence in countries like Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, and Kazakhstan. As it rebuilds its military capabilities and doubles down on nuclear reliance, Russia is strengthening its ties with authoritarian regimes, creating an emerging “axis of dictatorships” alongside China, Iran, and North Korea.

The growing Russia–China partnership poses a unique challenge to NATO, particularly as China expands its influence globally and engages in economic warfare. That country also benefits from its de facto alliance with Russia by gaining access to some of Russia’s modernized military technology, while China, in turn, provides a vital economic lifeline to Russia and a “moral legitimacy” for Russia’s actions in Europe, which align with China’s designs on Taiwan. This fusion of economic and military power, coupled with assertive moves in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait, is reshaping global dynamics and testing NATO’s reach and resilience. The West faces a rapidly evolving challenge, requiring swift, strategic responses to counter the growing authoritarian alliance that threatens global stability.

As Europe confronts an increasingly precarious security environment and potential friction in relations with the United States, the European Union appears to be doubling down on its efforts to achieve strategic autonomy. In March 2025, the EU unveiled a bold white paper outlining plans to significantly boost defense spending, foster collaborative defense projects, and shift toward purchasing European-made arms. This move is designed to close critical capability gaps in missile defense, drones, and cyber warfare, while also pooling resources to create a more unified defense infrastructure. The proposal even includes borrowing up to €150 billion for defense loans, aiming to reduce fragmentation in Europe’s defense industry and enhance the continent’s self-reliance. At the same time, recent elections in Germany have introduced new dynamics into that country’s defense policy. The newly elected leadership is reevaluating its defense priorities, a shift that could have significant implications for Germany’s role within NATO and its contributions to collective defense. Friedrich Merz, the incoming chancellor, has successfully lobbied the Bundestag to lift the legal deficit spending restrictions on defense, while repeatedly underscoring that Europe must chart an independent course. How Germany navigates this shift will be crucial in shaping Europe’s defense future and the tenor of transatlantic relations.

NATO, meanwhile, remains focused on deterrence and collective regional defense. With an emphasis on burden sharing and joint procurement of critical systems, the Alliance is rapidly expanding its combat-ready, forward-deployed forces in Poland and the Baltics, underpinned by a robust training and sustainment hub in Germany. The outcome of an ongoing US defense-posture review may drive additional modernization and deployment efforts, but this “fight tonight” readiness reflects NATO’s shared vow to defend European borders and ensure security. As NATO defense ministers have pointed out, these efforts demonstrate Europe’s increasing commitment to sharing the transatlantic defense load.

However, to truly succeed in its mission, NATO’s efforts must be underpinned by a data-driven approach. Modernization planning for its MDO strategy must integrate cutting-edge data analytics to ensure that defense initiatives are not only effective but responsive to the emerging threats of today and tomorrow. This strategy must be backed by a comprehensive Alliance-wide effort and a coordinated whole-of-government response to address NATO’s most pressing security challenges with agility and precision.

Europe stands at a critical juncture. There is potential tension inherent in Europe’s evolving commitment to strategic autonomy and strengthening NATO’s collective defense, as both ultimately rest on the ability to generate relevant, usable integrated capabilities. This demands a warfighting mindset, and an understanding of the acquisition, integration, and training required to be successful.

As Europe grapples with the challenges of an increasingly unpredictable world, the key question for NATO and collective defense will be what capabilities Europe can contribute to offer credible options to NATO. Success will hinge on how swiftly and effectively these efforts are coordinated and implemented, as they will significantly shape political decisions in the years ahead.

The war in Ukraine

Russia’s war on Ukraine has redrawn the European security map. It is a system-transforming conflict with asymmetric technology offsets, notably the emergence of drones and drone warfare. Regardless of the outcome, preexisting assumptions about transatlantic security and power distribution in Europe no longer hold. It is a litmus test for both NATO’s unity and the EU’s ability to sustain its support for Ukraine—especially as US military priorities shift toward Asia.

The coming months will be pivotal in determining how both institutions adapt to these pressures. NATO must reconcile the diverging priorities among its members, while the EU needs to strengthen its defense industrial base (DIB) to supply Ukraine, advance its own rearmament, and contribute to regional stability. As the crisis unfolds, the world will be watching how NATO and the EU respond—and whether they can navigate their internal divisions to confront the broader challenges ahead. Most of all, as the Trump administration endeavors to broker a ceasefire deal between Russia and Ukraine, the outcome of that process will likely be a defining factor in how the conflict unfolds in the coming months.

NATO’s cohesion is being put to the test, as the Trump administration’s pressure on allies to rearm generates a positive but uneven response. While some member states have stepped up defense spending, others remain hesitant, citing economic pressures and varying threat perceptions. The countries in the Baltic area and the Northeast Corridor have significantly increased their defense spending, while countries farther away from NATO’s eastern frontier have been less forthcoming. This divergence risks weakening unity and effectiveness. NATO must address internal tensions to remain a credible force.

The EU’s push to rearm is also being challenged. Economic strains, particularly in major European economies, threaten the EU’s ability to sustain a unified defense approach. The EU’s ambition to reduce dependency on the United States and bolster its defense capabilities is at risk unless it can harmonize the defense priorities of its member states. It also fails to address the most fundamental question of which country—absent a US nuclear umbrella—would provide a nuclear deterrent and in what fashion. This highlights the critical need for the EU to present a cohesive yet realistic program to address a dynamic regional and global security environment. While NATO remains the cornerstone of collective defense and deterrence in Europe, the EU can and must play a complementary role by strengthening defense industrial capacity, improving military mobility, and reinforcing political cohesion across the continent. The EU must use the financial and regulatory levers at its disposal to enable member states to meet their key capability requirements, as defined by NATO planning.

With the Ukraine conflict exposing vulnerabilities, NATO’s reinforced presence in the Baltic area and Poland has never been more essential. These regions are key to deterring further aggression and ensuring that European borders remain secure. At the same time, the war’s impact on energy security and global supply chains has pushed Europe to rethink its transition to green energy. No longer willing to rely on Russian energy, European nations are diversifying their sources and debating the future of clean energy initiatives. Some EU members have mooted the idea of reopening the Nord Stream pipelines and at least partially normalizing economic relations with Russia once a ceasefire in Ukraine has been put in place. But Europe’s challenges go beyond energy: NATO and the EU face the rise of hybrid warfare, autonomous systems and drone warfare, cyber threats, and false information campaigns—all of which undermine stability and test the Alliance’s adaptability.

Defense spending dilemmas, shrinking and fragmented defense industries

As global security challenges intensify, both US and European DIBs are grappling with serious capacity and scalability issues. The US DIB, now only 30 percent of its Cold War size, is strained by contractor consolidation and growing supply-chain vulnerabilities. Europe’s defense sector remains fragmented, hampered by disconnected industrial policies that stifle cross-border collaboration and scalability, with lead times from orders to delivery still unacceptably long.

To maintain strategic readiness and counter growing threats, both the United States and Europe must urgently come up with bold solutions:

• Modular, scalable production facilities and additive manufacturing must be prioritized to rapidly adapt to shifting demands.
• A significant boost in munition manufacturing capacity is needed to sustain large-scale conflict operations.
• Cybersecurity enhancements across industrial and critical infrastructure networks are paramount to safeguard against emerging digital threats.
• The integration of artificial intelligence (AI), robotics, and autonomous systems will empower defense forces to deliver rapid effects with minimal manpower.
• Improved NATO coordination and interoperability are essential to ensure defense production is optimized, maximizing collective industrial capacity.

In President Donald Trump’s second term, the United States faces a critical defense spending dilemma exacerbated by fiscal constraints, military recruitment challenges, and the demands of potential simultaneous conflicts in both the Atlantic and Pacific theaters. These factors present significant risks to NATO, transatlantic relations, and global security. To address these challenges, NATO must move from the perennial talk about burden sharing to burden shifting and focus on transferring conventional combat capabilities from the United States to Europe. This shift will require deeper military integration and force modernization to maintain NATO’s effectiveness against growing threats from Russia and China. The United States must capitalize on its technological advantages while strengthening cooperation with European and Indo-Pacific allies. This approach will ensure the United States can balance its global commitments and continue to take the lead in maintaining international security. As a result, NATO’s collective defense efforts will remain robust amid evolving geopolitical pressures. In a nutshell, technology must be a critical force multiplier for the Alliance, helping to offset at least some of Russia’s advantage in mass.

Since its founding, NATO has depended on US leadership and military power. With the United States less able to provide the same level of conventional forces and infrastructure in Europe as it did during the Cold War and the 2000s, key NATO members—particularly Germany, France, and the United Kingdom—will have to significantly ramp up defense spending and military readiness. The key challenge will be to ensure that the EU doesn’t veer into a full-blown “strategic autonomy” project, as that would inevitably drain real resources from NATO. Instead, efforts at deeper European defense industrial integration should allow Europe to take greater responsibility for its security by resourcing core conventional deterrence capabilities within NATO, while still benefiting from US strategic support. In this new landscape, NATO’s collective defense would benefit, as regional defense plans would be backed by real, exercised capabilities—ensuring NATO is once again up to the task. Should the opposite happen—i.e., if Germany decides to push the EU to chart an independent course from the United States—the ensuing stresses in transatlantic relations would further fracture European politics and likely make the continent more vulnerable to Russian blackmail or all-out aggression down the line.

European NATO nations have pledged to increase defense spending to 2 percent of gross domestic product, and many exceed that benchmark. Yet current European force posture in the Baltic states and elsewhere in the Northeast Corridor is insufficient to deter or respond to a rapid Russian incursion without significant external reinforcement. NATO needs to:

• Approach European rearmament in a way that builds credible, multidomain, combat-ready formations while keeping the United States engaged.
• Conduct a comprehensive review of capabilities and gaps (where the United States is engaged) to inform future force design and new operational concepts and doctrine to underpin collective defense.
• Develop a capability roadmap that enables burden sharing across the Alliance.

The view within NATO: What the Alliance needs by 2027

In response to Russia’s expanding capabilities, NATO has embraced a deterrence-by-denial posture, focusing on MDO to counteract aggression. This includes deploying forward forces, pre-positioning critical equipment, and developing operational concepts that prioritize holding the line and achieving rapid victory. Success will depend on massed effects and orchestrated battlefield efforts, with the unique strengths of each NATO member synchronized to support one another.

To counter emerging threats, NATO must urgently strengthen its logistical networks and mobility, ensuring rapid reinforcement of its eastern borders. Investment in key north-south road and rail corridors to enhance mobility along the eastern flank—from Scandinavia to the Baltic and Black seas—is essential for seamless troop and resource movement. Equally critical are interoperable C2 systems, designed with a data-centric, on-demand capability approach. These systems must integrate multidomain forces across nations, services, and echelons to maintain cohesion and operational effectiveness. To meet these challenges, NATO must modernize its infrastructure and adopt a wartime mindset, focusing on resilience, readiness, and strategic investments in critical capabilities. The Alliance must establish the necessary authorities to institutionally act with specific member states working in tandem with the EU to invest in critical infrastructure upgrades that support NATO operational requirements.

Russia’s military modernization efforts include enhancing unmanned systems for ISR and attack operations, networked fires, advanced weapons like hypersonic missiles, and robust cyber capabilities. Coupled with hybrid tactics such as false information campaigns, cyber-attacks, and sabotage, Russia poses an increasingly complex threat—especially with its use of “gray zone” strategies designed to blur the lines between conventional and irregular warfare. To counter these threats, NATO must be able to rapidly mobilize and deploy forces, emphasizing massed effects and MDO to blunt Russia’s initial momentum. The first seventy-two hours are critical, as Russia would aim to quickly seize territory and key infrastructure. Denying Russia these early operational gains could provide a critical off-ramp to avoid a protracted conflict. The following operational needs are key to NATO’s success:

• Track and target key Russian units by using advanced C2 and ISR capabilities, holding them at risk before conflict escalates.
• Surge reinforcements to hot spots through enhanced rapid deployment mechanisms as tensions rise.
• Deploy highly lethal forces, supported by unmanned systems, to halt Russian advances at the point of contact, using well-coordinated defensive positions and preplaced forces.
• Counterattack through multidomain orchestration and converged effects, targeting Russian C2 and employing anti-armor and long-range precision fires systems to disrupt rapid advances.
• Build integrated, trained formations capable of maneuvering and attacking Russian forces, logistics, and C2 systems to reclaim territory and reestablish international boundaries.

NATO must continue to strengthen its forward combat-ready presence with balanced rotational and permanently stationed forces, while investing in fires and defensive capabilities that provide a reinforcement window from the United States and other NATO nations. Critical to ensuring deterrence by denial is the top-down commitment from member states to operationalize multidomain C2, NATO’s unified networking and digital infrastructure.

Building an effective NATO force design

The Alliance must ensure that procured systems are the right systems based on regional plans, capability targets, and desired mission effects and work together seamlessly to create an integrated and interoperable multidomain force. To that end, NATO must:

• Deploy multinational MDO groups with shared ISR, C2, and kinetic/nonkinetic fires to overwhelm Russian forces and halt their advance.
• Expand integrated air and missile defense systems to counter advanced threats, including drones.
• Enhance rapid deployment and mobility through improved multimodal transport corridors and strategic airlift capabilities.
• Implement layered force protection and counter-mobility measures along NATO’s borders, buying time for multidomain forces to strike Russian formations deep inside their territory.
• Pre-position critical supplies (ammunition, fuel, heavy equipment) along the eastern flank.
• Invest in pooled and shared resources across member states, particularly in high-tech areas like satellite communications, drones, AI, and surveillance platforms.
• Invest in integrated training and experimentation to create strategic deterrence.

Establishing a NATO multidomain operations strategy

NATO’s ability to conduct effective MDO has never been more crucial. To counter Russia’s expanding military capabilities, NATO must integrate and leverage all domains—land, air, sea, cyber, and space—into a unified, cohesive strategy. MDO allow NATO to rapidly respond, disrupt enemy operations, and maintain strategic advantage. By improving interoperability, developing common standards, and building a seamless digital ecosystem, NATO can enhance its operational effectiveness and ensure rapid, coordinated action across all member nations. To counter Russia’s aggression and to reinforce its role as the cornerstone of global security, NATO must put forward an MDO strategy focused on a range of critical capabilities:

• A next-generation multidomain C2 system: This system must integrate all operational domains—land, sea, air, space, and cyber—into a single, unified interface for commanders. It should be fully interoperable across NATO member states and their national C2 architectures, enabling seamless cross-domain integration and battlefield orchestration, regardless of time, geography, or mission requirements.
• Integrated multidomain C2 operations centers: Within NATO’s multinational divisions, corps, and joint force commands, these centers can help to integrate situational awareness of national forces. Progress must continue to enable them to be networked to orchestrate operations across all domains, ensuring quick, coordinated action.
• Integrated ISR fusion centers: These centers must break down information-sharing barriers and integrate intelligence from multiple domains to provide real-time, actionable insights that are essential for swift decision making that enables expanded maneuver and cross-domain fires.
• AI (algorithmic warfare): AI will be pivotal in predictive analytics, persistent targeting, effects planning, and operational decision support. These algorithms can enhance decision making by providing commanders with insights on potential outcomes and courses of action.
• Cyber-resilient digital architectures: The zero-trust model secures critical systems and data by minimizing attack surfaces, enforcing least-privilege access, and enabling resilient, segmented networks. NATO’s digital infrastructure must employ this cybersecurity model to be protected from adversarial attacks that could disrupt or manipulate critical data, AI algorithms, and operational capabilities, ensuring system integrity and operational continuity.
• Autonomous systems: Leveraging low cost, expendable systems for reconnaissance, targeting, maneuver, lethal and nonlethal fires, and logistical support will significantly increase operational efficiency and reduce risks to personnel in contested environments.
• Unified networking and digital infrastructure: A data-centric approach will enable plug-and-play software development tailored to mission needs, ensuring NATO’s digital systems remain agile and responsive to emerging threats.

NATO must prioritize systems thinking, integration, and data interoperability within a unified, multidomain digital architecture. This approach is vital to ensuring that collective defense and deterrence capabilities are effective and adaptable to the complexities of modern warfare. These measures can significantly enhance NATO’s deterrence posture by leveraging technology to achieve mass and counter emerging threats. Success hinges on developing common standards, fostering interoperability across national systems, and creating a robust digital ecosystem that facilitates seamless data flow and decision making.

Envisioning NATO’s future through mission engineering

The United States and NATO must make smarter, faster decisions about what capabilities to acquire and how to integrate them within an multidomain force design. Every acquisition and force-development decision should be driven by a clear understanding of why it’s needed, when it’s needed, where it will be deployed, and what mission outcomes are expected. Only by focusing on these key factors can NATO build the warfighting capability and capacity needed for future success within the urgent timelines required.

NATO force modernization is not just about increasing defense spending—it is about spending smarter and optimizing the resources in hand more effectively. Regardless of spending levels, NATO must shift from a national-centric approach to an Alliance-wide mindset. This requires a shared engineering and analytics methodology to optimize defense resource allocations with a focus on speed, precision, and collaboration.

By investing in forward-deployed forces, integrated air and missile defense, multidomain warfare enabled by integrated C2 and ISR, autonomous systems, and resilient logistics, European NATO nations can strengthen deterrence and response capabilities—without relying on immediate US military intervention.

NATO, especially NATO European nations, must rapidly transform warfighting concepts and capabilities to counter a resurgent Russian threat by 2027. This demands agile decision making and investment in technological innovation, seamless integration, and interoperability—all essential to generate combat mass and achieve dominance in multidomain warfare.

MITRE’s data-driven, systems-thinking approach coupled with the Atlantic Council’s Euro-Atlantic strategic knowledge revolutionizes multidomain force design by combining scenario-based mission engineering and operational analysis. Known as the NATO Force Mix Analysis, this powerful methodology assesses and optimizes military force structures, C2, ISR, and fires architectures, all aligned with strategic capability options in a threat-driven context to help inform coordinated, future-ready investment strategies across the Alliance.

If broadly adopted, the NFMA can help NATO—especially European members—accelerate capability development, respond more effectively to current and emerging threats, and validate new technologies through continuous, real-world analysis and experimentation. This, in turn, would enable faster deployment of critical systems and smarter operational decisions. Specifically, the NFMA could support NATO in the following ways:

• Inform early deployment of experimental platforms and operational concepts. Prototypes will be evaluated in both live exercises and fielded operational environments to test performance, uncover capability gaps, and refine tactics. This would enable NATO to assess the real-world effectiveness of emerging technologies and operational concepts before full-scale integration.
• Provide the foundation for continuous testing and evaluation of tactics, techniques, and procedures in varied operational scenarios. Through persistent experimentation, NATO will remain adaptable, learning and evolving in response to new threats and opportunities for innovation.
• Enable rapid development and procurement of new capabilities to ensure NATO can meet evolving defense needs. Employing open architectures and agile acquisition for fielding critical capabilities will reduce time to implementation and enhance operational flexibility.
• Help NATO collectively identify and field the right combination of force structures, technologies, and operational strategies to strengthen its deterrence posture while maintaining agility and readiness. Through mission engineering, operational prototyping, persistent experimentation, and agile acquisition, NATO can test new capabilities and refine operational strategies to ensure sustained deterrence and rapid response in the Baltic region.

The Alliance must assess and adapt its force mix to operate in a contested, multidomain environment. The following analytic questions are critical to guiding NATO’s posture, readiness, and resilience amid evolving threats and uncertain US. force commitments.

• How can NATO combat readiness and forward presence be improved?
• How can NATO establish a resilient, multidomain C2 and ISR architecture and how does NATO best offset a reduction in US commitment of its capability and capacity?
  • How resilient is European C3 and ISR under cyber and kinetic attack?
  • What data integration and decision processes enable NATO unity and speed?
• How can NATO improve persistent targeting and lethality?
  • How can NATO establish a joint fires network?
  • What is the role of AI and autonomous systems in targeting and lethality?
• What is required for integrated air and missile defense (including counter-unmanned aircraft systems) to hold the line?
• What is required for NATO to successfully execute contested logistics forward in the battlespace? Can NATO sustain thirty-plus days of combat operations without US strategic lift, theater lift, and logistics assets and expertise?

The NATO 2027 use case: Insights and priorities

Initial insights from the NFMA underscore several operational priorities critical to NATO Europe’s ability to independently deter or defeat a Russian offensive in the Baltic region by 2027, particularly in scenarios with limited or delayed US engagement. These insights highlight the importance of integrating advanced fires, mobility, survivability, and C2 capabilities into a cohesive, MDO concept.

Key findings and operational priorities include:

• Countering Russian mass and tempo with integrated fires: NATO must pair long-range precision fires with close-combat drone swarms to disrupt and degrade Russian force concentration and tempo. This layered approach enhances survivability while enabling rapid effects across the depth of the battlespace.
• Persistent targeting via multidomain fires and C2 networks: Success in a high-threat environment requires a persistent, integrated “kill chain” linking ISR, C2, and fires across all domains. NATO must be capable of delivering operational-level fires from standoff range to neutralize Russian anti-access/area-denial systems, command nodes, and massed maneuver forces within key mobility corridors.
• Overmatch in mobility, countermobility, and survivability: NATO forces must dominate the terrain through superior mobility and countermobility operations, creating choke points and engagement zones that slow Russian advances and funnel them into preplanned kill boxes. Critical targeting priorities include Russian combat engineering units that enable cross-country movement and breaching operations, in addition to traditional C2 and logistics nodes.
• Integrated, layered force protection and terrain shaping: A combination of physical border fortifications, camouflaged forward positions, and active defense systems is required to delay Russian momentum and generate tactical opportunities—creating conditions for NATO forces to strike with precision anti-armor fires, loitering munitions, and coordinated drone swarms, especially at choke points and terrain seams.

These insights reinforce the need for NATO to invest in operational prototyping, joint experimentation, and rapid fielding of advanced fires and survivability capabilities. Implementing these priorities through a data-driven, mission-engineering approach will ensure NATO Europe is postured for success in a contested, near-peer conflict environment.

Recommendations

Building on the operational insights from the NFMA, the following recommendations are aimed at enabling NATO Europe to independently deter, respond to, and potentially defeat Russian aggression in the Baltic states by 2027. These measures are designed to accelerate capability development, institutional reforms, and operational integration in line with a forward-leaning, data-informed, mission-engineering framework.

• Prepare a warfighting burden-sharing roadmap: NATO must develop a capability roadmap that enables burden sharing and, where appropriate, burden transfer from the United States to Europe for critical warfighting capabilities while addressing gaps to achieve threat overmatch.
• Establish a unified NATO multidomain warfare doctrine: Develop and implement a multidomain operational concept, aligning land, air, maritime, cyber, and space operations across regional defense plans and force structures.
• Invest in multidomain C2 and ISR infrastructure: Build a resilient, interoperable digital architecture to support real-time C2, dynamic targeting, and cross-domain ISR sharing among allies.
• Establish a NATO multidomain open system architecture: Create an open system test and experimentation architecture to drive C2 interoperability and rapid deployment based on mission and user need.
• Accelerate forward posture of heavy forces and IAMD: Pre-position armored units and layered air and missile defenses in key forward areas to enable rapid combat mass and early crisis response.
• Enhance military mobility and industrial coordination: Improve cross-border military transit and align defense industrial base efforts for surge production of critical systems and munitions.
• Establish additional joint ISR fusion centers: Set up additional ISR hubs in Germany, Poland, and Finland that build on existing Baltic centers to provide persistent battlespace awareness and theater-level targeting.
• Develop a pan-European logistics control network: Create a secure, integrated logistics system to sustain operations under contested conditions, incorporating civilian and military infrastructure.
• Form MDO and cyber/influence task forces: Deploy specialized units to coordinate cross-domain fires and information operations, supported by integration cells at corps and division levels.
• Conduct no-notice Article 5 rehearsal war games (without US surge forces): Routinely execute unscripted, short-notice multinational exercises to test NATO’s ability to respond to aggression under Article 5. Use outcomes to inform force posture and capability investments.
• Build a NATO integrated training and validation program: The joint training architecture, in coordination with Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, will validate unit readiness and interoperability in line with the 2027 vision. This program should emphasize realistic, threat-informed scenarios and integration of new technologies and concepts.

Conclusion

To maintain NATO’s deterrence credibility and defend national sovereignty in the face of a reconstituted Russian threat, Europe must assume greater responsibility and operational capability. Achieving this NATO Europe 2027 vision requires more than policy alignment—it demands a mission-driven, technically grounded approach to force design, readiness, and modernization. In support of operationalizing this vision, the MITRE–Atlantic Council collaboration on the NATO Force Mix Analysis offers a reusable, scalable technical framework to guide strategic defense decisions through 2027 and beyond.

This framework integrates advanced digital engineering tools, mission-level modeling, and decision analytics to continuously evaluate NATO’s defense needs, mission requirements, and acquisition priorities in a dynamic threat environment. It provides a rigorous, evidence-based foundation for aligning strategy with capability development—supporting faster, smarter, and more resilient force planning across European allies.

Key enablers of the NATO 2027 vision include:

• Mission-driven analysis: NFMA supports an ongoing assessment of force mix options aligned with strategic objectives, enabling nations to prioritize investments that close capability gaps and build operational mass.
• Digital engineering and modeling: High-fidelity simulation and modeling environments allow planners to visualize and evaluate operational concepts, logistics, and reinforcement timelines under contested conditions—before investments are made.
• Operational prototyping and experimentation: The NFMA approach enables early testing of new operational concepts and technologies through simulation, live exercises, and real-world experimentation—de-risking decisions and informing doctrine.
• Agile acquisition support: Insights from the NFMA can guide iterative acquisition decisions, accelerating the deployment of high-impact capabilities such as ISR, integrated air defense, mobility assets, and interoperable C2 systems.

Scott Lee is the chief engineer for multidomain operations and C2 at MITRE. In this role, he leads MITRE’s efforts to develop solutions that address the defense challenges and operational requirements of next-generation command and control and enabling systems in support of US and allied and partner warfighting concepts. He previously led MITRE’s Joint All-Domain C2 (JADC2) Cross-Cutting Priority.

Andrew Michta is a senior fellow in the GeoStrategy Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and the former dean of the College of International and Security Studies at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. He holds a PhD in international relations from Johns Hopkins University. His areas of expertise include international security, NATO, and European politics and security, with a special focus on Central Europe and the Baltic states.

Peter Jones retired from the Army as a brigadier general and is a contract engineer at MITRE, providing broad support to the Army portfolio especially in the area of future concept development and experimentation in support of Training & Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and now predominately Army Future Command’s Future Concept Center. Prior to his retirement, Jones served for two years as the U.S. Army Infantry School Commandant and 56th Chief of Infantry.

Lisa Bembenick is the executive director of international security affairs for MITRE. She is responsible for MITRE’s international strategy and senior level relationships on defense issues related to the United States, Europe, and NATO, and positions MITRE to bring its technical capabilities to bear on critical security outcomes faced by NATO countries. She was previously director of strategy for MITRE’s National Security Engineering Center.

As part of their strategic partnership, the Atlantic Council and MITRE have conducted a NATO Force Mix Analysis, examining ways to harden the Alliance’s eastern flank, measure the value of multidomain operations, and deter Russian aggression. This paper is jointly produced by the Atlantic Council and MITRE.

MITRE and the Atlantic Council gratefully acknowledge Meg Adams, Greg Crawford, LeAnne Howard, Jackson Ludwig, and Matt McKaig for their valuable contributions to the publication of this paper.

The authors would also like to thank Paul O’Donnell, Lori Fermano, Phillippe Dickinson, Sheila Gagen, Bailey Galicia, and Sydney Sherry for their editorial assistance.

Issue Brief Feb 20, 2025

Issue brief: A NATO strategy for countering Russia

By Ian Brzezinski, Ryan Arick

Russia poses the most direct and growing threat to NATO member states’ security. This threat now includes the war in Ukraine, militarization in the Arctic, hybrid warfare, and arms control violations. Despite NATO’s military and economic superiority, a unified and effective strategy is essential to counter Russia’s aggression.

Cybersecurity Defense Technologies

Issue Brief Mar 31, 2025

Why NATO’s Defence Planning Process will transform the Alliance for decades to come

By Angus Lapsley and Pierre Vandier

NATO’s successes over the last seventy-six years are the result of constant adaptation, and the Alliance is now going through its most profound changes since the end of the Cold War.

Europe & Eurasia International Organizations

New Atlanticist Mar 13, 2025

NATO’s capability development: A call for urgent reform

By David Julazadeh

NATO must make major reforms to streamline its capability development process if the Alliance is to keep up with the pace of modern warfare.

Defense Industry Defense Policy

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

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On June 2, Rob Murray, non-resident senior fellow at Forward Defense and the Transatlantic Security Initiative, appeared on Sky News to offer his insights on the UK’s Strategic Defence Review. Murray emphasized the importance of re-drawing financial architectures and increasing credit flow into supply chains to effectively finance the Review’s ambitious armament procurement goals.

Fellow

Rob Murray

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Defense Policy

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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The Transatlantic Security Initiative, in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, shapes and influences the debate on the greatest security challenges facing the North Atlantic Alliance and its key partners.

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The consensus at the Istanbul meeting was clear: The US-Turkey relationship was poised for further improvement. This expectation was based not only on the historically positive relationship between President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and President Trump, but also on their shared approach to foreign policy: pragmatic, transactional, and focused on strategic economic and security interests. Yet, four months later, the transatlantic security landscape has again undergone a dramatic shift.

Trump’s foreign policy signals a shift toward burden sharing among NATO allies, prompting European nations to assume greater defense responsibilities and reconsider US defense partnerships. This shift has forced European leaders to take greater responsibility for their own security needs, significantly increasing pressure on NATO members to boost defense spending to 5 percent of gross domestic product—a level that many European governments had previously resisted. As a result, European defense markets are undergoing a transformation. European countries, once heavily dependent on the United States for defense procurement, are now directing increased defense spending toward their domestic industries rather than US firms. This is evidenced by the decline in US defense stocks and the rise in European defense stocks in recent months.

For US defense firms, this presents both a challenge and an opportunity. If American companies want to remain competitive in the European market, they might be well-served to partner with Turkish firms to access European domestic procurement programs. Turkish defense firms, already well-integrated with NATO supply chains, provide an ideal platform for US companies to keep a foothold in Europe. Turkish manufacturers like Baykar, Aselsan, and Roketsan produce cost-effective, high-quality systems that European nations increasingly need. The Repkon USA partnership is just the first step, and other joint ventures could enable US firms to leverage Turkey’s industrial base while meeting Europe’s demand for non-American suppliers.

Over the past month, European defense stocks have outperformed US defense stocks due to concerns over NATO’s future following Trump’s remarks suggesting the United States might not defend allies that do not meet spending targets. This has driven European nations to accelerate defense investments, with spending projected to rise dramatically. Countries across Europe are prioritizing domestic production to reduce reliance on US suppliers, while Turkey is expanding its defense industrial base and exploring partnerships with US firms. As a result, US defense companies are seeing declines in value amid expectations that European nations will shift procurement away from direct US purchases in favor of European suppliers.

Turkey’s role as an energy hub and regional leader is becoming more critical, serving as a key transit point for resources from Iraq, the Caspian region, and the Eastern Mediterranean to Europe. The expected reopening of the Iraq-Turkey Pipeline (ITP) and the potential expansion of Trans-Caspian energy routes further reinforce Turkey’s strategic importance. In March, Turkey reinforced its regional energy leadership as Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar met with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani to discuss resuming Kurdish oil exports and exporting Basra oil via the Iraq-Turkey pipeline. With the United States revoking Iraq’s waiver to import Iranian electricity, talks also focused on expanding Turkey’s electricity and gas supplies to Iraq. In Erbil, Bayraktar and Kurdistan Region Prime Minister Masrour Barzani agreed to remove barriers to Kurdish oil exports through Turkey’s Ceyhan port. These efforts reflect Turkey’s strategy to deepen regional energy ties and enhance regional energy security. As US firms look to offset margin pressures at home, investment in Turkey’s energy sector will only increase, aligning with Ankara’s ambitions to diversify its energy partnerships and solidify its role as a key transit hub for Europe.

The Trump administration’s focus on reducing inflation by lowering oil prices has also had significant consequences for global energy markets. As expectations for cheaper oil rise, many US producers are hesitant to expand domestic drilling, knowing that lower prices will reduce their profit margins. Instead, US energy firms are seeking new markets abroad, with Turkey, Iraq, and Libya emerging as key investment destinations. Recent deals underscore this trend, including the Continental Resources-TPAO partnership, which will explore and develop unconventional energy resources, and the ExxonMobil-BOTAS liquified natural gas agreement, which expands gas trade between the two countries.

The US-Turkey relationship is evolving in response to shifting transatlantic dynamics in defense and energy. The withdrawal of US financial and intelligence support for Ukraine amid Trump’s ceasefire push, later restored, pushed European nations toward self-reliance, creating both risks and opportunities for American defense firms. To maintain access to European defense markets, US companies will need to adapt by forming strategic partnerships including with Turkish firms. At the same time, the changing energy landscape is driving American energy firms to invest in Turkey and the broader region, ensuring continued economic ties between the two nations. While geopolitical tensions remain, defense and energy cooperation offer a pragmatic path forward for US-Turkey relations in this new era.

Few things are simple in US-Turkish relations, and the current environment presents obstacles as well as opportunities. Tariff effects on transatlantic trade remain uncertain in the first half of 2025, including in the area of defense industrial cooperation, though for now it seems the 10 percent tariff on Turkey may end up being relatively advantageous compared to some markets. The instinct to localize and nationalize industrial production in both the United States and Turkey represents something of a headwind for larger projects. Domestic political unrest in Turkey may also create caution in Washington or hesitance among US firms out of concern over instability impacting Turkish markets or suppliers.

Yet these concerns, while real and significant, do not outweigh the glaring and growing need that prompted formation of the ATBR. Greater US-Turkey engagement is essential for maintaining US strategic influence in NATO, European defense markets, and regional energy security; that engagement also facilitates supply chain resilience and surge capacity for future military contingencies.

Congress would be wise to support deeper defense industrial cooperation, including joint production agreements, to keep US firms competitive in Europe and engaged with Turkey. Strengthening US investment in Turkey’s energy sector would bolster transatlantic energy security and reduce reliance on adversarial suppliers. Additionally, renewed high-level diplomatic and security dialogues would help counterbalance Russian and Chinese influence while ensuring long-term US economic and security interests. A stronger US-Turkey partnership is not just beneficial—it is in many ways a strategic necessity.

Gregory Bloom is a senior advisor at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Turkey Program. He also serves as the chief operating officer of Jones Group International (JGI).

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Geopolitical shaping events

Momentous geopolitical events since our winter issue have included the advent of Donald Trump’s second term as US president, the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, and the apparent revelation in Europe that conventional military defense is a sovereign responsibility that cannot be outsourced in perpetuity. These events have had significant implications for the security of NATO, Turkey, and the United States.

Trump’s return has had several immediate effects on the United States (and thus the global) security environment. His approach narrows the US global mission from maintaining a liberal world order to pursuing US national interests, while adopting a tone of strategic ambiguity toward both rivals and allies. He has simultaneously directed reform of the US military to reemphasize combat readiness and lethality while minimizing social or ideological programs. As commander in chief, Trump has directed US soldiers to conduct counterterror strikes in places like Somalia and Yemen even as his negotiators seek to defuse conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza, and elsewhere.

The fall of Bashar al-Assad after an eleven-day rebel offensive reshaped the strategic map of the Middle East. Iran lost a valuable strategic position in its multidimensional “resistance” against Israel and Western influence. Russia lost its sunk investment in Assad and a degree of its influence in the Middle East. Turkey has gained greater stability on its southern border, close defense and intelligence ties with the new Syrian authorities, and prospects for expanded regional trade and a leading role in Syrian reconstruction. The challenges of stabilizing Syria, and tensions between Israel and Turkey stemming from their respective threat perceptions, have no immediate or apparent solution, and will require deft diplomacy to manage.

Shifts that might have attracted more attention in other times were easy to miss, but still noteworthy in terms of global security. China and Russia took steps to bolster the military junta in Myanmar that is teetering on the edge of collapse against a rebel coalition. Battles between the Sudanese army (backed by Egypt, Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia) and the antigovernment Rapid Support Forces (supported by Russia and the United Arab Emirates) have shifted decisively in favor of the army, though not yet presaging an end to the civil war. The war in Ukraine grinds on amid serious attempts by Trump to forge a ceasefire. Early 2025 continues to be an era of persistent conflict and great power competition, but one with dramatic developments that will echo throughout this and future years.

Strategic alliance development

International patterns of alliance and armament over the past half-year have reflected the weight of geopolitical changes noted above. Deep and effective US support to Ukraine’s defense against Russian aggression has led to a tighter convergence of what has been referred to as the axis of upheaval, with China, Iran, and North Korea sending weapons, supplies, and even soldiers to aid the Russian war effort. A dozen or more other countries have provided diplomatic support to Moscow, but these three have become critical suppliers of weapons and cash for the Kremlin. This is a trend that began before 2024, but has only accelerated in recent months.

The global arms market continues to shift in other significant ways. The United States in 2024 cemented its leading position in arms exports, accounting for 43 percent of global exports. Russian exports have sharply decreased as domestic production has been consumed by the ongoing war in Ukraine. Italy and Turkey have more than doubled their national shares of global exports over the past several years (2 percent to 4.8 percent for Italy and 0.8 percent to 1.7 percent for Turkey). Five Turkish defense firms rank among the one hundred largest in the world—and a sixth, Baykar, would almost certainly be high on the list if all of its sales data were publicly released. Only the United States, China, Germany, and the United Kingdom match or exceed this number. Of particular note has been the continued rise in demand for Turkish armaments from Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar.  

Europe, for its part, has shown signs of finally getting serious about developing its own conventional military deterrent vis-à-vis Russia—or at least talking about doing so. Shocked by Trump’s heavy-handed conditionality on future aid to Ukraine, Brussels and its member states have drawn up plans for massive new defense spending and other deterrent steps—if taxpayers and military-age youth prove willing. Yet the European Union’s initial formulation of deterrence against Russia independent of Washington and without integrating Turkish geography, military capabilities, and strategic resources does not inspire confidence, especially given the long years needed to restore defense industrial capacity even assuming consistent commitment. European firms and national leaders would do well to welcome Turkish contributions to European defense planning and resourcing both in NATO and in EU planning by following through on plans to sell Ankara Eurofighters and encouraging more collaboration like that between Italy’s Leonardo and Turkey’s Baykar.

While the past half year has demonstrated volatility at the geopolitical and political levels, it has brought multipolarity and diffusion of power at the strategic level. This has played out in the evolution of alliances and the flow of arms and trade more broadly. In mid-2024 dualistic constructs (autocracy versus democracy, the US-led Alliance against an axis of evil) retained some utility. The current environment is messier, with issue-specific coalitions and transactional diplomacy creating a kaleidoscope of rivals, partners, and targets that, for now at least, deny predictable patterns and lead some to question the credibility of the international system’s most potent actor.

Operational trends

As geopolitics and alliances continue to evolve, so, too, does war in operational terms. In a world with ongoing “hot wars” in Ukraine, the Middle East, Africa, and elsewhere, several discernible trends can be identified. These include diminishing returns for artillery as seen in Ukraine, failure to achieve military victory through ground maneuver forces for Russia and Israel, and the fragility of lightly armed proxy forces in various theaters.

Russia since 2022 has compensated for shortcomings in its infantry, armor, and air forces through reliance on superior tube and rocket artillery, exacting a heavy toll on Ukrainian defenders in the process. Yet in late 2024, losses among Russian artillery units rose as Ukrainian drone tactics and counterbattery fire became more effective. While Russia still outproduces NATO in artillery ammunition and continues to fire it at prodigious rates, its advantage is decreasing in relative terms.

Russia has continued to advance at high cost to try and consolidate control over the nearly 20 percent of Ukrainian territory it occupies, but has failed to end the war via ground maneuver after three years. The difficulty of ending wars through ground maneuver even against inferior opponents can also be seen in Gaza, where operations which have continued for eighteen months are not yet meeting the stated war goals of military and political leaders. Both the Russian and Israeli campaigns reflect the historical difficulty of reconciling the political nature of conflict termination with the operational conduct of wars, and a resultant tendency for destructive wars to yield stalemate when that task remains incomplete.

The recent period produced impressive operational results in other cases, notably Israel’s campaign against Iran’s regional proxy network and the Sudanese army’s efforts to regain control of the national capital region from the insurgent Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia. In late 2024 Israel crippled Lebanese Hezbollah and struck Iranian-supported militia targets in Syria and Iraq during an audacious campaign involving air strikes, ground maneuver, and exploding cellphones. Between November 2024 and March 2025 the Sudanese Army routed the RSF from Khartoum and other areas in central Sudan. The RSF had been supported by a number of foreign sponsors, including the United Arab Emirates and several other regional countries, but ultimately failed to achieve local or regional legitimacy—as had the Iranian proxy groups in Lebanon and Syria, and arguably in Iraq and Yemen as well. The past several months have badly undermined the notion popular over the past decade that proxy wars can effectively “enable intervention on the cheap.”

Military technical developments on the horizon

Over the past several months sixth-generation fighter aircraft have moved from concept to reality. China flew two prototypes in December 2024, one produced by Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group and the other by AVIC Shenyang Aircraft. US prototypes for a Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) aircraft have been under evaluation since 2020, but in March 2025 the Boeing F-47 was officially selected as the program’s platform. A half-dozen other countries have done some sixth-generation work—integrating advanced stealth, artificial intelligence, manned-unmanned teaming, and other advanced technologies—though even for those with the deepest pockets, fourth- and fifth-generation aircraft will be mainstays for the foreseeable future.

Artificial intelligence is a growing element in military planning and readiness. While the United States and many of its allies have endorsed the Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy, many potential adversaries and rivals have not. Military applications for AI focus at present on information processing, threat identification, and decision-making, areas in which the United States has relative advantage. The Department of Defense’s Defense Innovation Unit is implementing a project, Thunderforge, to deploy such capabilities to headquarters in Asia and Europe. The military services each have designated units to test concepts and systems related to AI in the field. The drive to develop effective defenses against small unmanned aerial systems (UAS) has gained urgency with the continued broad proliferation of cheap, easy-to-use, lethal UAS around the world. The December 2024 Department of Defense adoption of a classified strategy to accelerate counter-UAS development signals the rising criticality of the need for cost-effective and combat-effective counters to the cheap and plentiful threat. This is an area ripe for technical development and fielding in the near future.

Adaptive Alliance

The shifting dynamics at all these levels—geopolitical, strategic, operational, and technical—shape the contours of defense and security challenges for the United States and its NATO allies. These are certainly challenging times, yet the Alliance has endured for over seven decades through other chaotic and difficult periods because the basic value proposition of mutual defense among the members remains sound. Secretary General Mark Rutte strikes the right tone with his assessment that “there is no alternative to NATO” for either the United States or its partners, and that despite frictions related to burden sharing, domestic politics, and sometimes divergent national interest, NATO’s summit in The Hague in late June will show the Alliance evolving rather than dissolving.

Rich Outzen is a geopolitical consultant and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council in Turkey with thirty-two years of government service both in uniform and as a civilian. Follow him on X @RichOutzen.

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The Middle Corridor creates a strategic role for Turkey as a central energy hub connecting Europe to additional suppliers. The European Union (EU) has recently increased its interest and investment in the corridor. However, the United States is still sitting on the sidelines even though the Middle Corridor presents a vital opportunity to counterbalance Russian and Chinese dominance in the region and limit Iran’s desire to mitigate the effects of economic sanctions. Moreover, greater connectivity means access to Central Asia’s vast deposits of rare earth elements crucial for civilian and defense products, new energy, and information technology. As corridor countries seek to reach new markets and lessen their dependence on Russia and China, Turkey, the EU, and the United States share a common interest in increasing cooperation and counterbalancing the power of Russia and China.

The rise of trade corridors

Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the European Union faced unprecedented precarity and had to reconsider its energy structure to diminish its vulnerable interdependence on Russia’s asymmetrical control over pipelines and weaponization of energy. China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Europe’s urge for diversification increased the need for connectivity and shifted international attention toward trade corridors. As corridor wars intensify and become the new scene for great power competition, the United States needs a more assertive policy concerning Central Asia. This is especially true as the growing cooperation between Russia, China, Iran, and, to some extent, North Korea aims to challenge Western influence by building alternative trade routes aligned with their political agenda. Washington must actively engage in infrastructure initiatives across Central Asia to counterbalance this trend.

The Middle Corridor: A strategic alternative

The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), or the Middle Corridor, is a multimodal trade route connecting Europe and China via Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Turkey. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, its strategic importance has grown as it bypasses both Russia and Iran. The Middle Corridor relies primarily on existing rail and port infrastructure and requires further development and investment. Countries along its path are working to position it as an alternative to the Northern Corridor (the traditional route through Russia) and the Southern Corridor (which runs through Iran).

Before 2022, the Northern Corridor carried more than 86 percent of transport between Europe and China, while the Middle Corridor constituted less than 1 percent. Following the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Northern Corridor became a financial and political liability, especially for Western countries aiming to counter Russian control over trade routes. Shipping volumes of the Northern Corridor dropped by half in 2023 compared to 2022. Part of this traffic moved to the Middle Corridor, with increases of 89 percent and 70 percent in 2023 and 2024, respectively.

The Middle Corridor has many advantages. It is a relatively safer route, especially given the disruptions along the Northern Corridor due to Western sanctions on Russia and those in accessing the Suez Canal through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait due to increased Houthi attacks on vessels. In addition to providing economic revenues to corridor countries, some define the Middle Corridor as a “crossroads of peace,” echoing the “peace pipelines” strategy of the past.

According to the World Bank, by 2030, the Middle Corridor can reduce travel times, while freight volumes could triple to 11 million tonnes, with a 30 percent increase in trade between China and the EU. However, progress in the Middle Corridor is slow, and various operational and regulatory problems are causing unpredictable delays. There are still logistical and infrastructural challenges. Most importantly, its annual capacity (6 million tons in 2024) is drastically below the Northern Corridor’s annual capacity of over 100 million tons.

Corridor wars through connectivity

Recently, connectivity and diversification have become key drivers in international politics, with regional and global powers seeking to expand their influence in the Middle Corridor. Japan is following these developments to diversify its trade routes while countering Russia and China. Although the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is not yet a key player in the Middle Corridor, various summits between GCC and Central Asian countries since 2023 have manifested growing cooperation and increased GCC investments in the region’s infrastructure.

As the natural entry point into Europe, Turkey understood the importance of connectivity to sustain economic, commercial, and investment relations and political and cultural ties within the region. In line with its geostrategic location, Turkey has invested in many connectivity projects since the 1990s, such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, the International Transport Corridor, the Black Sea Ring Highway, the Eurasia Tunnel, the Yavuz Sultan Selim Bridge, the Edirne-Kars high-speed railway, and the Northern Marmara Motorway.

The Middle Corridor, as “the most reliable trade route between Asia and Europe,” presents Turkey with a historic opportunity to establish itself as a strategic transit hub in Europe-China trade. Diversifying its energy suppliers could reduce Russian influence in Turkey’s energy policy while expanding its influence in Central Asia and strengthening its economic ties with the EU. From the Turkish perspective, the corridor would improve its strategic position and strengthen its relations with Turkic-speaking countries in the region.

For the European Union, the Middle Corridor aligns with its Global Gateway strategy. The EU defined the development of the Middle Corridor as a priority to secure connectivity in the transport and energy sectors and promote sustainable economic growth in the region. While current global challenges increase the need for solid partnerships, Central Asia is a €340 billion economy, growing at an average rate of 5 percent annually, with further potential for collaboration. The EU sees the Middle Corridor as a fast and safer route connecting Europe and China, which helps diversify supply chains.

The Middle Corridor serving Russia, China, and Iran

For China, the development of the Middle Corridor is an opening to integrate into global markets and supply chains, an opportunity to reduce its financial burden and dependence on routes controlled by Russia, and also an escape from US sanctions.

Russia remains a major obstacle in developing the Middle Corridor. For regional countries,  Moscow would “do everything in its power to control overland trade flows.” While Russia is currently distracted with its war against Ukraine, considering Russia’s sensitivities, it will at some point want to disrupt Western involvement in the region or even exploit the corridor for its own benefit. Russia has already begun exploiting the Caspian Sea and Kazakhstan to bypass Western sanctions. Moscow aims to leverage the enhanced connectivity of the Caspian Sea for military purposes, including the transport of Shahed drones from Iran. Additionally, since 2022, Russia has increased its investment in the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) to diversify its trade routes, reducing its reliance on East-West routes. Iran’s neighbors and even its allies bypassed Iran in current connectivity projects. This result is mainly due to international sanctions, Iran’s poor infrastructure, and a lack of investment. In 2023, representatives from Turkey, Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan met to discuss the Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan Route, and Tehran immediately proposed a third alternative connecting this route to Iran. Tehran also invests in routes linking Iran to China via Afghanistan to secure a stronger foothold and influence the balance of power within regional trade routes. Iran perceives the Zangezur Corridor as a potential threat that might increase Turkey’s presence near its borders. For Tehran, this project is “Turkey’s highway to Turan.”

Potential strategy for the United States, the EU, and Turkey

Although Central Asia is pivotal in ongoing corridor wars, the region is still not an American priority. The United States needs a comprehensive and updated Central Asia strategy. As Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently signaled, a first step could be to end the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, which restricts formal trade relations with nonmarket economies such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The region also needs American investment to modernize the Middle Corridor. In addition to direct economic benefits, the United States could counterbalance the influence of Russia and China. While great connectivity would enable regional countries’ ambitions, for the United States, it would facilitate access to vast mineral and rare earth reserves, which globally are under significant Chinese control.

The Middle Corridor serves as a lifeline for the landlocked region. Regional countries have the political will and determination to develop the corridor’s potential. In the age of great power competition, these countries have significant room for maneuvering, and they benefit from the multidimensional foreign policy they pursue to enhance their autonomy. However, there is a growing mismatch between expectations and the capacity of the Middle Corridor.

The United States, the EU, and Turkey should cooperate and intensify their engagement with these countries to cultivate mutually beneficial partnerships. Turkey is wildly successful as Ankara invests political capital in strengthening relations. Enhancing partnerships with regional governments and investing in infrastructure would benefit regional governments and the West, as they can maintain their influence in shaping global trade routes. Given that Russia, China, and Iran are trying to prevent the growing Western influence in the region, the West must immediately recognize the strategic importance of transit corridors. As an influence war is intensifying over transit routes, the United States should be at the center of these developments—and not in the periphery—to benefit and counter the geopolitical challenges of Russia, China, and Iran.

Karel Valansi is a political columnist who analyses the Middle East and foreign policy issues in Şalom Newspaper and T24. Follow her on X @karelvalansi.

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This interview has been lightly edited for style.

DJ: Thank you for your time in speaking with us. Israel and Turkey have had alternating close and tense relations for decades but maintained discrete contacts throughout the cyclical ups and downs. Are they still talking?

Zakheim: It’s hard to know because if they are talking it’s probably through intelligence channels, which get reported the least. My guess is that they probably are, if only to deconflict over Syria. There was a report commissioned by Prime Minister Netanyahu that said tensions over Syria could create a dangerous situation. Regional press reported a conclusion that the countries “could go to war,” but that’s not what the report said—just that the tensions were potentially quite serious. Turkish hard-right commentators from MHP [Milli Hareket Partisi, the National Movement Party, of Turkish nationalist] and HUDA PAR [Hür Dava Partisi, the Independent Cause Party, of Kurdish Islamist] have pretty much said the same thing; even President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has said similar things. The tensions are worse than what happened after the Mavi Marmara incident in some ways¹. The military and security establishments in both countries tend to be more realists and to seek de-escalation, though; so, they are probably still talking.

DJ: After the very tense period between 2009–2014, President Barack Obama and later Trump worked to ameliorate Turkey-Israel tensions, leading to a rapprochement of sorts. This contributed to a softening of tensions over time. Without US involvement, the two countries pursued a diplomatic reconciliation in 2023 that was interrupted by the Hamas attacks of October 7 and the Israeli response. Do the two countries need the United States as a mediator or are they better off together proceeding at their own pace and modalities?

Zakheim: Trump has offered to mediate between Israel and Turkey so as to improve their relationship. But Washington might be too distracted by the president’s other priorities. President Trump has focused on de-escalating the situation in Gaza, which could indirectly benefit Israel-Turkish tensions stemming in part from the conflict there. In addition, the Trump administration also has Ukraine, tariffs and trade, and a lot of things competing for the attention of the president and his key advisers. It is not surprising that Netanyahu raised Syria with President Trump, because Israelis take a different view of what’s going on there and are concerned about the Turkish role: They are not comfortable with what they see as growth in Turkish influence there. Discontent in Jerusalem can’t be ignored, though it appears that President Trump’s initial response was balanced and that Netanyahu didn’t get the backing for his position that he might have wanted.

DJ: Syria is a unique challenge between Israel and Turkey now because it essentially makes them neighbors—tense and distrustful neighbors—not just countries in the same region. How do both countries meet their minimum interests in Syria?

Zakheim: It shouldn’t be zero-sum between these two, because there are other players in the equation. The Iranians are still present in Syria to a degree, and the Russians of course hope to keep air and naval bases [there]. Israelis are divided as to whether it is good or bad for Russia to stay or go. It appears Netanyahu thinks it may not be a bad thing to use the Russians to balance Turkish influence. Then there is the question of Damascus, the transitional government, itself. Some think they haven’t really evolved from their roots in al-Qaeda, while others say Damascus—especially transitional President Ahmed al-Sharaa—have been signaling moderation and reaching out to the West because they know that they need Western support. Where there are many players, a modus vivendi is possible, especially if Sharaa wants to move toward the West more than the Assad regime did. There is great fluidity in Syria now. The Kurdish factor still has to play out as well and the success or degree of their reintegration affects Ankara’s positioning. Abdullah Öcalan may want to disarm the movement he founded, the PKK [Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan, or Kurdish Workers’ Party], but it is possible that parts of the movement in Iraq or Syria do not². With so many possibilities, Jerusalem and Ankara both would do well to show flexibility.

DJ: Is Syria without Assad better for Israel than Syria with Assad?

Zakheim: I think it will very much depend on where the Syrian government goes. We haven’t heard the same sort of vitriol out of Damascus as under Assad, despite Israel taking more territory and conducting air attacks. It may be that the Israel-Syria border becomes a quiet border like it was under Hafez al-Assad as opposed to the more dangerous border that became the norm under Bashar and his backers, Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. Bashar was a slimy figure to the Turks as well: He lied to Ankara and was problematic for Israel. It may well be that a government that proceeds the way al-Sharaa says he wants to go could be a plus for both Israel and Turkey.

DJ: How much of the current Turkey-Israel tension do you see as structural or systemic, and how much personal (i.e., a product of the combative Netanyahu-Erdoğan relationship)?

Zakheim: There is no doubt that the personalities don’t line up very well. For comparison, though, we can look at the relationship between Netanyahu and former President Joe Biden—they were not fond of one another, but the two countries remained close. It was Erdoğan who patched things up gradually with Netanyahu over a decade. Erdoğan is a realist, and he knows very well that Israel has a number of things to offer and is an important market. Remember that Turkey is developing a very high-tech military and other industries, and there are many areas where they might partner with Israel. There was over $1 billion in bilateral trade that has now been cut off—though some still comes through third countries. The fact remains that Erdoğan is a pragmatist. If Gaza is somehow settled, that is a way for trade relations to be restored, and these two countries are potentially very important partners for trade and security cooperation.

Overall, despite the ups and downs there is a degree of complementarity. Both leaders are survivors and have pragmatist streaks. Gaza is a place where the United States can clearly play a major role in reconciling interests. If there is reconstruction, Turkish companies, especially in infrastructure, can have a role. A Turkish constructive role in stabilizing Gaza could be a new pivot point. It is true that Erdoğan plays to his base, but both he and Netanyahu remain less vitriolic about “the other” country in the equation than the hardliners in their own coalitions.

Dov S. Zakheim is a member of the Atlantic Council Board of Directors. He was US undersecretary of defense (comptroller) and chief financial officer from 2001-04. He is a senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and senior fellow at the CNA Corporation.

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The Atlantic Council in Turkey aims to promote and strengthen transatlantic engagement with the region by providing a high-level forum and pursuing programming to address the most important issues on energy, economics, security, and defense.

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Dramatic events altered the geopolitical landscape, affecting Turkey, the United States, and NATO in late 2024 and early 2025. The election of Donald Trump as the forty seventh president of America, a ceasefire in Gaza after months of showdown between Israel and Iran’s Axis of Resistance, and the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria have challenged many assumptions and regional political-military considerations. The fifth issue of the Defense Journal assesses key dynamics as we enter a new era. The Defense Journal team examines the rise of the hyperwar concept via military applications of artificial intelligence and the frontier of development for robotic systems. We also look at trends in key US policy concerns in the region to the south of Turkey, including Israel and Syria. If the first months of the second Trump administration are any indication, rapid change and a high tempo in US foreign policy decisions affecting Washington, Ankara, and their shared interests across several regions is the new normal. The Editorial Team hopes you find these contributions interesting and useful.

Rich Outzen and Can Kasapoglu, Defense Journal by Atlantic Council IN TURKEY Co-managing editors

Honorary advisory board

The Defense Journal by Atlantic Council IN TURKEY‘s honorary advisory board provides vision and direction for the journal. We are honored to have Atlantic Council board directors Gen. Wesley K. Clark, former commander of US European Command; Amb. Paula J. Dobriansky, former Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs; Gen. James L. Jones, former national security advisor to the President of the United States; Franklin D. Kramer, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; Lt. Gen. Douglas E. Lute, former US Ambassador to NATO; and Dov S. Zakheim, former Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and Chief Financial Officer for the Department of Defense.

Gen. Wesley K. Clark

Chairman and CEO of Wesley K. Clark & Associates & Board Director, Atlantic Council; former Supreme Allied Commander Europe of NATO

Amb. Paula J. Dobriansky, Ph.D.

Senior Fellow at Harvard University JFK Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs; Board Director, Atlantic Council; former Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs (2001-2009)

Gen. James L. Jones

President, Jones Group International and Executive Chairman Emeritus, Atlantic Council; former National Security Advisor to the President of the United States

Franklin D. Kramer

Distinguished Fellow & Board Director, Atlantic Council; former US Assistant Secretary of Defense

Lt. Gen. Douglas E. Lute

CEO, Cambridge Global Advisors & Board Director, Atlantic Council; former US Permanent Representative to NATO

Dov S. Zakheim

Senior Advisor, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Senior Fellow, CNA Corporation; Board Director, Atlantic Council; former US Under Secretary of Defense

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The post Transatlantic relations and a region in flux appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Merz was in Vilnius to formally inaugurate the 45^th Armored Brigade in Lithuania, which will embed German combat power at the heart of Baltic defense. Germany will implement a phased deployment—it sent advanced elements in early 2024 and formally activated the brigade on April 1. The brigade is expected to reach full combat readiness by 2027. Once complete, this will offer Lithuania and its neighbors a sustained, high-end deterrent anchored in the NATO framework.

But it’s not just Germany that is helping bolster the defenses of NATO’s strategically exposed eastern flank. The eastern flank countries themselves are implementing concrete measures to overcome Europe’s entrenched defense fragmentation. Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland—all located along the eastern border of both NATO and the European Union (EU) with mainland Russia, its Kaliningrad exclave, and Belarus—are emerging as leaders in bolstering regional defense integration, the benefits of which could extend throughout Europe. This shift is especially significant amid growing transatlantic tensions and renewed calls from the United States for Europe to assume greater responsibility for its own security and conventional defense.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, these countries have aligned their border protection efforts by integrating their counter-mobility measures. They have initiated the process of cooperatively developing deep-strike capabilities. They have also started the procurement process for German weapon systems, introduced the German defense industry to the region, and will soon host the first-ever permanently deployed German brigade. All these initiatives show that Europe’s defense efforts are well-positioned to grow together and consolidate from the epicenter in the northeast of the continent. By anchoring their defense planning in regional realities, the eastern flank countries are demonstrating that regional coordination, backed by political determination, can transform exposed vulnerabilities into strategic assets that enhance deterrence and operational readiness.

Integrating counter-mobility systems

Faced with growing geostrategic pressure along their borders with Russia and Belarus, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland have taken decisive, coordinated steps to reinforce border protection and defense. Increasingly aligned in their strategic approach, these countries are developing integrated fortification systems that form a continuous defensive line along the eastern border of NATO and the EU.

Two major initiatives launched in 2024—the Baltic Defense Line covering Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and Poland’s East Shield—share the common goal of strengthening deterrence and denying adversaries access to NATO and EU territory. These efforts include expanding existing forested areas, deepening drainage ditches, building engineering depots to store physical barriers such as “dragons’ teeth,” “hedgehogs,” “Spanish horse,” and solid concrete road barriers, as well as installing anti-tank landmines and mine-laying equipment. There are also plans for developing reinforcements with drone and anti-drone technologies. The overall goal is to ensure the two defense initiatives’ integrity, especially as they converge at the Suwałki Gap, a security chokepoint and the primary axis for NATO’s land reinforcement to the Baltic states.

Finland’s accession to NATO added 1,340 kilometers to the Alliance’s border with Russia. Unlike the more exposed terrain of the Baltic states and Poland, Finland’s border region is naturally defensive, dominated by forests, lakes, and wetlands, which would complicate a large-scale Russian ground incursion. Accordingly, Finland has chosen not to build physical fortifications along the border.

However, to reinforce deterrence and secure vulnerable segments, Finland aligned itself with the regional consensus by withdrawing from the Ottawa Convention banning the use of anti-personnel landmines. This means the eastern flank countries can jointly deploy and stockpile anti-personnel landmines as a shared border defense tool against Russia. Both Russia and Ukraine have used anti-personnel landmines in Ukraine.

The regional integration of border defense has triggered broader EU interest. Following Baltic and Polish calls for a collective response, the European Council’s conclusions on European defense, released on March 6, recognized the importance of EU border defense. The EU’s White Paper on Defense, published in late March, endorsed the idea of creating an “Eastern Border Shield” and in April, the European Parliament passed a resolution recognizing the East Shield and the Baltic Defense Line as flagship projects for common security. This momentum must now translate into concrete EU support—and funding—for transforming the eastern flank countries’ national efforts into a unified, layered European border defense architecture.

Coordinated development of deep strike capabilities

The Baltic states, Poland, and Finland are also integrating their long-range firepower into a regional deep-strike architecture, which significantly raises the threshold for aggression along the eastern flank of NATO and the EU.

Since Russia launched its full-scale war against Ukraine in 2022, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have each contracted High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) launchers and committed to trilateral cooperation with the United States on HIMARS integration, personnel training, system maintenance, and service. Embedding HIMARS into a joint operational concept will allow the Baltic states to conduct combined live-fire exercises and harmonize sustainment through shared maintenance, training, and logistics chains. Estonia’s six launchers, delivered in April, now reach well beyond four hundred kilometers. Lithuania’s eight launchers, due to arrive by 2026, will achieve a similar reach. Latvia is set to receive six launchers in 2027, which will complete the Baltic deep-strike firewall.

This Baltic cluster is dovetailing with Poland’s even larger “Homar-A” deep-strike program, under which some 486 additional HIMARS variants will be mounted on Polish Jelcz trucks and integrated into Poland’s Topaz command system. Together, Poland and the Baltic states are planning a joint logistics hub to manage munitions stockpiles, spare parts, and forward displacement. They are also planning to exercise joint targeting and coordinate fire support across borders.

Finland has opted to upgrade its M270 multiple-launch rocket systems rather than buy HIMARS. The upgrade, approved in 2023, allows Finnish M270s to fire the same munitions as their Baltic neighbors. This technical alignment transforms Finland’s forces into a seamless fourth pillar of the regional deep-strike ensemble, enabling integrated planning, data‐sharing, and cross-border reinforcement exercises.

By integrating US-provided launchers, coordinated doctrine, shared logistics, and interoperable fire-control standards, the five eastern flank nations are establishing a continuous, multi-tiered long-range fire network that spans from Finland to Poland. This network helps project deterrence and complicate adversary planning, solidifying a new level of collective defense integration on the eastern flank.

Regional consolidation with German weapon systems

The eastern flank countries have also deepened their partnerships with German weapon manufacturers. Lithuania is aligning its force modernization with the German brigade’s forward posture in the Baltics. In December, Lithuania’s defense ministry signed a €950 million contract with for forty-four Leopard 2 A8 main battle tanks—its first indigenous tank battalion—which will arrive through 2030, alongside an expanded fleet of twenty-seven additional Boxer “Vilkas” infantry fighting vehicles, which will arrive by 2029. Finland and Poland likewise use Leopard 2 variants, creating a shared main battle tank backbone across the eastern flank.

In the air defense domain, Estonia and Latvia will each field three IRIS-T surface-launched missile batteries this year, while Lithuania has bolstered its two national advanced surface-to-air missile systems (NASAMS) batteries (initially deployed in 2020) with additional systems due to arrive in 2026. To underpin sustained operations, German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall’s new NATO-standard 155 mm ammunition plant in Lithuania, scheduled to be online by mid-2026, will produce tens of thousands of shells annually, significantly enhancing regional munitions resilience.

In the defense innovation field, Lithuanian laser technology firm Aktyvus Photonics has partnered with German drone manufacturer Quantum Systems, having signed a memorandum of understanding on strategic collaboration in unmanned systems this month. Together, they will codevelop and field-test unmanned aerial vehicles equipped with laser capabilities, aiming to expedite deployment timelines and establish a standard for next-generation, networked unmanned systems in NATO’s eastern defenses.

Beyond procurement, production, and innovation, Lithuania has also positioned itself as a regional arms maintenance hub: Through the establishment of Lithuania Defense Services—a joint venture between Rheinmetall Landsysteme and French-German defense manufacturer KNDS—it provides repair, overhaul, and upgrade services for German vehicle platforms, including Boxer Vilkas IFVs, PzH 2000 howitzers, the Leopard main battle tank family, and tactical logistics vehicles.

Collectively, these deployments, procurements, and industrial partnerships do more than fill capability gaps: They forge a contiguous eastern flank defense ecosystem. By standardizing on German platforms, harmonizing training and logistics, co-locating production and repair facilities, and co-training under unified command structures, Finland, the Baltic states, and Poland, together with Germany, can achieve unprecedented interoperability and strategic depth. These initiatives are transforming NATO’s eastern flank into a seamless, multi-domain bulwark.

Strategic depth through regional alignment

The eastern flank’s transformation from a collection of fragmented national postures into a cohesive, multi-domain defense network exemplifies how sustained regional integration can overcome long-standing capability gaps. By aligning border defense, harmonizing long-range fires, and embedding German heavy armor and sustainment infrastructure, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland are creating a continuous belt of deterrence that leverages shared doctrine, logistics, and industry. This holistic approach raises the cost of aggression and sets a new standard for European collective defense: one where interoperability and joint capacity-building replace duplication and dependency, anchoring strategic depth at NATO’s most exposed frontier.

Justina Budginaite-Froehly, PhD, is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

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On May 29, Andrew Michta, senior fellow in the GeoStrategy Initiative, was published in 19FortyFive on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s ambition to restore “Russia’s imperial dominion.” He argues the Trump administration has failed to bring an end to the war in Ukraine because it does not fully grasp Putin’s worldview and warns that diminishing support for Ukraine and NATO would hand him a strategic victory. Michta’s piece was featured in RealClearDefense and featured in RealClearWorld.    

Staff

Andrew A. Michta

Senior Fellow, GeoStrategy Initiative

GeoStrategy Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Central Europe Eastern Europe

The post Michta in 19FortyFive, RealClearDefense, and RealClearWorld on Putin’s strategic objectives in Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On May 21, 2025, Andew Michta, senior fellow in the GeoStrategy Initiative, was highlighted in RealClearDefense on a report on how NATO can deter Russian aggression without an overreliance on US military power, which he co-authored with Scott Lee, Peter Jones, and Lisa Bembenick of MITRE. The authors argue that, as the United States pivots toward the Indo-Pacific and urges greater defense spending from its allies, European leadership will be essential to the Alliance’s strength and cohesion. 

Staff

Andrew A. Michta

Senior Fellow, GeoStrategy Initiative

GeoStrategy Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Central Europe Eastern Europe

The post Michta featured in RealClearDefense on concrete actions to strengthen NATO’s resolve amid shifting geopolitics   appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On May 26, Rob Murray, non-resident senior fellow at Forward Defense and the Transatlantic Security Initiative, published a piece in Politico Europe on the proposed multilateral Defense, Security, and Resilience (DSR) Bank and the importance of defense financing mechanisms to boost European defense spending. Murray discussed the importance of the new Safety Action for Europe (SAFE) program and its potential benefits and argued for the creation of the DSR bank to help Europe achieve its security goals.

Fellow

Rob Murray

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Defense Policy

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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The Transatlantic Security Initiative, in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, shapes and influences the debate on the greatest security challenges facing the North Atlantic Alliance and its key partners.

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Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Daniel Fried: Dan ran a pro-Europe, pro-NATO, and pro-Ukraine campaign

Victoria Olari: The implications of Dan’s win will ripple across Eastern Europe

Anca Agachi: Romanians don’t want more of the same, so how will Dan be different?

Mark Scott: It was an election fought as much online as offline

Andrei Covatariu: After the election, can Romania’s energy diplomacy bridge Brussels and Washington?

Olga Khakova: Energy policy can help build the coalition and strengthen the country

Dan ran a pro-Europe, pro-NATO, and pro-Ukraine campaign

There are two lessons to take from Romania’s presidential elections. First, Romanians seemed turned off by the establishment parties that have traded off running the government for decades. The candidate of the ruling coalition didn’t make it past the first round; and Dan and Simion were both seen, Romanians tell me, as alternatives to the ruling coalition. Second, despite predictions (or fears), the preference for an outsider didn’t translate into a preference for a nationalist or anti-EU firebrand, which is how Simion ran his campaign. Dan, a mathematician by training, ran a campaign that was pro-Europe, pro-NATO, and pro-Ukraine. 

Simion appeared to enjoy support from Russia, and plenty of stories are circulating of Russian information ops in his favor. He had maintained distance from Russian President Vladimir Putin (wise in Russo-skeptic Romania) and instead courted the Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement in the United States, even visiting the United States during the campaign. But this did not translate into enough support at home.   

Dan’s win is decisive, but it alone will not overcome the divisions in Romanian society. Romanians have voted for Europe and democracy, not nationalism, but they also seem to want change in the form of better governance. Dan will have a mandate but a big job ahead. 

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US ambassador to Poland.

The implications of Dan’s win will ripple across Eastern Europe

Romania’s presidential runoff turned into an intense race with significant stakes for the nation and the wider region. Dan won, an outcome expected mainly given the high voter turnout, offering him a strong democratic mandate. 

From the early hours of election day, Simion’s ultra-nationalist camp signaled that they would not accept a loss. They took to social media with accusations of fraud and amplified fake news stories that mimicked legitimate outlets and falsely declared Simion the winner. Simion told his supporters not to trust the exit polls, claiming that political elites had manipulated the results behind the scenes. His team also accused foreign actors of interference, notably targeting Moldova’s president, Maia Sandu, for allegedly mobilizing Romanian voters in Moldova. This followed an unprecedented voter turnout there in the second round, partly spurred by Simion’s hostile rhetoric toward Moldova. The nationalist camp further alleged meddling by France, specifically accusing President Emmanuel Macron of election interference. 

Despite these efforts, the election results left little room for dispute. Dan secured a mandate from Romanians. Simion conceded early Monday morning, marking the end of a tense and polarized campaign. 

This election isn’t just about Romania. It’s a big deal for the region, too. A win for Dan will likely lock in Romania’s commitment to the EU and NATO, a vital move as Russia’s war in Ukraine continues to unsettle the region. This is critical, as Romania’s strategic position strengthens regional security and support for Kyiv. Additionally, it will likely bolster Moldova’s EU integration efforts under Sandu, fostering closer Romania-Moldova ties and countering Russian influence. On the other hand, a Simion victory would have likely emboldened far-right movements across Europe, disrupted regional unity, and undermined support for Ukraine, which Simion openly opposed. 

Even with all the divisions, Romanian voters sent a loud message: they reject the old political elite. Both Dan and Simion positioned themselves as anti-system challengers, capitalizing on widespread frustration with corruption and governance failures. This call for change is real, and it’s going to continue to shape Romania’s future.  

—Victoria Olari is a research associate for Moldova at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab).

Romanians don’t want more of the same, so how will Dan be different? 

“Hope and patience.” This is what Dan, the now president-elect of Romania, asked for in his speech when the first exit polls were released. 

Patience because his mandate will be an incredibly difficult one. Immediately, he will have to choose a prime minister and help establish a pro-European political coalition in the Romanian Parliament, one third of which is made up of far-right parties. He will need to help build trust in an economy that has the EU’s highest budget deficit compared to gross domestic product. And he will need to lead the country’s foreign policy at a time when the regional context for Romania has never been more dangerous given Russia’s continued war in Ukraine. In the long term, Dan will have to face down the unaddressed root causes of discontent that gave oxygen to far-right parties in the first place and brought Romania to the brink of disaster. The country is plagued by poverty, inequality, a failing public health system, corruption, and inefficient, unresponsive, and distrusted state institutions, as well as a forgotten diaspora. He will have to “rebuild a one Romania” together with a divided population. 

But Dan was also right to ask for hope. In the election result Sunday, Romania decided it cannot go back, and Romanians have firmly made the choice to remain anchored in the Western, transatlantic community. Despite external pressures, disinformation campaigns, suspicions of Russian interference, and fears of a contested election result, Romanians made it clear that they are European. But the same voters who turned out in massive numbers for two anti-system candidates also made it clear that more of the same in Romanian politics is simply not acceptable. This is the hope and the opportunity Romania is facing—starting now. 

—Anca Agachi is a nonresident fellow with Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She currently serves as a defense policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, where she focuses on international security and defense issues.

It was an election fought as much online as offline 

Faced with a barrage of false online information, potential foreign interference, and opaque practices by social media companies, Romania’s second-round presidential election held up to scrutiny—but only just. In the hours before Dan was elected, Simion took to X to proclaim himself as Romania’s new president, only to backtrack on that claim when the official tally gave Dan the final victory.

Pavel Durov, the chief executive of Telegram, the popular messaging service, also took to his platform and other social networks to accuse “a Western European government” of urging Telegram to “silence conservative voices in Romania.” The Russian tech boss subsequently named that country as France, though Paris denied any potential interference in the Eastern European country’s election.

More than any other recent European election, Romania’s vote has been riddled with potential digital attacks on local democratic institutions, including scores of cyberattacks that the country’s security forces suggested may have come from Russia. In response, Romanian officials and those from the European Commission have criticized social media companies for not doing enough to combat malign actors, both in and outside of the country.

Yet even hours after Dan was officially named as Romania’s next president, little, if any, evidence about the role these global platforms played in promoting election-related falsehoods has been made public. Local voters remain mostly in the dark about how social media—and potential bad actors—may have targeted them in this weekend’s election. That has left more questions than answers as policymakers, tech giants, and the public try to unpack how Dan successfully saw off Simion in an election that was fought as much online as offline. 

—Mark Scott is senior resident fellow at the DFRLab’s Democracy + Tech Initiative within the Atlantic Council Technology Programs.

After the election, can Romania’s energy diplomacy bridge Brussels and Washington? 

Romania avoided a political shock this weekend as pro-European candidate Dan defeated right-wing populist Simion. The result reassures Romania’s continued commitment to EU and transatlantic partnerships. Yet, after months of political turbulence and voter polarization, restoring macroeconomic stability now depends on forming a new government—no easy feat despite a pro-European majority in Romania’s Parliament. 

The election outcome has implications for Romania’s strategic energy direction, too, even though energy and climate policy were not prominently featured in the campaign debates. Dan has pledged to keep Romania on its path of regional energy relevance, proven over the past few years, and to enhance the existing cooperation with the United States and the EU. His platform includes proposals to create a national energy champion, reduce Romania’s energy dependencies on authoritarian regimes, support strategic investment (including in data centers), and deepen ties with Moldova and Ukraine. His strong backing for EU enlargement further strengthens Romania’s geopolitical and energy role in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). 

At the same time, Romania—like other CEE states—faces a growing tension between the EU’s accelerated decarbonization push and the United States’ emphasis on “energy freedom,” as recently articulated by US Energy Secretary Chris Wright at the Three Seas Business Forum in Warsaw. This divergence presents both challenges and opportunities. The Romanian president can play a key role in expanding the win-set between Brussels and Washington through enhanced energy diplomacy—advancing nuclear partnerships (notably small modular nuclear reactors with US support), Black Sea gas development, cross-border infrastructure with Ukraine and Moldova, and clean generation scale-up. Romania also has the potential to become a clean technology manufacturing destination, supporting both EU goals and transatlantic alignment in a shifting geopolitical landscape.  

By advancing projects that resonate in both Brussels and Washington, Romania can amplify its geopolitical weight in the energy space. 

—Andrei Covatariu is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center.

Energy policy can help build the coalition and strengthen the country 

This anti-establishment, anti-corruption vote presents a historic opportunity for the new Romanian leadership to use this mandate to build on previous positive energy reforms. The next Romanian government has a chance to engage with the population to forge a secure, resilient, and diversified energy strategy that can attract new deals and investments in the energy sector. 

However, the close election results showcase that national concerns such as energy prices, reliability, and industrial competitiveness helped drive a significant percentage of voters to support the candidate with a nationalistic platform. The good news is that Romania can prioritize domestic issues through stronger partnerships and deeper regional integration: developing Black Sea resources, integrating electricity and gas interconnections with neighboring countries, and making progress on nuclear agreements with countries like the United States. 

Romania has led on diversification from Russian energy sources and support for Ukraine and Moldova’s energy security. The new coalition can lead by example in fortifying the region from backsliding into Russian natural gas dependence, as seen in the growing Russian liquefied natural gas shipments to the EU. 

Moreover, a strong energy agenda could also be a unifying platform for building the ruling coalition. 

—Olga Khakova is the deputy director for European energy security at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center.

The post Experts react: What message did Romanians send by electing Nicusor Dan? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine has laid bare Moscow’s neo-imperial ambitions and the direct threat it poses to its so-called near-abroad. For NATO frontline states such as Latvia, the security landscape has fundamentally changed over the past three years. While Russian forces are currently taking staggering losses in Ukraine, necessitating a period of force reconstitution, Russia’s military could be rebuilt and ready to invade a Baltic state in as few as three years, according to estimates from some Western intelligence agencies.

Other factors complicate the picture further. On the positive side, the accession of Finland and Sweden to the Alliance, growing defense capabilities in neighboring Estonia and Lithuania, and Poland’s significant defense investments, all provide Latvia with a strengthened collective defense posture in the Baltic Sea region. However, this has occurred amid growing uncertainty regarding the United States’ long-term commitment to European security. Critical US enablers and rapid reinforcements cannot be taken for granted to the same degree as in the past. While the US nuclear umbrella remains extended so far, the erosion of trust is noticeable, creating potential vulnerabilities that the Kremlin might seek to test.

The stakes could not be higher. For Latvia and its Baltic neighbors, Russian aggression represents an existential threat. At the same time, a Russian attack on NATO’s eastern flank would quickly reverberate across the entire Alliance.

In response to these threats and changing security dynamics, Latvia should pursue three fundamental and interconnected strategic goals:

• First, demonstrate political will: Latvia must demonstrate to allies in Washington and across Europe that it is maximizing its own defense capabilities and resilience, shouldering its share of the burden, and signaling unwavering commitment. It must then use that demonstration to harness the power of the Alliance for its national defense. Latvia’s defense budget hovered around 1 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2014 when Russia first invaded Crimea. Its defense budget this year is set at about 3.65 percent, with announced plans to push it to 5 percent of GDP soon. Latvia needs to make up for lost time.
• Second, generate sufficient capabilities: Riga needs to generate sufficient domestic defensive capabilities, integrated with NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence battlegroup, to realistically hold a defensive line against aggression long enough for decisive allied reinforcements to arrive. It needs to achieve a degree of deterrence by denial. This will require a significant Latvian military buildup.
• Third, enhance societal resilience: Latvia must also project an undeniable national will, making it clear to Moscow that any aggression would face fierce, protracted, whole-of-society, and costly resistance. There can be no perception of Latvia as an easy target.

Achieving these goals demands immediate, focused action in Latvia, as well as a rallying of Riga’s NATO allies.

National defense priorities

Latvia should begin by making its comprehensive defense concept a nationwide reality. The 2018 adoption of this framework, which called for integrating civilian elements into national security, is its vital strength. Through this whole-of-society approach, Latvia has demonstrated ingenuity and cooperation. For example, Latvia’s municipalities and state companies collaborate to support armed forces mobility and counter-mobility efforts. Another example is the involvement of hunters in the national defense system—as a patriotic and armed part of society that can be integrated with the National Guard and tasked with support assignments. While these efforts are commendable, more must be done to ensure that civilian agencies, businesses, and citizens are actively integrated into national resilience and defense planning through practical taskings and drills. As comprehensive defense evolves into the reality of society, it demonstrates credible national will, complicates adversary planning, and builds the societal backbone needed to withstand pressure and deter aggression, including hybrid attacks from Russia.

Latvia must also maintain momentum and keep military modernization on track. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Latvia has significantly increased investment in conventional war-fighting capabilities. Riga’s commitment to acquiring advanced systems such as HIMARS rocket launchers, IRIS-T air-to-air missiles, and coastal defense missiles sends a vital message: the country is serious about bolstering deterrence by denial. However, acquiring advanced hardware is only part of the equation; Latvia must also ensure that these systems can be effectively commanded, supplied, and maintained during high-intensity conflict. This necessitates trained personnel and critical support elements, including robust command-and-control, resilient logistics, sufficient ammunition stockpiles, and effective maintenance infrastructure. Not all equipment needs to be expensive or high-tech. Land mines along the border that would channel an attack and swarms of low-cost drones can have dramatic results on the battlefield. Perhaps most important, Latvia must ensure that it can sustain combat operations beyond the initial phase, proving it possesses the national endurance required to hold the line until allied reinforcements arrive.

National resilience also requires forging a cohesive fighting force from diverse sources of manpower. In 2023, Latvia introduced a mandatory conscription policy called State Defense Service (SDS) to bolster recruitment. This policy of mandatory eleven-month service has shown early signs of success. Latvia is planning to enlist four thousand new recruits annually by 2028, and 40 percent of the 2024 intake opted for professional careers after their mandatory service. However, given Latvia’s demographics, active service alone cannot generate sufficient manpower; it must be complemented by a ready and responsive reserve system—one that currently requires significant overhaul. With SDS providing a new input stream, the reserve system must be adapted to effectively integrate these personnel and grow combat power over the long term. Latvia could add significantly to its manpower mobilization by combining professionals, the Home Guard, and SDS graduates, as well as by implementing dedicated reservist training and early military education. Current military plans envision 31,000 troops by 2029, plus an equally large reserve contingent thereafter. While this objective is sound, the current timeline appears misaligned with the potential speed of Russian force reconstitution. Latvia must confront substantial constraints, including the need for adequate infrastructure, qualified instructors, and innovative policies to drive recruitment and conduct training at the required scale and speed.

Furthermore, physical defenses require turning the Baltic Defense Line from a concept to a concrete plan. A fortified line across the Baltics, leveraging naturally difficult terrain, is a clear-headed and necessary response to the Russian threat. Correctly executed, it could effectively impede a potential incursion, buying time for national counteractions and allied mobilization. Fast-tracking construction, funding, and policy decisions will be crucial for realizing this critical barrier. Critically, forces must train to fight effectively from these prepared positions, integrating them fully into national and regional operational plans.

Finally, Latvia must ensure that it has the infrastructure to support military mobility and to provide host nation support. Latvia’s defense fundamentally relies on NATO allies arriving quickly and in force, requiring substantial investment in mobility infrastructure and support elements. Latvia must therefore proactively invest in and expand the critical infrastructure needed to receive, stage, and sustain large-scale allied forces. Short-term priorities include accelerating projects like the Liepāja military port and enhancing airfield capacity at Lielvārde airbase and Riga International Airport. Accelerating Rail Baltica’s military utility is also crucial, as it could fundamentally alter the capacity and speed of NATO reinforcements into the region.

Rallying allied support

While Latvia shoulders these critical domestic responsibilities, its security ultimately rests on robust collective defense and the tangible commitment of its allies. Latvia must advocate for specific actions from its NATO partners, recognizing that the window before Russia potentially reconstitutes its offensive capabilities is short. This diplomatic push requires urgency and clarity.

The place to begin is in Washington. All three Baltic states and Poland have essentially accepted US President Donald Trump’s challenge for allies to spend 5 percent of GDP on defense. This should be presented in a high-profile fashion to Trump during the NATO Summit in June. As part of this presentation, Latvia should urge Trump to continue hosting US forces in the Baltic region on a rotational basis and to augment those rotations with high-impact capabilities such as air and missile defense assets.

To deter Russia, NATO must strengthen its forward defense posture on the ground. Latvia should continue advocating for transforming the Enhanced Forward Presence battlegroup on its territory into a combat-credible forward defense force that expands on the full-time brigade and integrates it with national defense structures that match adversary military capabilities. Enhancing this forward defense by securing broader participation, particularly from a nuclear-armed European ally, would send a strong deterrent signal to Moscow.

This enhanced forward presence must be embedded within deeper, more integrated regional defense planning. Latvia, working closely with its neighbors, should champion the development of genuinely interlocking, all-domain defense plans within an enhanced Nordic-Baltic-Poland framework. This necessitates moving beyond interoperability exercises toward shared operational concepts and assigned responsibilities. This will help forge a more cohesive and resilient defense architecture in NATO’s northeast as part of the Alliance’s broader reinforcement strategy. Consequently, Latvia must be a vocal proponent of the regular, rigorous exercising and continuous streamlining of the supreme allied commander Europe’s reinforcement plans for the Baltic region. Identifying and resolving friction points, especially cross-border military mobility bottlenecks and logistical hurdles, requires sustained, collaborative effort with those allies designated to reinforce the region in a crisis.

Minimizing the time required for those reinforcements to arrive necessitates a concerted push to maximize the pre-positioning of allied military equipment and essential stocks within Latvia and the region. Reducing the lift requirement during a crisis by having equipment already in theater dramatically shortens response timelines, directly bolstering deterrence by showcasing NATO’s capacity for rapid, large-scale reaction.

Lastly, building on a deep-seated relationship, the Baltic states must treat strengthening security cooperation with Ukraine as a long-term strategic imperative. Currently, Kyiv’s resolute defense delivers immediate dividends by tying down significant Russian forces and offering invaluable, hard-earned combat lessons. For the Baltic states, a battle-hardened ally such as Ukraine can be a substantial security and defense contributor to the region. If Russia were to test NATO’s defense capabilities on its eastern flank, the prospect of Ukraine joining the fight would dramatically expand Moscow’s theater of operations.

Latvia has a brief respite as Russian troops are worn down in Ukraine, but it will take little time for Russia to reconstitute its conventional forces. Latvia must use this window to create a more favorable defense environment. At home, it must rapidly build up its defense capacity and resilience. Abroad, it needs to assure a continued US commitment to its defense, generate a greater NATO forward presence on its soil, and deepen regional integration. It also needs to refine reinforcement mechanisms and maximize pre-positioning. Convincing allies to commit the necessary political will and resources before Russia regains its strength is the most critical security task facing Riga and its regional partners.

Armands Astukevičs is a researcher at the Centre for East European Policy Studies. His primary research focuses on the Baltic states’ defense and security, as well as the foreign and security policies of Russia and Belarus. Previously, he worked on policy analysis and planning at the Latvian Ministry of Defence, focusing on crisis management and comprehensive national defence issues.

Hans Binnendijk is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He previously served in several senior US government positions, including special assistant to the president for defense policy, principal deputy director of the State Department Policy Planning Staff, and director of the Institute for National Security Studies. 

The post Inside Latvia’s race against time to build deterrence against Russia appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The Ukrainian military has evolved dramatically during the past three years of full-scale war against Russia to become the largest and most effective fighting force in Europe. Innovation has played a key role in this process, with Ukraine relying on the country’s vibrant tech sector and traditionally strong defense industry to counter Russia’s overwhelming advantages in terms of both manpower and firepower. This has resulted in an army capable of developing and implementing the latest military technologies at speeds that are unmatched by any Western countries with their far more bureaucratic procurement cycles.

Ukraine’s innovative approach to defense is most immediately obvious in the country’s ability to produce and deploy a wide variety of drones. Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, the experience of the Ukrainian army has underlined the growing dominance of drones on the modern battlefield, and has redefined our understanding of drone warfare in ways that will shape military doctrines around the world for many years to come.

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The most important tools in Ukraine’s unmanned arsenal are the country’s growing fleet of First Person View (FPV) drones. These drones in many ways function as the infantry of drone warfare. They have become a central pillar of Ukraine’s war effort, inflicting up to 80 percent of Russian battlefield casualties and making it possible to hold the line even when Ukrainian troops have found themselves starved of artillery shells.

Ukrainian production of FPV drones has mushroomed in recent years, with domestic companies also gradually moving away from an initial reliance on imported components. By early 2025, Ukraine was reportedly producing 200,000 FPV drones per month. Cheap to manufacture, they are capable of destroying tanks and other military equipment worth millions of dollars.

Russia is also relentlessly adapting to technological changes on the battlefield, creating a daily race to innovate that runs in parallel to the actual fighting on the front lines of the war. The dominance of FPV drones has led to a variety of countermeasures, ranging from the widespread use of netting and so-called “cope cages,” to increasingly sophisticated electronic blocking and the jamming of signals. In response, both Russia and Ukraine are turning to fiber optic drones that are not susceptible to jamming technologies.

As the full-scale war approaches a fourth summer, the evolution of drone tactics continues. Over the past year, Ukraine has sought to establish a 15-kilometer kill zone patrolled by drones along the front lines of the conflict, making it extremely challenging to concentrate troops for major offensive operations. The strength of Ukraine’s so-called “drone wall” defenses will be severely tested in the coming few months by Russia’s ongoing offensive. Building on Ukraine’s experience, NATO is reportedly exploring the idea of creating a “drone wall” of its own on the alliance’s eastern flank.

Beyond the front lines, Ukraine has developed an expanding fleet of long-range drones capable of striking targets deep inside Russia. This has made it possible to carry out a wide range of attacks on Russian military bases, ammunition storage facilities, air defenses, and Putin’s economically vital but vulnerable oil and gas industry. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has called the country’s growing long range capabilities “a clear and effective guarantee of Ukraine’s security.”

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Ukrainian drone innovations are also transforming naval warfare. During the first two years of the war, Ukraine used marine drones to target Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, sinking or damaging multiple warships and forcing the remainder to retreat from Russian-occupied Crimea. This remarkable success made it possible to lift the naval blockade on Ukrainian ports and reopen commercial maritime routes, providing Kyiv with a vital economic lifeline.

More recently, Ukraine has begun using naval drones as launch platforms for missiles and smaller unmanned systems. The results have been spectacular. In January 2025, missile-armed Ukrainian naval drones reportedly destroyed several Russian helicopters over the Black Sea. In another world first, Ukrainian officials announced in early May that they had shot down two Russian fighter jets using marine drones equipped with anti-aircraft missile systems.

Ukrainian military planners are now working on a range of unmanned ground systems as they look to take drone warfare to the next level. With support from the country’s government-backed defense tech cluster Brave1, work is underway to develop dozens of robotic models capable of performing a variety of combat and logistical tasks. In December 2024, Ukrainian forces claimed to have made history by conducting the world’s first fully unmanned assault on Russian positions using ground-based robotic systems and FPV drones.

Speaking in April 2025, Ukraine’s former commander in chief Valeriy Zaluzhniy underlined how his country’s use of new technologies was transforming the battlefield. “The Russian-Ukrainian War has completely changed the nature of warfare,” he commented. Zaluzhniy predicted that the wars of the future would be won by countries that focus their resources on the development of drones, electronic warfare, and artificial intelligence. “It is obvious that victory on the battlefield now depends entirely on the ability to outpace the enemy in technological development,” he noted.

Western leaders and military commanders are clearly taking note of the remarkable progress made by the Ukrainian Armed Forces since 2022. Many are now incorporating Ukraine’s unique battlefield experience into their own programs, while NATO members including Britain and Denmark are reportedly already receiving training in drone warfare from Ukrainian military instructors. This is likely to be just the beginning, as more countries seek to benefit from Ukrainian expertise.

For many years, it has been customary to view Ukraine as being almost entirely dependent on Western aid and know-how for its survival. This was always an oversimplification; it is now hopelessly outdated. In reality, today’s Ukraine is a drone superpower with an innovative domestic defense industry that can provide its NATO allies with important lessons in the realities of twenty-first century warfare.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The post Drone superpower: Ukrainian wartime innovation offers lessons for NATO appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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On May 5, Atlantic Council Senior Advisor Harlan Ullman published an op-ed in the Hill on US President Donald Trump’s divergence from the traditional assumptions of the transatlantic alliance. He argues that, if the United States steps away from NATO, there is no clear European power poised to take a leadership role.

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Ukraine’s resistance to Russian aggression has demonstrated an important lesson about national defense: it requires all levels of society, not just the military. It’s also not enough simply to respond in a crisis. It’s necessary to be prepared ahead of one.

Applying these lessons, Latvia has in recent years pursued a comprehensive approach to defense based on an understanding that every element of the government and population plays a part in creating a networked civil and military defense system. This approach grew out of necessity: Latvia is a small country with limited strategic depth. It also neighbors Russia, a large, aggressive military power that has attacked countries in its so-called near abroad.

Latvia’s approach, like those of its fellow Nordic-Baltic countries, is built on a straightforward idea: the country’s civil and military defense systems can achieve a greater deterrence and defense impact if they collaborate and if each part is prepared. To achieve this, Latvia has focused since 2014 on integrating all societal elements into its national defense. In practice, this has meant working to integrate municipalities and managers of public and private-owned critical infrastructure—such as energy, communications, financial services, and medical providers—into preparedness-building efforts.

Although this integration effort still has a ways to go, Latvia’s experience so far offers valuable lessons for other countries seeking better preparedness during a time of increased military and hybrid threats. Some of what Latvia offers by way of example in ensuring essential services during a crisis includes passing the relevant baseline legislation, encouraging public-private cooperation, expanding the coordination role of municipalities, and running training and preparedness exercises. 

Boosting continuity of essential services and access to stocks

Latvia has shifted its crisis-management thinking from a focus on infrastructure protection to an emphasis on continuity of essential services and functions. Although this shift creates additional challenges for planners, it is based on the understanding that critical infrastructure cannot operate isolated from other national-defense factors. 

In a meaningful step to implement this shift, Latvia introduced amendments to its National Security Law and its National Mobilization Law in 2021. These amendments resulted in the creation of a new, industry-specific critical-infrastructure category, which exempts from mobilization the personnel responsible for maintaining critical infrastructure and financial services. In the event of a major crisis, these workers have a duty to continue doing their regular jobs, which are necessary to ensure the continuous operation of critical services and industries that support the nation.

Working at the local level

Municipalities play an important role in nurturing a society-wide culture of preparedness and resilience. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014 and 2022 deeply resonated with Latvian society and created momentum for action. Latvians demanded that their local governments go beyond declaratory contingency plans to proactively explain preparedness plans to their own constituents. 

Today, the necessary legislative basis has been adopted: the National Defense Concept (2023) requires that Latvian municipalities continue essential services in crisis or war and develop a society-wide culture of preparedness and resilience. Municipal preparedness plans related to war are developed in close cooperation with the National Armed Forces, and these plans must be exercised at least yearly in cooperation with the National Armed Forces.

Some municipalities have been more proactive than others. For example, Jelgava, which is the fourth-largest Latvian city in terms of population, created a municipal operation information center back in 2011, ahead of many other local governments in Latvia. In peacetime, this center serves as a municipal hotline for damaged infrastructure, but in a crisis, it serves as the municipal early warning system.

Setting expectations for public-private cooperation

Like in many other countries, owners and managers of critical infrastructure in Latvia are obligated by law to develop plans and standard operating procedures for continuity of their services (even if at a reduced level) during a crisis. Ultimately, companies are expected to be proactive about investing in their capacity and capability-building efforts and finding relevant in-house or external expertise to improve their preparedness. However, expertise and experience regarding continuity of critical infrastructure is highly specific and may be context dependent. Therefore, it may be a possible bottleneck in resilience-building efforts. 

Some companies proactively seek to learn from the experiences of others. In one such case, the Latvian electric power transmission system operator Augstsprieguma tīkls organized open practical exercises for linemen, learning from the conditions in which Ukrainian linemen are operating. 

Nevertheless, the Ministry of Defence and the National Armed Forces retain a key role in comprehensive defense planning, likely reflecting both the fundamental need to closely integrate military and civilian planning factors in comprehensive defense systems and the traditionally high level of societal trust in the National Armed Forces. Thus, even private industry’s preparedness plans are drafted in close cooperation with both the ministry of the specific field and the Ministry of Defence. This ensures that the government is aware of the resources in the civilian sector, able to provide expertise and experience, and can monitor how they fit in with the broader national resilience system. Moreover, industrial actors participate in exercises with the ministry of the specific field and the Ministry of Defence at least once every four years. 

Public-private cooperation is also at the heart of securing food, water, and healthcare supplies. The Latvian Ministry of Agriculture plans and coordinates deferred procurement of food stocks in cooperation with municipalities, tasking food producers with being prepared to provide food in emergency situations. While the burden of preparedness responsibility is, again, placed on companies, municipalities have to identify industrial farms and food producers and wholesalers with storage capacity for finished products in their civil defense plans. 

Ensuring access to cash and communications

The ability to ensure the flow of money in exchange for goods and services is another element of critical services. Societal upheavals, crises, and wars often undermine the ability to continue with peacetime payment systems, as Ukraine’s experience demonstrates. The Bank of Latvia (analogous to the US Federal Reserve) is developing cash and noncash crisis payment solutions for Latvian society that have a high adoption rate for noncash payments. For example, the Bank of Latvia is working with major commercial banks to develop Bank of Latvia–approved offline solutions to ensure individuals can use their bank cards to pay for basic necessities, even if bank communications are down. Similarly, during a crisis or war, banks are required to maintain the continuous operation of a predefined network of ATMs with at least one ATM per municipal center.

Latvia has sought to improve the integrity of its communications systems by ensuring that critical data—including sensitive healthcare, defense, security, and economic data—does not leave the territory of Latvia and that critical information technology systems continue to function without interruption even if the connection to the global internet is disrupted. To do this, the government now requires that national and municipal institutions, companies, and owners and managers of critical information-technology infrastructure prioritize using a single national internet exchange point, GLV-IX—a state-wide and state-operated local internet ecosystem—for their data flows if the outer perimeter of electronic communications is compromised. 

Finding solutions to common preparedness-building challenges

Finally, Latvia has sought to address two common challenges among countries working to build preparedness: How can the government improve how it communicates preparedness requirements? And who pays for building resilience? Today, many national governments are increasingly concerned about how to communicate their preparedness and resilience expectations related to military crises and war with municipalities and private industries. Efforts such as disseminating information and issuing legislation need to be augmented by activities that encourage a thoughtful planning process, true understanding of the requirements, and knowledge development. 

Indeed, Latvian municipalities have complained about the lack of resources to implement civil preparedness or insisted that preparedness should be handled on the national level. Likewise, even large and well-funded hospitals are struggling to store enough medicine and supplies to meet the three-month requirement of supplies, while smaller hospitals lack enough funding to meet the requirement.

Latvia has sought to address these questions through legislative changes, clarifying responsibilities and tasks, as well as mandating regular exercises. With time, continuous cooperation and the mandatory requirement of yearly exercises may also offer the parties involved a better understanding of the overall defense system, their own role within it, and therefore what to expect from their partners. 

Regular exercise schedules may benefit Latvia’s preparedness across sectors by stress-testing the developed plans, developing knowledge, and informing the exercise participants of the potential challenges that their organization may be subjected to in case of a military crisis or war. For example, during the yearly state-wide comprehensive defense exercises Namejs, municipalities are involved in playing out different scenarios alongside the National Armed Forces. On a local level, Pilskalns exercises have been used since 2020 to test municipalities’ planning and practical response capabilities under a wartime scenario, involving national and local institutions, the National Armed Forces, and local companies. Ultimately, however, private enterprises must fund their preparedness planning and implementation activities.

Latvia has adopted a comprehensive national defense approach that integrates all levels of society and emphasizes proactive preparation where different levels of society—national and local governments, the public, and owners of critical infrastructure—are prepared to collaborate. Development of legislation promotes private-public partnerships, which in turn requires and enables municipalities, providers of essential services and owners of essential infrastructure to develop their own contingency plans to ensure uninterrupted operation during crises. Most importantly, regular exercises serve as a tool for stress-testing and self-reporting to ensure the plans are usable, as well as allow participants to gain experience implementing them and attain a better understanding of the entire defense system. However, financing and development of industry-specific expertise about continuity can serve as a potential bottleneck.

Latvia offers these important lessons; it’s the obligation and opportunity of allies and partners to learn from them.

Mārcis Balodis is a researcher and a Member of the Board of the Centre for East European Policy Studies. His primary research focuses on Russia’s foreign and security policy as well as Russia’s use of hybrid warfare.

Marta Kepe is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She is also a senior defense analyst at RAND, a nonprofit, nonpartisan research organization.

This article is part of a series in partnership between the Atlantic Council and the Centre for East European Policy Studies.

The post Lessons from Latvia’s efforts to keep essential services running during a crisis appeared first on Atlantic Council.

US President Donald Trump’s efforts to initiate peace talks between Russia and Ukraine reflect a commendable desire to end the war. Nevertheless, after more than three months of Russian stalling tactics and empty promises, it should now be abundantly clear that attempting to negotiate a meaningful compromise with Vladimir Putin was a mistake.

Since the current peace process began in early February, the Russian ruler has refused to join Ukraine in backing a US proposal for an unconditional ceasefire. Instead, Putin continues to insist on maximalist goals that reflect his undiminished determination to erase Ukrainian statehood and subjugate the Ukrainian people.

Putin’s demands include the comprehensive disarmament of the Ukrainian military and the reestablishment of Russian dominance in all spheres of Ukrainian public life (euphemistically called “denazification” by the Kremlin), along with official international recognition for Russia’s territorial gains and an end to all military support for Kyiv. If implemented, Putin’s terms would leave Ukraine partitioned, isolated, and defenseless. This is not a negotiating position; it is a call for Kyiv’s capitulation.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

While Russia’s ultimate objectives remain unchanged, there is a very real danger that Putin may seek to exploit Trump’s evident ambition to settle the Ukraine issue as soon as possible. He could do so by agreeing to a temporary ceasefire that would lead to a pause in hostilities, while creating the conditions to complete the conquest of Ukraine following the end of Trump’s presidency. This would allow Putin to lift sanctions, rebuild the Russian army, and destabilize Ukraine from within.

In order to secure Kremlin backing, a ceasefire deal would need to hand Putin the semblance of victory while denying Ukraine any genuine and reliable security guarantees. Alarmingly, reports indicate that current US peace proposals go a long way toward meeting these conditions.

Crucially, the United States is reportedly prepared to officially recognize the Russian seizure of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula. This has led to inevitable comparisons with the 1938 Munich Agreement, which saw Britain and France hand Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland over to Nazi Germany in the hope that this would satisfy Adolf Hitler. Instead, the shameful deal struck in Munich encouraged the Nazi dictator to escalate his territorial demands. Less than a year later, World War II began.

The appeasement policies of the 1930s have long been condemned for enabling the rise of Hitler. Attempts to appease Putin have produced strikingly similar results. After Russia invaded Georgia in 2008, Western efforts to downplay the war and resume “business as usual” only served to embolden the Kremlin. When Russia’s 2014 invasions of Crimea and eastern Ukraine again failed to produce a resolute Western response, Putin interpreted this as a tactic green light to go further. This paved the way for the full-scale invasion of 2022.

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It should now be obvious to any objective observer that the continued appeasement of Putin will further fuel his imperial ambitions. This would be potentially fatal for Ukraine itself. It would also be disastrous for the future of international security.

Putin’s revisionist agenda is not limited to Ukraine. He openly speaks of establishing a new world order and frequently laments the fall of the Russian Empire, which at its peak included more than a dozen currently independent nations beyond Ukraine, from Finland and Poland in the west to the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia. If Putin is allowed to succeed in Ukraine, it is delusional to think he will simply stop. On the contrary, abandoning Ukraine to Russia would dramatically increase the chances of a far larger conflict in the coming years.

In order to prevent this nightmare scenario from materializing, the West must demonstrate maximum unity and an uncompromising commitment to Ukraine’s survival as an independent state. Putin interprets any talk of compromise as a sign of weakness. The only language he truly understands is the language of strength.

The most effective deterrent remains Ukrainian membership of NATO. Unsurprisingly, Putin has worked hard to prevent this from happening. He has employed nuclear blackmail to intimidate the West, and has spent years spreading false narratives about an alleged NATO security threat to Russia itself.

Putin’s objections to Ukrainian NATO membership do not stand up to scrutiny. Notably, he has been unable to explain why he went to war over Ukraine’s distant hopes of joining NATO but did nothing to oppose Finland’s recent NATO accession, despite the fact that Finnish membership of the alliance more than doubled Russia’s NATO borders overnight. Indeed, Russia already shares borders with six NATO member states and leaves these frontiers largely unguarded. Putin’s real problem is evidently with Ukrainian independence and not NATO enlargement.

Bringing Ukraine into NATO would serve as a powerful barrier to future Russian invasions and would dramatically reduce the likelihood of a major European war without undermining Russian national security. However, this would require a degree of political will on the part of the United States and major European powers including Britain, France, and Germany that is currently absent. Unless that changes, Western leaders must come up with a credible alternative to NATO membership that will guarantee Ukraine’s long-term security.

Nobody wants peace more than the Ukrainian people. But Ukrainians also recognize that well-meaning efforts to compromise with the Putin regime will only encourage further Russian aggression. Similar policies aiming to accommodate and appease Hitler led directly to World War II. If Western leaders wish to prevent a repeat of this catastrophic outcome, they must stop offering the Kremlin concessions and demonstrate the kind of resolve that Russia respects.

Oleksandr Merezhko is a member of the Ukrainian Parliament for the Servant of the People Party and Chair of the Ukrainian Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee.

Further reading

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A pragmatic peace plan for Ukraine

By Mykola Bielieskov

A pragmatic and sustainable peace is possible in Ukraine if Kyiv’s European partners dramatically increase their own defense spending while significantly strengthening the Ukrainian military, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The post The shadow of 1930s appeasement hangs over US-led peace talks appeared first on Atlantic Council.

For more than a decade, Russia has carried out information-manipulation campaigns aimed at polarizing society and undermining democracy among its neighbors and other countries in Europe. These manipulation efforts have only intensified following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. For targets of these campaigns, such as Latvia, the resilience of the country’s information space has become a national-security priority. 

In response to Russia’s actions, Latvia is developing practical tools across government, civil society, and the media to expose and counter disinformation and other tactics. It has, for example, formally recognized the information space as a domain of national defense in its National Defense Concept since 2016. Protecting an open, resilient media environment now stands alongside the pillars of military and civil preparedness in Latvia’s security strategy.

Latvia is acutely vulnerable to Kremlin-backed information influence activities due to historical ties and its large Russian-speaking minority. At the same time, Moscow’s manipulation of information is not just aimed at individual countries. There is also a broader underlying target—Western society—and Russia repurposes the methods it employs in Latvia elsewhere in the world.

To address this wider Russian threat, Latvia is sharing what it is learning with its allies and partners. It hosts NATO’s Strategic Communications Center of Excellence, and it works with allies and partners to combat malign influence. Examples of this kind of cooperation are IREX (International Research and Exchanges Board), which conducts media training in the Baltics, and the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab, which investigates disinformation and debunks narratives, educates media consumers, and has had staff based in Latvia since 2017.

Russian information influence threats in Latvia’s media space

Zeroing in on manipulation campaigns in Latvia, Russia appears to have several goals: It wants to provoke and sustain disagreements and discord within both the transatlantic community and Latvian society. It wants to discredit Ukraine and its statehood. And it wants to polarize, disinform, and multiply doubts about local and Western politics and state institutions. 

Russia has strengthened its information influence tactics over the years, transforming traditional tactics into complex campaigns that now perform across multiple domains simultaneously. Since the beginning of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s information-manipulation activities have increased in intensity and aggressiveness, using a varied spectrum of information resources to ensure the dissemination of its desired narratives. 

Russian influence operations are well-funded and adapt quickly. Until 2022, Russian state TV and radio channels dominated Latvia’s media, outmatching local Russian-language content. After Latvia banned dozens of Russian state media outlets following Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, the propaganda efforts shifted online. Kremlin narratives now spread via social media platforms such as YouTube, TikTok, and Telegram, and they are often amplified by bots, trolls, and proxy websites. Common themes distributed on these channels include portraying Latvia’s government as illegitimate and “Russophobic,” rewriting history to romanticize Soviet times, and framing NATO and the European Union (EU) as enemies. 

Cases of Russian disinformation in Latvia have risen despite efforts to control the spread of Kremlin-generated narratives. Moreover, the increasing use of artificial intelligence is allowing information manipulators to become more efficient and making detection of their efforts that much harder. In addition, the Latvian population in the border areas are still subjected to comprehensive Russian information manipulation activities via analogue broadcasting, which is available in certain regions. Approximately 20 percent of Latvia’s Russian-speaking viewers still access banned Russian state TV channels through virtual private networks (VPN). This poses a threat in the event of Russian kinetic maneuvers, as it could reduce resistance and resilience.

How Latvia is countering information influence

Latvia’s response has been to treat the information space as a critical front, viewing defense against lies and propaganda as vital as physical defense. Under its comprehensive defense strategy, the government has designated a resilient information environment as a shared responsibility of the state and society. 

Public awareness and education are central to this effort. Media literacy training is built into school curricula and community programs. The government has fostered a “culture of readiness” through regular information campaigns and hands-on materials with tips to spot falsehoods. The state has also bolstered strategic communication resources and independent media. A dedicated strategic communications unit under the State Chancellery coordinates messaging across ministries and works with social-media companies to curb fake news. Quality journalism is supported by funding and policy. Authorities have also not hesitated to ban harmful outlets. Dozens of Russian propaganda channels were taken off-air or have been penalized. In 2021, Latvia became the first Baltic state to prosecute individuals for willfully spreading dangerous falsehoods, as per the Criminal Law, though there have been few convictions due to legal ambiguity around the definition of “fake news” in Article 231. There are ongoing attempts to reword parts of the law to mention false content or disinformation explicitly.

Latvia’s multi-layered approach extends beyond government. An ecosystem of nongovernmental organizations, academics, and volunteers (such as the “Baltic Elves”) actively debunk online falsehoods and track malign campaigns. Investigative journalists and fact-checkers expose disinformation trends, while initiatives such as the Baltic Centre for Media Excellence train reporters and promote high standards in journalism. At the same time, advanced monitoring tools help detect and attribute new tactics—from bot networks to deepfakes—in collaboration with NATO’s Strategic Communications Center and other partners. Crucially, Latvia strives to balance security with free expression. Maintaining an open and resilient information environment is considered crucial to national endurance in crises.

Latvia’s strategy has its limitations. Its main approach has been one of blocking malign narratives rather than proactively projecting its own strategic messages. The planned discontinuation of funding for Russian-language content on the public broadcast from next year contradicts the policy of recognizing the need to invest in alternatives to Russia’s information space, especially for minorities and older Russian-speakers less comfortable online. This could push approximately a fifth of Latvia’s Russian-speakers further into the Kremlin’s info-sphere. The experiment of welcoming Russian independent media has had mixed results. These outlets primarily focus on audiences in Russia and Latvian policymakers have placed few expectations on them for working within the Latvian information space. Thus, sustaining quality Russian-language media content remains a challenge. Furthermore, years of low financing for media, especially public media, in earlier years has been attributed as a root cause of the current information vulnerability.

The roles of partners and allies

Although the Baltic states are often considered to have the broadest experience within NATO in dealing with Russia’s influence campaigns and activities, the Kremlin has also targeted other allies with information manipulation. Latvia’s experience has contributed to broader transatlantic defense efforts on this challenge, generating support from the United States in setting up media-resilience programs and coordinating closely on counterpropaganda efforts. Latvia’s advocacy helped push NATO to treat disinformation as a core security issue. For example, NATO exercises in the Baltics now include simulated information-warfare scenarios, and the Alliance has fielded counterhybrid support teams that can deploy to allies under attack. 

However, success depends heavily on continued support from major partners such as the United States. There are concerns that the United States could step back from efforts to counter foreign disinformation, which some US policymakers have framed as a “censorship industrial complex.” This could leave allies exposed and weaken collective resolve, particularly impacting European nations heavily targeted by Russian influence operations. There is also a risk that in the absence of firm US leadership, European counterparts may follow suit, potentially undermining the credibility and resilience of liberal democracies. Furthermore, Russia does not appear constricted by political, ethical, moral, or legal considerations, making its abilities more flexible, broad, and therefore harder to counter in any democratic society built on free-speech principles. Thus, sustaining international cooperation and collective defense is crucial.

The EU has also begun to recalibrate. In April of this year, the European Commission unveiled ProtectEU, a strategy aimed at reinforcing the bloc’s ability to anticipate, prevent, and respond to hybrid threats, acknowledging the blurred line between hybrid interference and warfare, particularly citing Russia’s campaigns. The Commission is proposing to expand the powers of EU law enforcement agencies to tackle such threats more effectively, signaling a more integrated approach. The EU Digital Service Act also helps regulate large platforms and the spread of disinformation. For ProtectEU to succeed, member states need coordination, integration, and the political will to overcome frictions around data sharing and sovereignty. If the United States pulls back from the continent, Europe has an opportunity to step forward, potentially becoming the vanguard in defending democratic values.

Where to start

To effectively counter information manipulation in this evolving threat landscape, policymakers in targeted countries should adopt a multi-pronged approach drawing on steps Latvia has taken. 

Latvia’s experience demonstrates that even a small democracy can bolster its media space. By combining policy tools, public education, media support, active debunking, and international partnerships, Latvia built a layered defense. The fight is a marathon, not a sprint, requiring agility and continuous refinement of strategies. Unity is key. Collective resilience is achievable when nations pool knowledge and stand firm. Latvia’s example shows that with proactive measures, societies can strengthen their “information immune system” and fortify democracy against propaganda and lies.

One of the lessons from the Baltics, and especially the Latvian experience, is that strengthening the national counterdisinformation framework and building resilience are crucial. This involves treating the information domain as a formal element of national security with clear leadership allocation and integrated policies. Educating the public in media literacy creates a resilient society over time, resulting in a populace less likely to be duped by fake news and minimizing the impact of influence activities. Regularly reviewing and updating laws and regulations helps address modern manipulation techniques. Explicitly defining disinformation-related offenses empowers law enforcement to act in egregious cases without imposing broad censorship. Individual countries can also empower media regulators to take action against channels facilitating foreign influence.

Countries looking to foster a robust and independent information ecosystem need to support reliable information sources and actively counter falsehoods. Governments and citizens need to support independent and local media, including minority-language content, which provides credible alternatives and acts as a bulwark against external propaganda, filling gaps hostile actors might exploit. Governments can partner with private companies (social media platforms, for example) and media organizations to improve resilience and facilitate the flagging and removal of malicious content. Countries can also leverage nongovernmental organizations to allow for faster debunking within communities, often with greater trust. Using innovative forms of communication like art, stand-up, and gamification can reach audiences unresponsive to traditional media.

Working with allies multiplies the effectiveness of what individual states are doing. Actively participating in international coalitions and working toward common standards, such as joint incident response protocols, ensures a unified response and prevents adversaries from exploiting gaps or moving operations next door.

Even as this work progresses, important challenges persist. Democratic countries must counter influence within political, ethical, moral, and legal constraints, while adversaries often operate without such limits. The main task is avoiding the restriction of public debate while still countering malign influence. As with other Western democracies, Latvia’s main strategy has been blocking disinformation, but proactive narrative projection is lacking. Relying so much on reactive policies gives Russia and other sources of information manipulation a large advantage.

Elīna Vrobļevska is a researcher at the Center for East European policy studies and lecturer and researcher at Rīga Stradiņš University. Her primary research focuses on Russian foreign policy and narrative construction in the public sphere. 

Beniamino Irdi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Previously, Irdi served within the Italian government in various capacities related to foreign affairs and security policy, including as a special adviser to Italy’s minister of foreign affairs.

This article is part of a series in partnership between the Atlantic Council and the Centre for East European Policy Studies.

The post What’s the best way to deal with Russian information manipulation? Latvia has answers. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Public Event Thu, May 1, 2025 • 3:00 pm ET

French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot on Europe and the new world order

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT—French Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs Jean-Noël Barrot will share his vision of Europe’s role for the future of transatlantic relations.

Europe & Eurasia Politics & Diplomacy

Speaker

Jean-Noël Barrot
Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs of the Republic of France

Moderator

Frederick Kempe
President and CEO, Atlantic Council

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

FREDERICK KEMPE: Good afternoon to those joining us in our headquarters, our relatively new global headquarters here in Washington today. Good evening to those watching online from Europe. Hello to everyone joining us from throughout the world. My name is Fred Kempe. I’m president and CEO of the Atlantic Council. And I’m delighted to welcome you to Atlantic Council Front Page. This is our premier platform for global leaders. And it’s an honor to host today the Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs of the French Republic Jean-Noël Barrot. Today’s discussion turns our attention to one of the most enduring and consequential bilateral relationships in US history.

In the nearly two-and-a-half centuries since France became the first country to formalize diplomatic relations with the newly born United States—and next year, Mr. Minister, is the anniversary of the revolution here—France became the first country to formalize diplomatic relations with the newly born United States. Since that time, this pillar of the transatlantic relationship has seen moments of triumph and moments of trial. From Lafayette and Washington to the beaches of Normandy, the United States and France have forged a partnership unlike any other, based on common values and history.

However, this relationship goes beyond just sentiment. At each major inflection point in recent history, our countries have stood together. Not just because of friendship, but because of shared interests. And now, facing a war on European soil, facing an unfolding trade war, potentially, rapidly evolving technological disruptions, and more, the United States and France must consider how to recalibrate and perhaps how to reinvent its partnership, and the broader Atlantic alliance with it, in order to achieve our common goals of security, prosperity, and freedom.

As we think through how best to address these challenges, we are delighted to welcome Minister Barrot for today’s event, and on the occasion of his first visit to the United States in his current role. The minister has held numerous positions in the French government, including most recently minister delegate for Europe, and then minister delegate for digital affairs, making him well-placed to share the French perspective on the political dynamics at the EU level, as well as critical issues of digital and tech policy. And it may help in these times also to be an economist. Minister Barrot, so, welcome to the Atlantic Council.

Before we begin, let me just say to our audience that we will be taking questions. First Minister Barrot will make some opening comments, then I will join him on the stage and ask a few questions, and then turn to the audience for questions. For those in person, we’ll have a microphone to pass around. For those online, please go to AskAC.org, AskAC.org, to send your question in virtually.

Minister Barrot, it’s always a pleasure to have someone speak at the end of meetings in Washington instead of the beginning of meetings of Washington. So we look very much forward to your reflections.

JEAN-NOËL BARROT: Thank you very much, Mr. President. Hello, everyone.

One week from now on May 8 we’ll mark an important anniversary, the eightieth anniversary of the end of World War II in Europe. This was the starting point of an extraordinary endeavor, a formidable building—the building of rule-based international order, the building of multilateralism.

Who was the architect of this formidable building? Well, the architect of this building were the United States of America. They did not do this out of charity. They did this as—out of enlightened self-interest. They collected substantial dividends from multilateralism throughout the eight decades that have just passed by. The dividends of multilateralism—think about security. Thanks to the nonproliferation treaty, we collectively have avoided a race to the nuclear bomb that would have caused so much instability and raised the cost of defense for all our countries. NATO has allowed the US, alongside its European partners, to ensure security in the North Atlantic, but also a tool for major investment opportunities for its defense industry.

Think about trade. WTO has allowed the US economy to grow, has allowed US services to thrive—digital services, financial services, around the world.

Think about currency. The Bretton Woods Institution, the Bretton Woods framework have made the dollar a global reserve currency. What does it mean to be a global reserve currency? It means that everyone wants to hold you so that the yields on your Treasury bonds are the lowest on earth. And even more than that, when there is a crisis—even when there is a crisis in the US, people rush to buy your Treasury bonds, and the cost of borrowing goes down.

This exorbitant privilege, as a French president coined it, is part of the dividends of multilateralism that the US brought to the world and that they also benefitted from.

This formidable building, the building of multilateralism, was designed eighty years ago for a unipolar war, where a benevolent hegemon, the United States of America, was the guarantor of rule-based international order. A world in which US leadership was unchallenged, untested.

But eighty years later, indeed, the world has changed. It has become multipolar. US leadership is challenged, and sometimes multilateralism seems powerless or unfit for purpose. And therefore, and gradually, a temptation arises for the US to perhaps let go of multilateralism, quit multilateralism, to pull back, to restrain. This is a sovereign choice that belongs to the American people. But this would be a major shift—a major shift for the US, who would not be able to collect the dividends of multilateralism any longer; a major shift for the world, because the multilateralism will survive whether or not the US quit multilateralism.

And so someone will fill the void, starting with China, who is already getting ready to step up and to become the new hegemon of this new era of multilateralism, in the case where the US would decide to let them play this role.

Now, there is another route. There is an alternative route. Rather than quitting multilateralism, reshaping it, adjusting it, making it fit for the twenty-first century. The first step—and this is a difficult step—is accepting to share the power in order not to lose it altogether. This means reforming the UN and its Security Council, reforming the financial infrastructure to make space for big emerging countries, and share the burden with them, but also hold them responsible because they have part of the burden to share in handling the global issues and challenges.

The second step when building multilateral for a multipolar world is to be ready to build coalitions of the willing to overcome obstruction in multilateral fora like the UN Security Council when they arise. It’s not because something won’t happen at the UN or the IMF or the World Bank that you cannot design a coalition of the willing with willing and able countries in order to overcome this obstruction.

This is the new era of multilateralism and this is the route that Europe is willing to take and that Europe is hoping to take alongside the United States of America. One week from now we’ll celebrate another anniversary, not on May 8th but on May 9th, the seventy-fifth anniversary of the birth of Europe.

On May 9th of 1950 my distant predecessor Robert Schuman woke up in a country, France, that was five years past World War II but where tensions were arising with the neighbor and rival Germany.

Germany was recovering from the war faster than France was and so what was the tendency in Paris on that day in that year? Well, the tendency was protectionism, was raising tariffs, raising barriers, to prevent Germany from thriving and fully recovering.

And so Robert Schuman, as he was heading to the council of ministers, he had this crazy idea in mind to put in common steel and coal across France and Germany, swimming against the tide to favor cooperation over confrontation.

At the council of ministers he barely mentioned this initiative for his prime minister not to prevent him from announcing it, and at 6:00 p.m. in a 1:30 speech he made this unilateral offer to create the European steel and coal community and laid the foundation of a multilateral cooperative European Union.

So, you see, when times are hard and when the tendency is to restrain, pull back, raise barriers, those visionary men that brought us prosperity and that brought us peace in European continent they swam against the tide and offer innovative models for cooperation.

So let us find inspiration in the great work of these visionary people. Thank you very much.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Minister Barrot, that was a—I feel that was a very important statement, and I’m going to start with that. You see by the audience and standing room only that there’s a lot of interest in this conversation and what you had to say.

The seventy-fifth anniversary of the birth of Europe, the eightieth anniversary of VE Day all next week—thank you for calling attention to that—and it seemed really to be a call to your American allies and to the current administration to stay the course on multilateralism and transatlantic engagement, et cetera.

So, A, do you intend it as that? And it’s no accident no one in this audience who’s following the news, everyone knows that there are doubts right now in the transatlantic stream. Not all of them do I share. But I just wonder if you could give us a little bit more of the context for your statement.

JEAN-NOËL BARROT: Well, we deeply care about the rule-based international order, multilateralism. So I spent two days in New York at the Security Council as we were wrapping up our presidency. You know, the fifteen members of Security Council, they get a one-month presidency every fifteen months. And so you try and make the most of your month’s-long presidency. And to give you a sense of what our commitment is, I am—we are very committed to the three fundamental missions of United Nations—peace and security, human rights, sustainable developments.

That’s why we had three important security meetings, Ukraine, Middle East, but also nonproliferation, in a closed-door Security Council meeting that was on proliferation that was first convened in fifteen years—was last convened fifteen years ago. On human rights, we brought together—I was mentioning coalitions of the willing. International humanitarian law is under attack, let’s say. And we brought together countries from all around the world—east, south, west, and north—in a coalition of the willing to support politically and better implement in practice the rules of international humanitarian law.

And then third, on sustainable development, we took this opportunity to bring together the countries that are the most committed, like we are, to the preservation of oceans, forty days ahead of the third United Nations Conference on Oceans that will take place in Nice, south of France, and is—and that is aimed to be the equivalent for ocean as what the Paris accord has been for carbon emissions. So we’re very ambitious with this event. We need as many countries as possible to rally some of the key deliverables of this conference. And so I decided I would spend some time at the UN talking about that.

So we think this is the right way to go, adjusting multilateralism to make it more efficient in the multipolar world that we’re—that we’re living in. And I hear that the new leadership in the—in the US is considering what its course of action is going to be. And I think amongst friends that have—that are actually the oldest friends, we owe each other, you know, an honest discussion on what we see our common interests to be. And I think that was the sense of my introductory remarks.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Thank you so much. And I think you’re seeing a signal of commitment today, I think, toward the United Nations, with the nomination of National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, to be the UN ambassador. So also an interesting piece of news.

Speaking of news, you have had meetings here. We do have media. French, US, other here. And I wonder whether you could tell us your perspective on what you take away from your conversations with Secretary Rubio, with others. Anything specific that we can take away from that? And then in that context, as you’re looking at what your greatest challenges are, what were the priorities in your conversations with US leadership?

JEAN-NOËL BARROT: Well, I mentioned the ninth of May and seventy-fifth anniversary of this declaration by Robert Schuman. This year will be in Ukraine, because I think a very important—a significant chunk of our future, and I’m not talking about the future of Europeans only, depends on how this war of aggression is going to end. So we’ll be with my fellow European ministers of foreign affairs there to express our support to Ukraine and our willingness for this war to end in accordance with the UN Charter and international law. So that was clearly an important topic that I discussed with US leadership at the State Department, as well as Capitol Hill.

But we also discussed the Middle East, where France and the US have been leading the effort to put an end to the war that was basically destroying Lebanon eight months ago. We managed to broker a ceasefire five months ago, to monitor the ceasefire through a joint mechanism. We managed to create the conditions for the end of a political crisis, with the election of President Joseph Aoun, that then appointed a government that is now at work trying to implement the reforms that are long due in Lebanon.

And we want to do the same thing—same fruitful cooperation—in Syria, where this—after overturning the dictatorship of Bashar al-Assad there is an opportunity to build a strong, sovereign country that will be a source of stability rather than instability for the region.

I cannot let aside Gaza and the Israel-Palestinian conflict, where, again, we converge on the necessity to bring back stability and peace to the region. We have praised the Abraham Accord logic. And we are working in the same direction, bringing Muslim and Arabic countries in the region and Israel towards a security architecture that would ensure the security of all peace and stability.

We also discussed Africa, where the US made a breakthrough in handling or in sort of moving towards a cessation of hostilities in the Great Lakes regions in the east of the Democratic Republic of Congo, where the second-worst humanitarian crisis is happening right now. This is good. And after they were received or they were hosted by the Department of State a few days ago, the ministers of DRC and Rwanda gathered in Qatar with France and with the United States.

So, as you can see, on some of the major, major issues, major crises, France and the US are working together, you know, to find the right solutions. Sometime we’ll disagree. Sometime we don’t start from the same point. But look at Lebanon. It’s because of our complementary, because of different history in the region, because of the different nature of our partnership/relationship/friendship with the stakeholders of that crisis that we were able to broker a ceasefire and a political solution.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Thank you for that answer.

Let’s start with Ukraine. News yesterday about a critical minerals deal with Ukraine. Almost more interested in the political side of this than the economic side of this. Talking to Ukrainian officials over the last few months, they’ve been concerned that the US had gone more from being an actual partner of Ukraine in trying to counter Russian threat and the Russian attack and more of an arbitrator, more of a moderator. This critical mineral deal, if you read the language of it, suggests a little bit of a change of direction. And I just wonder—and that is an area where, you know, France and the US have not always been entirely singing from the same song sheet. What did you hear during your trip there? How do you assess this new agreement and its political meaning?

JEAN-NOËL BARROT: Well, I think it’s a very good agreement. I think it’s a very good agreement for Ukraine and also for the US.

But I also think that it tells us something very important about what’s happening right now. Let’s go back to the Oval Office when President Zelensky was there. What was the expectation by President Trump with respect to Ukraine? Well, actually, there were two expectations: ceasefire and sign a minerals deal. Since then, on March 9 in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, Ukraine accepted a comprehensive ceasefire. And yesterday night, they agreed to a minerals deal with the United States of America. They’ve done their part of the job. They’ve walked their part of the talk.

But in the meantime, we haven’t seen Vladimir Putin send any signal, any sign of its willingness to comply with the requests of President Trump. To the very contrary. So let’s face it: Right now the main obstacle to peace is Vladimir Putin.

So what I found very interesting my meetings here in Washington is the efforts—the commendable efforts by Senator Lindsey Graham, who put together a massive package of sanctions that he—that he collected bipartisan support for, with almost seventy senators now signing the bill, which is aimed at threatening Russia into accepting a ceasefire or else those sanctions will apply. And here again, we agreed that we would try to coordinate because we, Europeans, are in the process of putting together a seventeenth sanction package that we are going to try on substance and timing to coordinate with Senator Graham’s own package.

That was perhaps a bit of a long answer, but in summary, it’s good news that this deal was struck. It’s good news that the US—and I heard Secretary Bessent express what he had in mind, that the US are considering deep economic cooperation with Ukraine. It goes in the right direction. It’s the right course that they should—that should be taken, basically.

FREDERICK KEMPE: And Secretary Bessent also said this is meant to be a signal to Putin, and you see it as that, as well?

JEAN-NOËL BARROT: Yeah. Put together this deal, the package by Lindsey Graham—who last time I checked is not a political adversary of President Trump—as well as the pressure that Europe is building up on Russia, and you get a sense of—well, the fact that it’s now basically Putin’s fault if we don’t yet have a ceasefire in Ukraine.

FREDERICK KEMPE: So, you’ve—in recent discussions with US Envoy Steve Witkoff, what divergences existed between France and the United States, and how do you hope to close those divergences? I guess part of this has to do with European troops, American backstop, but it also gets to the conditions behind a peace deal.

JEAN-NOËL BARROT: Now, listen. If Ukraine was to capitulate, this would have long-lasting, wide-ranging consequences for the entire world, because it would basically replace rule-based international order by the law of the strongest. It would create massive incentives for countries around the world that have borders issue with their neighbors to consider that they can invade or they can use military threat or force to obtain territorial concessions. This would be major. And this would be very costly for all of us, at least for responsible powers like the US and France that tend to get involved when there are issues around the world, where we would see issues exploding all around the world. It would be major instability.

In addition to that, should Ukraine capitulate after Ukraine has agreed to let go of its nuclear weapons in exchange for security guarantees, this will send a signal that the only ultimate security guarantee is the possession of nuclear weapons. And there, you have a nuclear proliferation crisis which, again, raises global instability at levels that we haven’t seen for the past eighty years, and will increase the cost massively of security in the US, security in Europe. And I think this view is shared between the US and France.

But, of course, there is one difference between the perspective of the US and the European perspective on this crisis, which is that our own security is at stake because we are neighbors of Russia, or because we don’t want to be neighbors of this Russia that is now spending 40 percent of its budget on its military spending, 10 percent of its GDP, that just conscribed 160,000 additional soldiers, the largest conscription in fourteen years. I’ve heard many, many times Russia say that they don’t want NATO at their borders. Well, we don’t want this Russia at our borders either.

And that’s why we are so serious about what’s happening, about how the war will end. And that’s why we’ve been insisting so much about the security guarantees. And I think our message went through. And I think the US are counting on us to build the security arrangements such that when the peace deal is struck that we can provide those security arrangements in order for the peace to be lasting and durable. But I think it’s well understood. And I’ve heard President Trump, but also officials from the US, clearly say that, of course, they want this peace to be lasting. And of course, this means that there is security guarantee for Ukraine.

FREDERICK KEMPE: And can it work without an American backstop? Are you getting closer to a conversation about that? Or, alternatively, is this critical minerals deal a security guarantee, in a different form?

JEAN-NOËL BARROT: So you should put things into perspective. We are—we have been supporters of the Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine. Namely, we’ve said that we were open to extend an invitation, a NATO invitation, to Ukraine. We understand that NATO members—not all NATO members agree with our view. And so we have to find an alternative path. This alternative path is the sense of this coalition of the able, of the willing, that France and the UK has been putting together in order to design those security arrangements. This is ongoing work. This starts with making the Ukrainian army strong enough to be able to deter any further aggression by Russia, but it also very likely means some form of military capacity as a second layer of such a guarantee.

When those detailed discussions will have been wrapped up, they’re currently ongoing, it will appear whether or not, and how much, any contribution or backstop by the US is needed. It’s possible that it is needed. Why? Well, because as far as Europeans are concerned, we’ve been working—we’ve been—we’ve been working and planning for our defense. It’s a little bit—little bit different for France, the UK, and Poland. But for the rest of European armies, we’ve been working within NATO frameworks. So if—you know, if you’re going to work on a security arrangement outside of a NATO framework, then at some point you might need some kind of NATO-like enablers, or, you know, make items that are going to make sure that the security arrangement is robust.

But that being said, in the same way we fully understand that the US have decided that they will—they will likely reduce their commitment within NATO. We also understand that they are counting on us to bear the burden of providing the security arrangements. But we also need to be honest with them, once we’ve done our homework, if there are pieces of these security arrangements that cannot be replaced—you know, that can be—cannot be found outside of, you know, US contribution. We’ll just be honest.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Excellent answer. Thank you so much.

The one thing you didn’t mention in your opening comments is you didn’t talk about—you didn’t talk about tariffs. You knew I was going to say tariffs. And I wonder if it came up at all in your discussions. And also, I wonder if you could talk a little bit about what—you know, this ninety-day pause gives a potential for an agreement. What sort of agreement can you imagine, or what is the direction of agreement with the European Union and the United States? How concerned are you about the tariffs driving a more lasting wedge across the Atlantic?

JEAN-NOËL BARROT: Well, the good thing, when you’re a foreign minister—the foreign affairs minister for France, is that you’re not responsible for tariffs. It’s the European Commission. That being said, you’re allowed to have your own view on things. And indeed, as an economist, I have to say, otherwise I would be a traitor to my profession, that tariffs are not good news. Are not a good idea. President Trump wants to bring jobs back to America. And this is a perfectly legitimate ambition. In fact, we have the same in Europe. We want to bring jobs back to Europe. But tariffs are probably not the best way to achieve this objective.

Tariffs are in tax on our economies. It’s a tax on the middle class. And it will make us, Europeans as well as Americans, poorer. We do have research on what happened during the last trade war, the 2018 trade war. What happened? Well, the effect on the economy on this side of the Atlantic was limited. It’s basically a seven billion loss—a seven-billion-dollar loss on the economy. That’s not big, but it led to a massive transfer from the US consumer middle class of fifty billion [dollars]. So a loss for the US consumer of fifty billion [dollars]; transferred to producers nine billion [dollars], to the government 35 billion [dollars], and the rest is what’s lost from US economy. So it’s a mild loss but it’s a massive transfer from the US consumers to the US government. That’s what happened last time around, and those numbers are small because the trade war at the time was very limited.

Multiply this, right, by ten and you’ll get the kind of effects that you’re going to see on European economies, US economies, and so on. So our hope is to reach the same type of outcome that we got the last time around. The US applied tariffs, we retaliated, and then at some point we suspended those. We lifted those tariffs.

It was not the same administration that did it but still those tariffs were lifted, and I really hope that we’ll get to this objective because, again, we’re very closely intertwined economies so we have a lot to lose while we have major rivals, adversaries, competitors, that are going to benefit massively from this trade war if we sort of choose confrontation over cooperation.

FREDERICK KEMPE: So let me ask one quick follow-up there and then I’ll go to the audience. On the tariffs, you know, did you raise this issue when you were here—you are the foreign minister but it is a political as well as an economic issue—and did you get any indications of what direction the agreement could go?

JEAN-NOËL BARROT: Well, the good thing about being Marco Rubio is that you’re not in charge of tariffs either. But when we met in NATO I told him that if there was only one positive aspect of those tariffs is that by lowering GDPs that would allow us to reach our NATO targets faster.

FREDERICK KEMPE: That’s on the record, everybody.

Let me take a first question from Bill Drozdiak.

Q: William Drozdiak, author and journalist.

We seem to be entering a phase—a new intensive phase of big-power rivalry with the United States retreating from security commitments in Europe, Russian military militarizing its society and having designs on other neighbors besides Ukraine, and China seeking economic domination of the world. President Macron has spoken often about the need for Europe to achieve greater strategic autonomy. Do you think Europe should seek to constitute a fourth bloc even at the risk of putting greater space between its principal—with its principal ally, the United States?

And a quick follow-up. You spoke about the need to share power in a multilateral context. In terms of UN Security Council reform is France prepared to fold its seat into the European Union presence or would you also agree to the idea of expanding the Security Council to have ten to twelve nations?

JEAN-NOËL BARROT: Well, thank you. So you mentioned Russia. You mentioned the four blocs. That was your first question.

I wouldn’t call Russia a bloc. Russia has a GDP that is twenty times smaller than the EU. I wouldn’t call that a bloc. Russia is a big country geographically. It is, you know, one of the winning nations of the Second World War so it has a—you know, there are a number of consequences coming with that including the permanent seat at the Security Council. But I wouldn’t call Russia a bloc.

And we don’t see the—we don’t see ourselves—when we speak about strategic autonomy we don’t see ourselves as entering into a logic of blocs or spheres of influence and stuff like that. We remain committed to multilateralism, rule-based international world order, balance.

The only thing is that in a more brutal world—brutal world—if you want to be heard and be respected when you’re upholding the values that Europe and the EU are upholding—freedom, democracy, free speech, and so on—you’re going to need to be much stronger, much less dependent on other regions.

And so we see our strategic autonomy as a way to defend a model which is an open model, which is a balanced model, which is a multilateral model of governance for the world. And we see a lot of sort of appetite for this approach, because since those trade wars started we cannot count the number of countries that are knocking at EU’s door to strike a trade deal or even to become a candidate. And it’s not only Iceland and Norway that seem to be interested; I heard that on this side of the Atlantic there are people considering it. And you know that there is one geographical criteria, but I just want to mention that even though it’s a very, very, very, very tiny island in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean—no one lives there; I think it’s, like, twenty meters long—but this island is split between Canada and Denmark, which gives Canada an actual border with the European Union.

And the second question is about reform. So I want quickly because I was told that remarks should not be long in introduction of those conversations, but I really think that if we want to adjust those institutions—Security Council and so on—to the new era, we need to accept that others have grown over the past eighty years and they need to—they need to be represented, but they also need to take their responsibility. Some of them are no longer developing countries; they are actual major economies, major powers. So they should have a seat at the table, but they should also behave as major powers.

So what’s our position? Our position is a permanent seat at the Security Council for India, Germany, Japan, Brazil, and two African countries, with all associated prerogatives. This is what we want for the reform of the Security Council.

But we also want the same kind of thing to happen with the international financial institutions. And this is the spirit of what President Macron has called the Paris pact for all, the pact for the people and the planet, where the idea is the following: No country in the south should have to choose between fighting against poverty and fighting against climate change. So it should be more balanced, more equal, sort of equitable funding for southern countries. But those emerging countries for the south—from the south that are now developed economies should also bear their responsibilities with respect to the least-developed countries, with the poorest countries on the planet. Because right now some of them are sort of bunching with the least-advanced countries to not sort of take their responsibility with respect to the poorest countries. So that’s the spirit in which we’re pushing. And in fact, I had a meeting dedicated to Security Council reform on Monday in New York with some of the African countries that are working on it.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Thank you for that clear answer.

Well, we’re got a lot of questions now. I saw this gentleman first, and then we’ll go—I’ll figure it out. We’ll figure it out. Where have I got—I want to turn to the French press here at some point. If there’s anyone here that wants to—there we go. That’s what I’m going to do next. There we go. Please.

Q: Thank you, Foreign Minister.

In context with President Macron’s call to Prime Minister Modi of India in solidarity after the terror attack in Pahalgam, Kashmir, India, do you see a justifiable response by India against this attack as another roadblock to ensuring the India-Middle East corridor gets off the ground? Of course, it was set back after the Israel-Hamas war. And did that conversation come up in your discussion with Secretary Rubio today? And if not, then what do we need to do, collectively as the international community, to make sure this gets off the ground?

FREDERICK KEMPE: Could you identify yourself too?

Q: Oh yes. Jay Kansara. Jay Kansara, independent analyst.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Great.

JEAN-NOËL BARROT: Thank you. So President Macron has been in touch with Prime Minister Modi. I’ve been in touch on the phone two times with Dr. Jaishankar, my fellow foreign affairs minister from India. We expressed solidarity. We’ve expressed that we stand alongside India to fight against terrorism. Of course, we hope for restraint on both sides, for the tensions not to escalate. And I heard Secretary Rubio called Pakistan to formally recognize the terrorist nature of this attack, and to condemn it in the strongest possible way. And I would happily join his call to Pakistan to recognize the terrorist nature of this—of what happened. And we’ll keep in touch with Marco Rubio, but also with my fellow minister David Lammy from Great Britain, the UK, and my Indian colleague in order to ensure or to try and avoid an escalation in the region.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Please?

Q: Good afternoon, Minister. Piotr Smolar from the French newspaper Le Monde.

I have two questions, the first one regarding security guarantees for Ukraine. For months France supported the idea of a deployment of a sort of international monitoring force in Ukraine but with very strong American security guarantees. The Trump administration doesn’t seem to see eye-to-eye on this. They don’t—they are not inclined to offer any sort of serious security guarantees. So what’s the plan B? Have you given up on this two-fold idea or not?

And the second question, regarding Iran. There are currently very important discussions between the Trump administration, direct and indirect with the Iranian representatives. For a very long time France was in favor of putting on the table as well with Iran the ballistic issue. That doesn’t seem the case at all right now. The Trump administration is basically considering a sort of JCPOA—revisit it, or maybe an interim agreement. So what’s your view exactly on the current discussions?

JEAN-NOËL BARROT: Thank you. So on the first question, let me just clarify, because I think it’s important that everyone gets this right. There are two things. First there is a ceasefire, and the ceasefire needs to be monitored. And the coalition of the able and willing, put together by France and the UK, have been working on proposals so that the minute a ceasefire is brokered that the US have in their hands—because they will be sort of the guardians of the ceasefire—solutions for this ceasefire to be monitored. And this might involve some European capacity just to, you know, to check what’s happening and the line of contact and to be able to attribute violations. So that’s one thing.

But the ceasefire is only one step towards what’s our end goal, which is a full-fledged peace treaty or peace agreement. This peace agreement that the Ukrainians and Russians will be discussing—but that was President Trump’s intuition—this discussion cannot happen while the war is happening in Ukraine. That’s why you need a ceasefire for the discussion to start.

It will end up with discussions on territories and discussions on security guarantees. And with the same coalition of the able and willing, we’re working on this second piece, which is security guarantees. But security guarantee has nothing to do with monitoring the ceasefire. Security guarantee is deterrence against any further aggression. How do you do that? Well, as I was saying earlier, the first layer is to porcupine the Ukrainian army, for it to be deterrent enough for anyone to try and invade. But then you probably have in other layers—so, military capacity, deployed in Ukraine or around Ukraine, and that’s what we’re working on. And when the moment is ripe, we will get to the Americans and ask them or tell them what is it we need for this security guarantee to be. And we’re working on this, and we’re confident. And again, as I was saying, I’ve heard President Trump on several occasions speak in a way that shows that he understands the importance of this security guarantee.

And then on Iran—very important topic that I should have mentioned in response to your first question, Mr. President, because this is a topic on which we’ve been coordinating with Marco Rubio on day one—from day one.

We are supporting, encouraging the discussion that the US opened with Iran. Why? Because Iran is posing a major threat to our security interests because we, France—Marseilles—are within reach, and because our partners—close partners in the region are also within reach. So we are very serious about this question. But we believe that there is no other route, no other path than a diplomatic path to solve this issue. That there is no military solution to this issue, and that any form of military attempt to solve this issue would have very large costs that we would not like to bear.

So in order for this discussion to be as successful as possible, we’ve been coordinating with the US on substance and timing. Substance, because our teams have been working over the past few months ahead of the expiration of the JCPOA, of the nuclear agreement that was struck ten years ago and is that is expiring in the fall. So we were getting ready for this expiration. And we have a clear idea of, indeed, what might be a robust and protective deal for us. And this would include, indeed, some of the ballistic components, but also the regional activities, components. And the substance is what is sort of at the disposal of US negotiators, because it’s for free and there is no copyright. And I was very transparent with that.

But we also coordinated on timing, because we will not hesitate to reapply all the sanctions that we lifted ten years ago when JCPOA was struck in the case where the IAEA confirms that Iran has violated its obligations under JCPOA, and if it happens that by the summer we don’t have a protective—or, a deal that is sufficiently protective of our security interests.

FREDERICK KEMPE: So we—this has got to be the last question. I really apologize to others, but I saw that gentleman’s hand up first right here in the middle. So—no, no. There we go. Yes, please. Thank you. Yes. Yeah, thank you. Thank you.

Q: Mr. Minister, thank you for being here. I’m Alex Saint-Jemi from Transfer Paris and Georgetown University.

You mentioned very clearly the fact that the PRC will fill the void caused by US disengagement during your opening speech. I’d like to know what’s your opinion, what’s your take on what will—how France will balance its relationship with the US and at the same time with China, in light of the fact that France needs new partners, and also in light of the fact that President Trump openly asked European leaders to break ties with the PRC. Thank you.

FREDERICK KEMPE: And since this is the last question, let me add to it. Let me add to it on the tariff front, because, you know, in your conversations here—and you’ve spoken before about the relationship between the European Union and China on the trade front—does this tariff policy drive Europe more into the hands of trade and economic relationships with China? And if you believe that, have you said that to your interlocutors here in Washington during your visit?

JEAN-NOËL BARROT: I mean, it’s obvious, no? We were—I mean, you know, whether you want it or not, look at what happened. I mean, read economic research. The numbers I quoted earlier are from a paper in the Quarterly Journal of Economics called the Return to Protectionism. It’s the best paper on the 2018 trade war, best economic paper, research paper. But any paper will tell you that what happened last time is that it was—you know, during the 2018 trade war it’s not like suddenly factories moved from one country to another. It was a reshuffling of international trade. So you’re going to see a lot of reshuffling.

You mentioned the—or, you recalled what I said up there on China and filling the void. Listen to Chinese official speeches now. And, again, we take all of this with lots of grains of salt, but my colleague, Wang Yi, minister of foreign affairs, now in all his speeches is saying how much he cares about multilateralism. And I’m sure—no, but he seriously is saying this constantly. And he will—I mean, I’m pretty sure that they will consider filling the void at the World Health Organization. I’m pretty sure that they will—anytime they will see some pullback, they will try to step in. Because they have two—there are two possible strategies. Either the US are there filling the void, and then they will try to build sort of formats outside of the established formats, as we’ve seen them do; or they will see US pullback and then they will try and fill the void.

Now, what’s our relationship with China, as far as Europe is concerned? Again, we’re lucid. We are—we’re not blind. And so we think there can be a trade agenda with China, so long as some of the issues that we’ve had are solved, which is not quite the case now. Because we’ve also had our trade war with China those past few years, with us sanctioning Chinese EVs and them sanctioning European brandies, which mean cognac and armagnac. So this is dear to our heart, and we—of course, it’s going to be difficult to engage into an actual trade agenda with them until those sort of contentious issues are solved. Then we can.

But of course, our discussion cannot only touch upon trade. And when China is supporting Russia’s war of aggression, when China is on the side of DPRK, on the side of Iran, proliferating countries that are threatening this Non-Proliferation Treaty and sort of the global stability, it’s difficult to build trust. And so if China wants to establish sort of a trusted relationship with European countries, it will have to show also that it takes our security interests into account. Otherwise, it will—it might—it might be challenging.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Thank you for—you have your answer? . . . Yes. Great. Thank you.

So, look, this—Minister Barrot, on behalf of the audience, on behalf of the Atlantic Council, thank you for three things: First of all, for your visit to the United States, a very timely visit, very crucial moment; second of all, for taking so much time with us at the Atlantic Council and talking so frankly and clearly in your opening statement, and in this fascinating engagement; and then, most of all, for our enduring alliance. So thank you so much.

JEAN-NOËL BARROT: Thank you.

Watch the full event

The post French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot on US tariffs, European security, and risks from Russia, China, and Iran appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On April 26, Andrew Michta, senior fellow in the GeoStrategy Initiative, was published in 19FortyFive on the increasingly distant relations between Washington and Brussels that threaten to harm the future of the transatlantic alliance. He argues that the tensions between the United States and Europe are not merely based on policy but instead represent fundamental differences between how US President Trump and European leaders see the world. The piece was featured in RealClearDefense.   

Staff

Andrew A. Michta

Senior Fellow, GeoStrategy Initiative

GeoStrategy Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Central Europe Eastern Europe

The post Michta in 19FortyFive and RealClearDefense on how a growing ideological gap across the Atlantic threatens NATO  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Most days are quiet at the crossing, border guards tell me. Motor traffic was closed on the bridge after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The checkpoint primarily serves pedestrians moving back and forth to see family. But the guards know intuitively that things could change at any moment with Russia, as they have many times before. 

Today, Lithuanians see a Russia that is in it for the long haul in a battle of attrition with the West. They see a Russia whose society and economy are adjusting in real time to a program of redoubled military recapitalization, endemic economic hardship, and the loss of a generation of young men killed or injured fighting against Ukraine.

Similarly, at the 422-mile border between Belarus and Lithuania, the Lithuanian government has invested hundreds of millions of dollars to fortify the frontier against a range of threats. The Lithuanians view the Belarusian border as an extension of Russia’s campaign of low-grade aggression against the Baltic states, which Moscow is carrying out at the same time it works to shrink Belarusian sovereignty and agency. 

The border with Belarus is a hive of activity. Lithuanian border guards battle cigarette smuggling via air balloons, incursions by drones, and waves of migrants attempting to cross into Lithuania. It is hard to know what is simple criminal activity, what are actions directed by Minsk to test Lithuania’s security, and what are both. The effect is the same—nonstop heat on Lithuania along most of its southern and eastern borders.

It is worth remembering that Lithuania has outpaced the United States and nearly all other NATO allies in ramping up its defense spending to nearly 5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), which it will hit as soon as next year. Lithuania spent only around 1 percent of GDP a decade ago. These efforts are not without societal costs and tradeoffs, of course, and it remains to be seen what elements will be financially and politically sustainable over time.

In addition to increasing its own military spending, Lithuania has, in the space of just one year, spent millions in national funds to expand the burgeoning training center at Pabradė for enhanced use by US and other allied troops. It aims to build its air defenses, better integrate its ground forces, and increase its mobility, countermobility, and logistics capabilities. It is taking steps to improve command and control and beef up air, naval, and special operations forces. Lithuania is also on track to support a historic deployment of some five thousand German troops and their families by 2027.  

The Trump administration has often maintained that countries must pull their own weight as a prerequisite for its support and respect. The United States maintains a presence of only around one thousand soldiers in Lithuania, with talk in the air in Washington of possible changes or reductions to US force posture in Europe in the interest of focusing on the Indo-Pacific. It is unclear how or whether being a high-performing ally will be factored in by the Trump administration as it reviews military posture options. But pulling back from such deployments in front-line states would be short-sighted, amid Russia’s long game against the West.

For its part, Lithuania has the unenviable task of navigating the current European impulse to be more strategically independent from the United States while advocating for long-term NATO cohesion and preserving its bilateral relationship with the United States. It will not be easy. Regardless of the nature of scope of ally support, the country must continue to strengthen its armed forces, diversify its industrial base, harden critical infrastructure, and protect its borders. Its recent deals to purchase forty-four German Leopard 2A8 tanks and support German defense manufacturer Rheinmetall’s construction of a 155 mm artillery shell plant are a start, but much work needs to be done.

Just a trickle of pedestrians move across the aging bridge between Lithuania and Kaliningrad now. As one border guard observed looking toward the Kaliningrad side, “Lithuania, we know Russia by now.” Russia has repeatedly shown itself to be a threat to its neighbors and hostile to their ambitions for closer ties with the United States and the rest of Europe.  

Even if the war in Ukraine is ultimately resolved, Russia will not give up its strategic intentions in Europe and around the globe. Ongoing hybrid attacks attributed to Russian and Belarusian pressure at the Lithuanian border—and across Europe—make that clear. As it looks to ensure its own interests and the geopolitical stability they rely on, the United States would be wise to keep the view from Panemunė in mind.

Tressa Guenov is the director for programs and operations and a senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. Previously, she was the US principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy at the US Department of Defense.

Note: The Atlantic Council delegation’s visit to Lithuania was sponsored by the Lithuanian Ministry of National Defense.

The post Dispatch from the Kaliningrad border: Russia is fighting a long battle of attrition with the West appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, Lithuania, a small NATO ally of about three million people, has taken seriously the threat of a more aggressive and revanchist Moscow led by Russian President Vladimir Putin. The Russian leader has called the dissolution of the Soviet Union one of the greatest tragedies of history and has dedicated his regime to reasserting Russia’s dominance in the former Soviet space.

We visited the borders with both Belarus and the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. At the former, Lithuanian border guards told us of many cases of so-called “hybrid warfare” by the oppressive Belarusian regime, including pushing South and Central Asian migrants across the border and using drones and balloons to smuggle cheap Belarusian cigarettes into Lithuania. In Kaliningrad, Russia has built a heavily militarized province. Looking across the border bridge, which is now only open to pedestrian traffic, we saw a dark and foreboding city very different from the modern and free Lithuanian side.

Amid US calls for Europe to take more responsibility for its own defense, Lithuania has been investing in its military. Vilnius will increase its defense spending to 5 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) in 2026, competing with Poland for the highest percentage of GDP spent on defense by a NATO country and far above the current level of US defense spending as a proportion of GDP.

In the past few years, Lithuania has spent billions of dollars on new weapons systems, including from the United States. It has also built modern infrastructure for its own forces, for a German brigade expected to deploy in the next few years, and for a relatively small US rotational force in the country. It has taken the lead in constructing a liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal at the port city of Klaipėda that has allowed the Baltic states and new NATO ally Finland to end their dependence on Russian natural gas and import LNG from elsewhere. Last year, half of the gas imported at this terminal came from the United States. Lithuania has also provided more assistance for Ukraine’s fight for freedom than one might expect. On our trip to the far corners of the country, we saw many signs that Lithuanians support Ukraine’s own “never again” fight.

But Lithuania is a small country with a relatively flat landscape, which does not lend itself to fighting a potentially reconstituted Russian military in a few years. Lithuanians need a strong NATO to deter the threat and make it clear to Putin that the country is not low-hanging fruit, ripe for the Kremlin to pick off. Lithuanians welcome the Germans and others who are eager to help with deterrence, but they know that only the United States and a physical US presence in the country can truly deter Russia. The Lithuanians are trying to show they deserve that support.

When then NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg spoke to a joint session of Congress in 2019, he said that the point of NATO is that “it’s good to have friends.” It’s good for the United States as it faces the challenges of the twenty-first century, he explained, and it’s good for US allies. “We are stronger and safer when we stand together,” he said. Stoltenberg received a bipartisan standing ovation.

Six years later, the stakes are considerably higher, as Russia’s aggression has only become bolder. The United States is urging its friends to do more for themselves and strengthen their defenses. Lithuania, in its resolve to “never again” be dominated by Moscow, is seeking to do just that.

James A. Hursch is a nonresident senior fellow with the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. He previously served as the director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency and as deputy defense advisor at the US Mission to NATO.

Note: The Atlantic Council delegation’s visit to Lithuania was sponsored by the Lithuanian Ministry of National Defense.

The post Dispatch from Vilnius: A NATO ally in Russia’s shadow won’t let history repeat itself appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On April 21, Andrew Michta, senior fellow in the GeoStrategy Initiative, was interviewed on the Focus podcast on the future of NATO amid shifting geopolitical dynamics in the transatlantic relationship. He argues that, to counter Russian aggression and remain competitive against other foreign threats, European defense must work in tandem with the US.  

Staff

Andrew A. Michta

Senior Fellow, GeoStrategy Initiative

GeoStrategy Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Central Europe Eastern Europe

The post Michta interviewed on the Focus podcast on European security as the war in Ukraine continues appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Following his return to the White House in January, US President Donald Trump has initiated a dramatic shift in United States foreign policy that has left many in Europe unsure of the transatlantic alliance and keen to ramp up their own defense capabilities. This geopolitical instability is also encouraging European policymakers to rethink Ukraine’s role in the defense of the continent. With unparalleled combat experience and proven ability to scale up arms production at relatively low cost, Ukraine is in many ways the ideal partner for European countries as they confront the twin challenges of an expansionist Russia and an isolationist US.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Ukraine’s defense industry has grown at a remarkably rapid rate since 2022 and is now capable of meeting approximately 40 percent of the country’s military needs. The segment that has attracted the most international attention so far is drone production, with Ukraine widely recognized as a global leader in drone warfare. It requires a careful approach in order to identify the few true gems from among the hundreds of Ukrainian companies currently producing over a million of drones per year, but the potential for groundbreaking advances in drone technologies is obvious.

In order to make the most of this potential, Ukraine must first safeguard its survival as an independent nation. Looking ahead, a key challenge for the Ukrainian authorities will be creating the kind of business climate that can enable the country’s emerging defense industry to prosper in a postwar environment that is likely to feature declining defense budgets.

At present, many Ukrainian defense sector companies are moving production to locations outside Ukraine due to a combination of factors including export bans and a lack of financing options inside the country. The most elegant solution to this problem is to promote more defense sector partnerships with Ukraine’s European allies.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Tue, June 17, 2025 • 1:00 pm ET

Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

Conflict Defense Technologies Europe & Eurasia Politics & Diplomacy

During the first few years of Russia’s full-scale invasion, security cooperation between Ukraine and the country’s partners was generally a one-way street, with weapons and ammunition flowing to Kyiv. More recently, a new model has emerged involving Western countries funding production at Ukrainian defense companies. This approach is efficient and strategically sound. It boosts Ukraine militarily and economically, while also taking advantage of the country’s strengths as a cost-effective and innovative arms producer. However, it lacks long-term appeal for Ukraine’s partners.

Establishing joint ventures between Ukrainian and European defense companies may be a more attractive and sustainable format. This would be a financially attractive way of fueling Europe’s rearmament, and would allow participating companies to build on a wide range of potential research and development synergies. Setting up production facilities in wartime Ukraine would clearly involve an element of risk, but this need not necessarily be a deal breaker if sensible security measures are implemented.

The scope for such joint ventures is huge. Indeed, it would make good sense to invest in specialized business and science parks providing the full range of related services and industry expertise. Initially, jointly produced equipment could be fast-tracked to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Further down the line, output could also be exported to partner countries and global markets. The growth of joint ventures would significantly improve Ukraine’s defensive potential and enhance the country’s ability to shield Europe from the Russian threat.

An ambitious European rearmament plan is currently taking shape that could significantly accelerate the integration of Ukraine’s defense industry. For this to happen, a number of regulatory and operational issues must first be resolved in Kyiv, Brussels, and various European capitals. While Ukraine can undoubtedly make a meaningful contribution to European security, the continent’s political complexities are particularly pronounced when it comes to defense budgets and procurement policies. It will require a degree of pragmatism to dismantle bureaucratic hurdles and overcome narrow national interests.

As European leaders adapt to radical shifts in the geopolitical landscape, Kyiv is ideally positioned to help the continent address its most pressing security needs. Ukraine’s army is by far the largest in Europe and has unique experience of modern warfare. It is backed by a domestic arms industry that is growing at a phenomenal rate while benefiting from an innovative startup culture that is transforming the twenty-first century battlefield. With sufficient international funding and technological cooperation, the Ukrainian defense sector can serve as a cornerstone of Europe’s security architecture for decades to come.

Pavlo Verkhniatskyi is managing partner of COSA, co-founder of Fincord-Polytech Science Park, and advisor to the Defense Group at the Ukraine Facility Platform.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Mar 25, 2025

Ukraine’s growing military strength is an underrated factor in peace talks

By Serhii Kuzan

Any discussion on the future course of the war against Russia and the terms of any peace deal must take into account the fact that Ukraine is a now major military power in its own right, writes Serhii Kuzan.

Conflict Defense Industry

UkraineAlert Mar 20, 2025

Putin is ruthlessly erasing Ukrainian identity in Russian-occupied Ukraine

By Peter Dickinson

Kremlin dictator Vladimir Putin is pursuing policies in Russian-occupied Ukraine that almost certainly meet the definition of ethnic cleansing and may qualify as genocide, writes Peter Dickinson.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Apr 10, 2025

A pragmatic peace plan for Ukraine

By Mykola Bielieskov

A pragmatic and sustainable peace is possible in Ukraine if Kyiv’s European partners dramatically increase their own defense spending while significantly strengthening the Ukrainian military, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

European Union NATO

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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This failure to achieve a breakthrough is a significant setback for US President Donald Trump, who famously claimed during the 2024 election campaign that he would end the war in twenty-four hours. Since returning to the White House in January, Trump’s approach to peace talks has been based on the need for a compromise settlement. He has sought to persuade Moscow and Kyiv by pointing to the devastating cost of continued hostilities, while arguing that neither side can realistically hope to achieve their goals via military means.

So far, Putin remains unconvinced. This is in part due to Trump’s own actions. The US leader’s foreign policy turn away from Europe, together with his frequent Kremlin-friendly statements and hostile treatment of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy during their notorious Oval Office meeting, have encouraged Putin to believe that he can outlast the West in Ukraine.

With the Western coalition in support of Ukraine looking increasingly fragile, Putin is now more than confident than ever of succeeding in his historic mission to extinguish Ukrainian statehood. This is reflected in his current negotiating position, which includes a series of maximalist demands that would deny postwar Ukraine any meaningful sovereignty or security, leaving the country at Russia’s mercy.

Needless to say, Putin’s insistence on an internationally isolated, disarmed, and defenseless Ukraine is a non-starter for Kyiv. Ukrainians have learned the bitter lessons from previous international agreements with Russia such as the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, which did not deter Moscow from attacking Ukraine in 2014 and failed to prevent the full-scale invasion of 2022. Understandably, Ukrainian officials are now emphatic that security guarantees for their country must be at the heart of any future peace deal.

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With Putin unwilling to make concessions and seemingly determined to fight on, the United States will soon be forced to reassess its approach to ending the Russia-Ukraine War. In order to deliver on his promise of peace, Trump must seek to change Russia’s strategic calculus and convince the Kremlin that its present goals in Ukraine are unattainable.

Any settlement seems certain to involve Russia’s continued occupation of the almost 20 percent of Ukraine that is currently under Kremlin control. This has led some commentators to draw parallels with the partition of the Korean peninsula following the Korean War in the early 1950s. In order for such comparisons to be relevant, the front lines of the current war in Ukraine must be stabilized to the extent that neither side has any realistic chance of achieving a decisive military victory. That is not yet the case.

If a ceasefire proves possible, the next challenge will be moving toward a more permanent peace. Trump has made it clear that he does not support Ukrainian membership of NATO and will not deploy US troops to Ukraine in order to enforce any peace deal. Instead, responsibility for safeguarding Ukraine’s security will fall primarily on the country’s own armed forces and Kyiv’s European partners. This cannot be compared to the kind of watertight security guarantees that many Ukrainians had hoped for, but it is not entirely unrealistic.

The Ukrainian military has evolved dramatically since 2022 and already represents a formidable obstacle to Putin’s imperial ambitions. Crucially, Ukraine has emerged over the past three years as one of the world leaders in drone warfare. In 2024, Ukraine became the first country to establish a separate branch of its military dedicated to drones. Hundreds of Ukrainian companies are now producing millions of drones per year, and are using wartime conditions to test their products on the battlefield. This is leading to new innovations on a virtually daily basis. Ukraine’s drone revolution is already transforming the way wars are waged and can serve as a key pillar of the country’s future security.

The broader Ukrainian defense industry is undergoing rapid expansion but needs additional investment in order to make the most of excess production capacity. With this in mind, Kyiv is calling on the country’s partners to place orders with Ukrainian defense companies and support joint ventures. If sufficient international investment is forthcoming, Ukraine’s defense sector can become a key component in Europe’s future security architecture. This would greatly improve the country’s ability to defend itself and help contain the threat posed by an expansionist Russia.

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With continued United States security support no longer assured, European countries are now embarking on an unprecedented rearmament drive. This will have huge implications for any peace settlement in Ukraine. Indeed, Ukraine’s survival may well hinge on Europe’s ability to match the current rhetoric about the need to rearm with concrete steps to boost weapons production.

The EU is preparing to unveil a major package of measures to support defense sector spending in the coming weeks, while individual countries including Germany are set to radically increase national defense budgets. A significant portion of Europe’s expanding arms industry output will likely go to Ukraine. After all, European leaders are acutely aware that if Ukrainian resistance should falter, they will be next in line.

Some European countries are also expected to play a more direct role in enforcing a peace deal in Ukraine. A “coalition of the willing” led by Britain and France is already taking shape, with practical discussions between military chiefs over possible troop deployments now well underway. However, it is still far from clear whether European troops in postwar Ukraine would have a mandate to engage in combat operations, leading to doubts over their effectiveness as a deterrent force.

While details remain vague, Ukrainian commanders and their European partners are currently discussing a military presence “on land, in the sky, and at sea.” The most practical contribution may be in the air, with coalition forces potentially capable of supplying fighter jet squadrons and air defense systems. This could allow them to close the skies over large parts of Ukraine, minimizing the threat posed by Russian missiles and drones without risking direct clashes between coalition and Russian forces.

Officials in Kyiv and across Europe are also still counting on some degree of continued US support. First and foremost, this means leading the diplomatic push for a ceasefire and the start of serious peace talks.

While it is thought to be highly unlikely that the Trump administration will be willing maintain earlier levels of military aid, the US can still make a critical contribution to Ukraine’s security in terms of intelligence sharing, sanctions enforcement, and the supply of specific munitions such as missiles and air defense interceptors. In a bid to win Trump’s approval, Ukraine has recently expressed a willingness to pay for future US weapons packages, possibly with support from European partners.

After two months of false dawns and failed ceasefires, it is evident that the road toward a sustainable settlement in Ukraine remains long and uncertain. The radical recent shift in US foreign policy under Trump has transformed perceptions of what a possible peace deal in Ukraine could look like, but a plausible picture is now slowly beginning to emerge.

Naturally, the first step is to stop the fighting. If US-led talks do lead to a ceasefire, preparations are in place that should allow Ukraine and the country’s European partners to make any temporary pause in hostilities more permanent. Participating European countries will be expected to close Ukrainian skies and provide a reassurance force of troops on the ground, creating the conditions for a Ukrainian national recovery. In parallel, they must also significantly increase the flow of military aid to Kyiv and strengthen Ukraine’s domestic defense industry.

Ultimately, Ukraine’s main security guarantee will remain the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The country’s military has already proven itself during the past three years of full-scale war. If Kyiv’s European partners can now rise to the challenge and provide sufficient support, Ukraine looks destined to continue guarding Europe’s eastern frontier and defending against the Russian threat for many years to come.

Mykola Bielieskov is a research fellow at the National Institute for Strategic Studies and a senior analyst at Ukrainian NGO “Come Back Alive.” The views expressed in this article are the author’s personal position and do not reflect the opinions or views of NISS or Come Back Alive.

Further reading

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Any discussion on the future course of the war against Russia and the terms of any peace deal must take into account the fact that Ukraine is a now major military power in its own right, writes Serhii Kuzan.

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Conflict Defense Technologies

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post A pragmatic peace plan for Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On April 4, Andrew Michta, senior fellow in the GeoStrategy Initiative, was interviewed by Lithuanian National Radio and Television on the status of transatlantic relations, NATO, and European defense as the Trump administration challenges the status quo. He argues that close relations between Washington and Brussels are vital to preserving European security and countering Russian aggression.  

Staff

Andrew A. Michta

Senior Fellow, GeoStrategy Initiative

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The post Michta in Lithuanian National Radio and Television on the necessity of US-European cooperation on defense  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The US servicemen had gone missing a week earlier during training exercises at a Lithuanian military facility close to the border with Belarus. This led to the largest search operation in modern Lithuanian history through the surrounding area of forests and swamps, with military and civilian teams being joined by colleagues from Poland, Germany, and Estonia. Tragically, the four missing United States soldiers were eventually found submerged in a peat bog together with their vehicle.

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Around one thousand US soldiers have been based at Camp Herkus in Lithuania since 2021. Their presence is part of NATO’s Operation Atlantic Resolve, which involves rotational deployments of troops from member states as part of the alliance’s deterrence strategy on its eastern flank.

The recent deaths of four US soldiers have shocked and saddened the Lithuanian public, underlining the bonds between the country and the United States. For days, the search operation for the missing soldiers gripped the nation of almost three million. “For us, it is more than a duty, it is an emotion. We have experienced trials in our history and therefore we understand well what loss is, what death is, what honorable duty is,” commented Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda during events in Vilnius honoring the deceased servicemen.

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The tragedy has served to highlight the importance of the NATO troop presence in Lithuania at a time when Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has heightened alarm in the region over the threat posed by a resurgent Russia. With the Trump administration now discussing plans to reduce the US commitment to European security and focus more of Asia, there are concerns in Lithuania and other front line NATO member states that Russia may seek to take advance of any weakening of resolve within the alliance.

In March, Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kestutis Budrys traveled to Washington DC with his Estonian and Latvian colleagues to meet with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and seek assurances regarding the continued United States commitment to the security of the Baltic region. “The Baltic states are quite skeptical about Russia’s intentions. Our intel assessments clearly show that Russia and their instruments of power are all aligned toward war, not toward peace,” commented Latvian Foreign Minister Baiba Braze while in the US.

Lithuania is currently preparing for a dramatic increase in military spending as the country responds to Russia’s expansionist agenda and Kremlin dictator Vladimir Putin’s apparent imperial ambitions. Lithuanian officials unveiled plans in January 2025 to boost the defense budget from just over three percent to between five and six percent starting next year. This increase comes as the Trump White House calls on NATO members to move beyond current guidelines stipulating two percent of GDP and spend significantly more on national security.

Amid heightened geopolitical uncertainty, the recent tragic events involving US troops stationed in Lithuania have helped unite the two countries. “We cannot thank our allies and fellow service members enough, especially the Lithuanians, who spared no resource in support of this mission,” commented Major General Curtis Taylor, the commanding general of the United States 1st Armored Division, in the wake of the tragedy. “Together, we delivered on our promise to never leave a fallen comrade.”

Agnia Grigas is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and the author of Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire and other books.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Mar 25, 2025

Ukraine’s growing military strength is an underrated factor in peace talks

By Serhii Kuzan

Any discussion on the future course of the war against Russia and the terms of any peace deal must take into account the fact that Ukraine is a now major military power in its own right, writes Serhii Kuzan.

Conflict Defense Industry

UkraineAlert Apr 3, 2025

The West must stop seeking Putin’s permission for peace in Ukraine

By Alyona Getmanchuk

If Western leaders are serious about achieving a lasting peace in Europe, they must move decisively to provide Ukraine with security guarantees without worrying whether Putin will agree or not, writes Alyona Getmanchuk.

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Putin is ruthlessly erasing Ukrainian identity in Russian-occupied Ukraine

By Peter Dickinson

Kremlin dictator Vladimir Putin is pursuing policies in Russian-occupied Ukraine that almost certainly meet the definition of ethnic cleansing and may qualify as genocide, writes Peter Dickinson.

Civil Society Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Lithuanians pay tribute to US soldiers who died in training exercise tragedy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In December, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen assigned Kaja Kallas, the EU’s top diplomat, and Andrius Kubilius, the first-ever commissioner for defense and space, to produce this document. The resulting text presents a roadmap for Europe to build up its defense capabilities in response to growing external security threats, including the possibility of Russian military aggression against EU territory. The White Paper also represents a direct reaction and message to the ongoing changes in Washington’s approach to European security under US President Donald Trump.

The White Paper adopts a five-year outlook, which is also the timeframe in which several European intelligence agencies have estimated Moscow would require to reconstitute its military capabilities such that it could conduct a large-scale attack on a NATO country. In the event of a cease-fire or peace agreement with Ukraine, Russia would almost certainly seek to accelerate its rearmament. Meanwhile, Europe faces uncertainty regarding the extent of continued US security assistance given Washington’s rapidly shifting foreign policy stances and priorities.

The White Paper calls for addressing critical capability gaps, fostering a competitive defense industry, strengthening military support for Ukraine, and securing relevant financial instruments and resources for defense. But whether the EU will be able to address these challenges in the five-year window the report outlines will depend on member states’ willingness to make the necessary financial commitments and their ability to navigate political divisions within the bloc.

Filling capability gaps

The document begins by diagnosing Europe’s severe defense shortcomings. It explicitly states that Europe is currently ill-equipped to respond adequately to contemporary security challenges.

Major capability gaps are identified in the following areas:

• Air and missile defense
• Artillery systems
• Ammunition and missile production
• Drones and counter-drone systems
• Military mobility
• Artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, cyber, and electronic warfare
• Strategic enablers and critical infrastructure protection

It’s a big list, and to close these gaps the White Paper advocates for deeper collaboration among European nations on defense projects of common interest. It builds on EU reports from 2024 by former Finnish President Sauli Niinistö on civilian and military preparedness and by former European Central Bank President Mario Draghi on competitiveness, both of which highlighted inefficiencies and excessive costs resulting from a lack of coordination within the European defense industry.

So, what does this mean in practice? The White Paper specifically recommends harnessing “European economies of scale” and collaborative procurement to reduce costs, shorten delivery times, make demand more predictable for producers, and enhance interoperability.

A major question going forward, however, is how the EU’s efforts fit in with NATO. Importantly, capability building is an area in which EU collaboration can benefit the Alliance. EU countries share a single set of capabilities. If these capabilities are primarily defined by NATO, then the twenty-three EU member states that are also part of the Alliance would contribute to fulfilling them, including through EU instruments. For example, one of the major capacity building areas is military mobility, which particularly important for the EU countries that provide NATO host-nation support.

Strengthening the defense industry

In addition to capability gaps, the White Paper addresses structural weaknesses within the European defense industry, pinpointing fragmentation and underinvestment as major obstacles to achieving credible deterrence. Three years into the war in Ukraine, Europe remains unable to produce sufficient weapons and ammunition quickly. To remedy this, the document proposes creating a common European defense market, aggregating demand to increase predictability.

Another main focus is ensuring supply-chain security and reducing external dependencies. The commitment to collaboration is further reinforced by plans to simplify regulations. The European Commission pledged to launch a strategic dialogue with the defense industry and introduce the Defence Omnibus Simplification Proposal by June 2025. This act is intended to simplify the legal and administrative framework for procurements and industry cooperation. Excessive regulation has been a long-standing obstacle in this field, and streamlining administrative processes is overdue.

Prioritizing Ukraine

The White Paper states that Ukraine remains on the front line of European security and enhancing the EU’s defense requires continued military support to Kyiv. The report outlines what it calls a “Porcupine Strategy,” which is aimed at deterring further Russian aggression by equipping Ukraine with the necessary capabilities. This is the strongest security guarantee that Europe can provide to Kyiv.

The document highlights the following defense priorities for enhancing Europe’s military support for Ukraine:

• Provision of large-caliber artillery ammunition (with a target of two million rounds in 2025)
• Deployment of air defense systems
• Enhanced drone capabilities
• Continued military training

Despite Kallas’s initial ambition for a twenty billion euro military support package in 2025, her initiative has reportedly faced resistance from several member states, resulting in a more limited focus on ammunition supplies. This highlights the potential limitations that will complicate efforts to implement the plans outlined in the White Paper.

The document also calls for supporting Ukraine’s defense industry through direct contracts and closer integration with the European defense sector, including joint ventures. This effort should be further outlined in the forthcoming European Defence Industry Plan, expected within the next few months. Close cooperation with Ukraine in this domain is in Europe’s interest, as the bloc will benefit from Kyiv’s wartime experience and innovations. Such defense industry collaboration could also indirectly strengthen Ukraine’s EU membership prospects.

Securing new financial sources

Perhaps the most transformative element of the White Paper concerns defense financing. It builds upon the ReArm Europe Plan, unveiled by von der Leyen in early March.

The financial framework includes:

• Joint EU loans backed by the EU budget, branded as SAFE (Security and Action for Europe), with an initial ceiling of €150 billion
• An “escape clause” from the Stability and Growth Pact, allowing member states to exclude up to 1.5 percent of defense spending from national debt assessments
• Relaxation of existing EU funding rules, mobilization of private capital, and adjustments to European Investment Bank regulations

The overarching ambition is to generate up to €800 billion in defense funding.

Success will depend on how seriously member states approach the offer. Some may take advantage of the relaxation of the escape clause to finance projects that are only superficially linked to military objectives. There is also some uncertainty surrounding the SAFE instrument, which aims to increase member states’ investments in defense via loans. Some capitals may secure better interest rates in domestic markets than those offered by the EU. Others may prefer different cooperation frameworks. Fiscally cautious governments might even exclude loans as an option on principle. A true embarrassment for the EU would arise if a substantial number of capitals considering SAFE were to withdraw due to the instrument’s byzantine rules.

From paper to practice

Since the White Paper is a European Commission initiative, it does not require formal approval from member states. However, its implementation will hinge on their willingness to support concrete instruments that will be built on the White Paper’s findings.

The first high-level discussions will take place at the upcoming EU Defense Ministers’ meeting on April 2-3, followed by the Foreign Affairs Council meeting on April 14. The goal is to secure agreement on key measures—such as SAFE and the Defence Omnibus Simplification Proposal—by June’s EU leaders’ summit.

A white paper, not a silver bullet

EU financial tools and incentives—aiming to generate €800 billion—certainly have the potential to move things forward, but they are not a silver bullet. A comprehensive response to the defense and security challenges Europe faces requires a multipronged approach to funding, with a majority of resources coming from member states. This will require significant increases in member states’ defense spending, likely beyond the currently discussed figure of 3 percent of each country’s gross domestic product. The mobilization of private capital should also be considered as part of this mix.

The success of the White Paper’s recommendations will also depend on the unity of the EU. Hungary, which has repeatedly blocked proposals for further military support to Ukraine, will not be the only obstacle to consensus on these initiatives. Take, for example, the prolonged discussions surrounding the upcoming European Defence Industry Plan, with the question of non-EU country participation emerging as a significant stumbling block. If increasing obstacles put EU security at greater risk, then one could expect a growing willingness to move forward instead in a “coalition of the willing,” which would further diminish the Commission’s coordination and support work.

Five years—the period in which a potential Russian threat to the EU could materialize—is a brief timeframe for Europe’s rearmament. For the sake of the EU and, in the more immediate term, of Ukraine, Europeans need to move from identifying the problems to acting on them. The White Paper is a good beginning, indicating a positive change in the mindset of EU policymakers, but the bloc must now translate this spirit into swift implementation.

Petr Tůma is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. He is a Czech career diplomat with expertise on Europe, the Middle East, and transatlantic relations. His views are his own.

The post The EU just released a roadmap to defend Europe. Will member states follow it? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The planning cycle, which comes to a head this summer, involves allies adopting capability targets that will shape national defense policies for the next two decades. If allies succeed in focusing their investments and policies to pursue this challenge, it will strengthen NATO’s ability to shield its members, even if Russia and other authoritarian states continue to challenge the Alliance.

So what has changed and why does it matter?

NATO’s successes over the last seventy-six years are the result of constant adaptation, and the Alliance is now going through its most profound changes since the end of the Cold War.

The challenges in the Euro-Atlantic region over the last twenty years—such as terrorism and regional instability—have not gone away. But the Alliance has needed to reprioritize the threat of conflict with a revisionist, risk-taking, militarily capable, and nuclear-armed Russia, which has committed itself to a war economy and increasingly appears enabled by the technological, industrial, and economic support of China, Iran, and North Korea. NATO is not at war, and its deterrence is holding. But, as Secretary General Mark Rutte recently made clear, “we are not at peace either” and NATO needs to be ready for what is coming its way.

NATO allies need to rediscover some of the disciplines and structures of the Cold War era—in particular how to fight together at scale, fight at home, and manage deterrence. This means something closer to Cold War levels of effort in terms of finance, people, technology, and industrial planning. It is a return to the Alliance’s original DNA.

However, the Cold War offers only a partial template. The Alliance’s geography is more complex than it was then (if also more coherent with the accession of Sweden and Finland). Thirty years of globalization have created a very different world. The strategies that Russia and its partners employ, as well as NATO allies’ social and industrial conditions, are very different. All these shifts are happening while technological developments are changing the character of modern interstate competition and conflict very quickly. In the secretary general’s words, NATO must be “faster and fiercer.”

Therefore, the Alliance needs to draw from the past, make the most of its considerable strengths, and be inspired by the future. Striking this balance is at the heart of the NDPP.

Laying the foundation

Since the early 1950s, NATO has had three collective foundations for its defense.

The first are the political commitments embodied in the Washington Treaty, particularly Article 3 (the promise by allies to invest in their own defense) and Article 5 (the promise to come to one another’s assistance).

The second is a common command structure under the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), responsible for planning and commanding collective deterrence and defense operations. Since 2002, NATO has also had the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT), responsible for shaping and transforming the force for the future. Between them, they develop the planning, force design, doctrine, interoperability, training, and exercising that make it possible for national forces to fight as a coherent whole.

The third is a collective process for agreeing on and delivering the military means that the Alliance needs to fulfill the core tasks to which it periodically agrees in its Strategic Concepts. (The most recent Strategic Concept, agreed to in 2022, set out three core tasks: deterrence and defense, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security.) This process aims to be broadly fair among the allies, ensure that all are protected, and deliver an operational result that is bigger than the sum of its national parts. This is the role of the NDPP and its antecedents.

Operational planning—the responsibility of SACEUR through Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and its subordinate geographic and domain commands—is a military discipline but always under the political control of allies in the North Atlantic Council. Such planning aims to achieve specific goals using the military resources available at any given time.

Defense planning, by contrast, looks further into the future and at a wider range of scenarios. By definition, it is both a civilian and military process, engaging national governments in choices about what they want to achieve and what resources—financial, human, and industrial—they are willing to allocate to do so. Ultimately, those decisions are made nationally; NATO has no power to compel its members to raise taxes, spend on defense, or conscript their citizens. But the NDPP provides a collective framework in which the thirty-two allies agree on what they should each deliver, and by when. Operational planning and defense planning are complementary in purpose.

Building a new way

Why is this cycle of the NDPP so different from its predecessors?

The first reason is that this cycle reconnects operational planning and defense planning in a way that has not been the case since the end of the Cold War. Over the last thirty years, the NDPP asked allies to maintain forces for the contingency of collective defense while, in practice, the emphasis of operational planning and activity was on expeditionary operations outside of NATO territory. The former looked for heavier combat-capable forces with their own enabling capabilities; the latter for lighter and more deployable forces, often enabled by the United States. In many ways, allies’ force structures today reflect the tension between these two pulls.

As a result of decisions made by NATO leaders at the Madrid summit in 2022, this NDPP cycle makes the development of forces for collective defense the clear priority. Moreover, because NATO again has a military strategy for deterrence and collective defense, and a set of operational plans for putting that strategy into effect, this cycle can be based on a far more granular military demand signal. Instead of building forces for a range of potential scenarios across multiple theaters, allies are being asked to focus primarily on fulfilling roles earmarked to them under the operational plans. For example, an ally might be asked to provide a fully deployable corps allocated by SACEUR to a particular geographically defined role, with other allies asked to provide supporting forces or host-nation support.

The NDPP will still ask allies to retain some forces capable of out-of-area projection. Flexibility to deal with the unexpected is an essential element of defense planning, and NATO looks at its neighborhood with a 360-degree perspective. But this reconnection of operational and defense planning allows for the NDPP to become a more powerful instrument for transformation. As allies develop the interoperable forces requested by the NDPP and declare them to the NATO force structure, SACEUR will be able to exercise them more realistically against new operational plans, verify readiness, and drive improvements in interoperability and effectiveness through constant testing and learning. This pressure will feed into national procurement decisions, as allies give greater consideration to geography and interoperability with partners in specific regions or roles.

This is why, although the NDPP is formally co-led by a combination of Allied Command Transformation (ACT, housed under SACT) and the Defence Policy and Planning Division of the NATO International Staff, this cycle has featured much closer involvement from Allied Command Operations. The basic template for what is asked of allies, known as the Minimum Capability Requirement, was co-developed by both strategic commands. The ability to turn operational plans into precise requirements is a critical ACT function that leverages expertise and ensures consistency with operational plans. The result is a dynamic relationship between operational and defense planning. The NDPP cycle allows for in-depth revision of military requirements every four years to account for the evolution of these plans. Similarly, SACEUR can adjust plans based on a closer understanding of what allies deliver today and what they will develop in the short and medium terms.

The second big shift in this cycle is toward the demands of collective defense against a nuclear-armed peer adversary. NATO’s forces need to be larger, be better protected, have more firepower, be able to prevail in all five domains (land, air, sea, cyber, and space), be able to coordinate and harness all of that in a fully integrated way, and be able to operate across a NATO territory that is a lot larger than it was during the Cold War. NATO forces must also be able to both bring these effects to bear early enough to prevent a war from breaking out and, if war breaks out, to fight for long enough and in the right places. All of that needs to be possible in an environment where the Alliance would almost certainly be subject to attempts at nuclear coercion, as well as sophisticated attempts to disrupt its information environment and the security of the territory (including maritime territory) through which its logistics and enablement flow. There will be no rear-area sanctuary and no neat distinctions between sub-threshold (i.e., cyber and hybrid attacks), conventional, and nuclear operations.

In other words, collective defense is more complex and more demanding—not just of militaries, but of governments and societies more widely—than the kinds of military operations NATO has participated in over the past twenty-five years or so, as difficult as many of those operations were.

Russia is not ten feet tall, and NATO’s planning assumptions are careful to be realistic about the size and nature of the threat Russia could mount against the Alliance. NATO does not seek to mimic or match the way Russia fights. The Alliance’s assumptions are based on the conviction that deterrence—putting enough doubt into the adversary’s mind regarding whether it would prevail when attempting to threaten, coerce, or attack NATO—is the best and most cost-effective strategic approach when faced with a resolute, capable, and nuclear-armed adversary.

Advancing capabilities

Allies also already have formidable capabilities available to them. This includes home defense forces, which were less relevant in the era of expeditionary operations but are critical to territorial defense, as well as outstanding modern warships, submarines, fighter aircraft, special forces, and cyber capabilities. Over the last two years, allies have declared as available to SACEUR more than half a million service personnel at high readiness for the purposes of putting NATO plans into effect. NATO’s nuclear forces, particularly those of the three nuclear allies—the United States, the United Kingdom, and France—make a vital contribution to ensuring deterrence twenty-four hours a day, 365 days a year, and are all undergoing important modernization.

However, it is clear that urgent investment is needed to ensure that existing plans, as well as additional requirements that the NDPP captures (for example, support to NATO’s nuclear forces), are adequately resourced for the Alliance to keep pace with Russian military modernization and expansion. The Alliance must be able to counter in those areas in which Russia has sought to build up asymmetric advantage. In particular, allies will need to grow

• their air-defense capabilities to meet the full spectrum of missile and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) threats;
• their ability to strike deep into enemy territory, overcoming the range of anti-access/aerial denial (A2/AD) and electronic-warfare challenges that poses;
• their logistics and enablement capabilities to ensure that forces can be deployed and sustained when and where they are most needed for deterrence;
• modern communications systems that allow decision-makers to act decisively and effectively across all domains of operation; and
• the ability to fight larger land formations (divisions and corps) in complex high-intensity operations.

Overall, the Alliance aims to build about one-third more frontline capability than it has today, with significantly more of that capability held at readiness for warfighting against a peer opponent. Within that demand signal, the priority is the capabilities NATO needs to deter—those things that really alter an adversary’s decision-making calculus.

However, this larger and more complex demand signal is not just about frontline forces. As important is that allies have in place the foundations to support those forces in a larger-scale and potentially longer-lasting conflict. This means stocks of weapons and spare parts, fuel, and food. It means enabling capabilities such as engineering, medical services, and signals. And it means being able to move, sustain, and support forces that might have come from the far side of the continent or across the Atlantic. Investment in host-nation support by flank states—such as accommodation, training facilities, and storage for munitions and fuel—is once again a critical part of burden sharing. Meanwhile, priorities for other allies will include the means to move forces, such as heavy lift trucks, railway wagons, and roll-on/roll-off (RORO) ferries.

Much of this vital support function will involve working with civilian authorities and industry, and relying on assured access to civilian capabilities—disciplines that NATO knew well during the Cold War and in which allies are now reinvesting. NATO’s logistics and enablement (including medical logistics and enablement) will likely be contested even before a conflict starts, targeted through sabotage, cyberattacks, and strike operations. This pushes allies toward building more resilience through collective logistics and allocating more forces to protection.

Third, the revamped NDPP is driving allies to embrace the potential military edge that rapid adoption of new technologies and innovation can provide. It does this by emphasizing the delivery of desired effects—for example, the ability to suppress enemy air defenses—and thus pushing nations to incorporate innovative solutions to meet their targets. ACT actively supports initiatives that strike an optimal balance between cutting-edge technologies and traditional military capabilities. This approach seeks to enhance operational efficiency on the battlefield while ensuring cost-effectiveness. In doing so, ACT, in coordination with Allied Command Operations (ACO), will be able to develop an updated force mix, which will support future defense planning cycles and drive nations to innovate.

Moving at the speed of tech

In every era, nations try to balance investment in proven military technologies with the need to adapt to the threats and opportunities of new technology and its tactical application. However, the pace at which change happens is not constant over time. At the moment, it is accelerating for three reasons.

First, we are experiencing a period of intense innovation by the private sector—notably in the tech sector, but also in space—often with revolutionary implications for military capabilities. In many cases, the volume and pace of technology research and development in the private sector exceed anything that allied militaries are doing.

Second, we are in a period of intense interstate competition between large states that are investing heavily in technology. This includes some of NATO’s strategic competitors, including China with its military-civilian fusion strategy and investments in a number of emerging technology areas that are on a par with those of NATO allies. We are also seeing an increase in the number of states around the world with the means to drive technological innovation in their militaries. Ukraine and Israel are good examples of medium-sized countries with tremendous capacity for innovation.

Third, war itself shows what works and can rapidly change perceptions of the mix of capabilities required for success. The conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East are doing just that. Russia is also learning quickly, bringing new capabilities to the battlefield with innovation cycles as short as twelve weeks.

The pace of military technological change is simply accelerating. NATO helps allies in a number of ways, including its Rapid Adoption Action Plan for innovation, the Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) technology incubator, ACT experimentations, and the NATO Innovation Fund. But planning and procurement processes need to keep up and become faster, more agile, and more flexible.

This does not mean giving up on more traditional capabilities. As current conflicts demonstrate, successful militaries need a mix of capabilities. There is often no substitute for sufficient mass of artillery, protected mobility for infantry, air-defense capabilities, and other capabilities. As SACEUR has noted, if one side turns up with a tank, the other side had better have a tank. There are no areas of capability in which NATO will need less in the future, and the Alliance will need more of some traditional platforms. Many of these platforms can be made more effective and will need to be better protected by the application of emergent technologies. At the same time, NATO can leverage new technology to address immediate capability shortfalls or reduce the need for conventional mass by increasing precision or effectiveness. New technologies can also provide an advantage by creating pressure on adversaries’ vulnerabilities. There is rarely a simple trade-off between old and new.

The application of technological advances in some areas—such as quantum computing, artificial intelligence, space, and autonomous systems—are also having more profound transformational impacts on defense. They can allow for the collection and exploitation of data on a previously unimaginable scale, and the recreation of the effects of mass—for example, in fires, surveillance, or logistics—in very different ways.

This presents a great opportunity for allies to achieve effects more reliably, at larger scale, and more efficiently. But it also presents risks if adversaries are able to move further and faster to exploit these technologies.

Transforming the approach

Within a twenty-year framework with regular revisions that allow allies to factor the effects of innovation into their acquisition and development plans, the NDPP can help in three main ways.

First, it is increasingly clear that forces enabled by up-to-date communications and information systems—the digital backbone of modern defense—are now indispensable. Interoperability at large scale is even more critical than before. NATO will not criticize any ally for investing in getting these basics right.

Second, whereas NATO has historically tended to express its ask of allies in terms of numbers of platforms or personnel, it increasingly seeks evidence of an ability to achieve a particular effect, recognizing that the “how” is likely to involve constant innovation. This is a critical evolution in the defense planning process. For example, NATO might have a template for an armored brigade, with a certain number of tanks, artillery pieces, rocket launchers, infantry fighting vehicles, and reconnaissance units. However, an ally might look at the conditions and terrain in which the NATO plans require it to be able to fight and conclude that a different mix of vehicles, ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), and fires—perhaps exploiting UAV technologies—is better able to achieve the required effects. That mix will evolve continuously, sometimes month to month. In that case, provided that the proposition can be verified though ACT modeling and simulation tools, the NDPP can take it as the answer.

Third, as NATO communicates the NDPP demand signal to industry, the Alliance needs to recognize that this goes far beyond traditional defense industrial actors. It also means engaging the allied innovation ecosystem, helping it understand the requirements that NATO has at the Alliance level. The scale of transformation and growth that NATO requires of allies means that the Alliance has, in effect, become a market creator, helping to give industry long-term perspectives about what it should deliver.

As NATO works with allies on how they intend to meet the capability targets to be set in June 2025 at its summit in The Hague, allies are already presenting a range of transformative approaches that the NATO force will adopt in the next few years.

For example, the United Kingdom—which leads the NATO forward land forces in Estonia—is developing “Project ASGARD,” a software-driven reconnaissance and strike complex enabled by combat UAVs and drones that aims to increase reach and lethality.

ACT, in conjunction with regional allies, is developing a maritime surveillance system for the Baltic that uses uncrewed vessels to extend presence and awareness.

A number of allies are looking to incorporate the highly successful, Ukrainian-developed Sky Fortress system into their own air defense. Sky Fortress uses a network of acoustic sensors to accurately track and engage cruise missiles and other air threats.

All of these changes are happening now and are bringing a different range of industrial partners into the picture, especially those from the civilian tech sector. NATO’s message to allies over the next decade will be clear. More of this is needed, and faster.

Maintaining the core

However, there are ways in which this NDPP cycle has not changed from its predecessors.

First, it requires commitment by all allies. The effort will not always look the same. The demands on a flank ally, ready to receive and sustain deployed forces, are different than those on an ally that is deploying them and managing long logistics chains. But fair burden sharing remains a core principle.

Nor can one ally—the United States—continue to bear the main burden of providing such a wide range of capabilities for the defense of the Euro-Atlantic area, given growing alternative demands on the US force. That is why this NDPP cycle will ensure there are no areas in which the US share of capability targets is disproportionate. By the end of the decade, the NDPP will have significantly reduced the overall share of such targets borne by the United States.

Second, for all the scope for efficiencies through smarter, more agile, and more collaborative procurement—and for all the advances that innovation and technology offer—there is no way of avoiding the need for greater and more sustained investment in defense when the threat is rising after an era of relative stability. Two-thirds of NATO allies reached the target of spending 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on defense in 2024. But it is clear that the combination of needing to grow the overall force, modernize and stay relevant in the technological race, and, in some cases, address the effects of long periods of under-investment will push most allies much closer to requirements beyond 3 percent of GDP. That represents the lower end of the range of European allies’ defense spending during the Cold War. NATO leaders will address how to express this changed level of requirement at the summit in June in The Hague.

Third, this cycle must be underpinned by a serious push to increase not just defense industrial capacity in the Alliance—already tested by the immediate needs of supporting Ukraine—but also the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of industry and its ability to absorb emerging technologies at pace. This explains why NATO is putting so much focus on industrial strategy. As ever, the key levers for change are national, but NATO can help by being as clear as possible with allies and industry about the demand signal over time, identifying opportunities for collaboration among allies, promoting standardization and interoperability, and helping allies chart their way through fast-changing commercial landscapes such as the space sector. NATO’s Defence Production Action Plan, developed by the national armaments directors, sets out an overall approach.

Fourth, NATO is looking to help allies as they find the people they need to meet growing demand. The personnel models that allies employ vary considerably, reflecting national circumstances and traditions. NATO does not tell nations how they should approach sensitive questions such as the relationship between citizens and the state. However, there is much that allies can learn from each other as they experiment with the reintroduction of limited conscription, expansion of reserve forces, and schemes for attracting and retaining highly skilled personnel. Ensuring the full participation of women in NATO’s force is also a critical challenge. Ultimately, with some 3.4 million people serving in uniform, NATO has the numbers. The challenge is ensuring that it has people with the right skills, experience, and training available in the right place and at the right time.

Drawing on history

The NDPP is at the heart of shaping daunting change that will require deep and sustained commitment from allied governments. All need to step up in terms of money, industry, people, and the courage to embrace technology-driven innovation.

The good news is that NATO has been here before and delivered. In the 1970s, allies acknowledged that there was a widening disparity in conventional capabilities between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and they responded with what was then called the Long-Term Defence Programme. The May 1978 meeting of defense ministers, which approved this plan, issued a communiqué that could almost read as current, talking of the need to improve readiness, increase spending, increase reserves, address complex air and electronic warfare threats, ensure sea control and effective command and control, modernize nuclear forces in the face of growing Russian theater forces, and underpin all this with better logistics. The ministers agreed on the joint procurement of a fleet of E3 airborne warning and control systems (AWACs).

That program delivered. By the mid-1980s, NATO’s posture and forces were considerably strengthened, not least through a series of major US and European technological and industrial programs that provided platforms NATO still uses today and were exported globally. Russia was successfully deterred and eventually unable to continue competing. Defense spending rose and also contributed to a strong period of economic growth in Alliance nations, helping lay some of the foundation for the technological strengths of their modern economies.

Today we are at a similar point in our history—with NATO even deciding to procure a new airborne early-warning capability. European allies were critical to the transformation that occurred during the Cold War, at that time coordinating as the Eurogroup. They will be so again, supported by the increases in defense spending now seen across the Alliance (up almost 20 percent in 2024 for non-US allies). NATO’s efforts to support Ukraine and strengthen its own deterrence and defense need to be seen as responses to long-term structural realities, not to a passing phase of crisis.

Angus Lapsley is the assistant secretary general for defence policy and planning at NATO, and the former director general for strategy and international in the UK Ministry of Defence.

Admiral Pierre Vandier is NATO’s supreme allied commander transformation, and the former chief of staff of the French Navy.

NATO Allied Command Transformation and the NATO Public Diplomacy Division are financial supporters of the Atlantic Council.

The Transatlantic Security Initiative, in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, shapes and influences the debate on the greatest security challenges facing the North Atlantic Alliance and its key partners.

Learn more

New Atlanticist Feb 22, 2023

Russia policy after the war: A new strategy of containment

By Alexander Vershbow

To prevent further damage to the rules-based international order, the United States and its allies will need a strategy of containment to deter Russia militarily and decouple Russia from the international community, until Moscow has earned the right to be considered a partner once more.

Arms Control Defense Policy

Report Sep 19, 2024

NATO-Russia dynamics: Prospects for reconstitution of Russian military power

By Andrew A. Michta, Joslyn Brodfuehrer

How will Russia reconstitute its land forces in response to the war in Ukraine and the changes in NATO’s force model? The NATO allies closest to Russia can provide valuable insight.

Central Europe Eastern Europe

Issue Brief Feb 20, 2025

Issue brief: A NATO strategy for countering Russia

By Ian Brzezinski, Ryan Arick

Russia poses the most direct and growing threat to NATO member states’ security. This threat now includes the war in Ukraine, militarization in the Arctic, hybrid warfare, and arms control violations. Despite NATO’s military and economic superiority, a unified and effective strategy is essential to counter Russia’s aggression.

Cybersecurity Defense Technologies

The post Why NATO’s Defence Planning Process will transform the Alliance for decades to come appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The nonstop use of the word “unprecedented” is justified, but it fails to capture the gravity of what’s happening. As one Trump ally put it to me this past week, the president’s critics have underestimated his determination to deliver on what he has called “a revolution of common sense,” one that will upend everything from transatlantic relations and the future of the Middle East to US foreign assistance and executive authority.

“The genie is out of the bottle,” a senior official from a NATO country told me this past week. He shared that a growing list of European allies are seeking self-sufficiency, concluding that, after eighty years, the era of reliable US security in Europe following World War II is irrevocably over. 

I disagreed with the finality of that observation, as NATO remains in place alongside its cornerstone Article 5, obligating all allied nations to come to the assistance of an attacked member. Greater European defense spending, I argued, is one of the more positive outcomes of the Trump administration’s first weeks.

Yet there’s not a conversation I have with European officials these days in which they aren’t asking fundamental questions: Do they now need their own nuclear weapons? Do they need to expand trade relations with China? Can they defend Ukraine from Russia? Can they help allied Denmark keep control of its autonomous territory of Greenland?

“Woke, weak, and freeloading”

One European ambassador, weary from countless meetings over Trump’s tariffs, summed up the thinking of the Trump officials he meets with: “The consensus is that Europe is woke, weak, and freeloading,” he said. “It’s not a minority view.”

Again this past week, US Vice President JD Vance emerged as the Europe-basher-in-chief through an extraordinary Signal chat among top administration officials that inadvertently included Atlantic Editor in Chief Jeffrey Goldberg, who reported out its details.

In the chat, Vance questioned Trump’s willingness to strike Houthi rebels in Yemen who have been disrupting global shipping that passes through the Red Sea. Vance’s reasoning was that this waterway, through which flows more than 10 percent of global trade, serves Europe more than the United States.

“I just hate bailing Europe out again,” he wrote, to which US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth replied, “I fully share your loathing of European free-loading. It’s PATHETIC.”

You can read more about what the Wall Street Journal called the administration’s accelerating “anti-Europeanism” in the cover story of its latest Weekend Review section, “What Does MAGA Have Against Europe?”

“Europeans,” write authors David Luhnow and Marcus Walker, “even those who thought they were prepared for a second Trump presidency, have been stunned by the speed of events.” 

They cite the Trump administration’s European Union–targeted tariffs, embrace of Russia’s misleading talking points on Ukraine, sidelining of Europeans in peace talks about their own continent, and “watered down” security commitments to allies. 

By Friday, Vance added a new concern for Europe with his visit to Greenland with his wife, Usha, National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, and Secretary of Energy Chris Wright. He endorsed Trump’s ambition to annex this autonomous territory of the Kingdom of Denmark, without mentioning that it is already part of the traditionally US-led NATO alliance. 

Speaking at a US space base above the Arctic Circle, with US military members arrayed behind him, Vance told Greenlanders, “I think that you’d be a lot better coming under the United States’ security umbrella than you have been under Denmark’s security umbrella.” 

This was the same US vice president who a few weeks earlier had stunned Europeans at the Munich Security Conference through his de facto endorsement of the far-right Alternative for Germany political party just days ahead of that country’s election, and through his contention that Europe’s “threat from within” from suppressing free speech was larger than the threats from China or Russia.

“No turning back”

Amid all this, you could be forgiven if you missed last Thursday’s statement by Mark Carney, Canada’s new prime minister, that “the United States is no longer a reliable partner,” a situation from which there was “no turning back.” That came a day before Carney’s call with Trump that the Canadian government praised as “constructive.” The two leaders agreed to negotiate a new economic and security relationship after Canada’s April 28 elections.

Then on Friday, the Trump administration finalized the long-signaled dismantling of the United States Agency for International Development, the government’s primary agency for distributing foreign aid, and fired almost all of the employees at the headquarters of the congressionally funded US Institute of Peace.

If you’re a Wall Street investor, however, you paid more attention this past week to falling consumer settlement, rising inflation, and a new set of 25 percent tariffs on vehicles and auto parts. That was prologue to what Trump has referred to as this coming week’s “liberation day,” the culmination of more tariffs making up his “America First Trade Policy” aimed at revitalizing US manufacturing. That’s likely to exacerbate the markets’ dismal March, which is on pace to be the worst month for US stock performance since December 2022.

In a Truth Social post foreshadowing next week’s announcements, Trump wrote, “For DECADES we have been ripped off and abused by every nation in the world, both friend and foe. Now it is finally time for the Gold Ol’ USA to get some of that MONEY, and RESPECT, BACK.”

Meanwhile Ukraine, the country whose stakes in the United States’ policy directions are existential, received a new draft economic agreement this week from the Trump Treasury Department that would give the United States sweeping powers over the country’s critical minerals and other natural resources. The Wall Street Journal has reported that the fifty-five-page draft is much tougher than the version left unsigned after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s tumultuous, televised Oval Office meeting on February 28.

A senior Ukrainian official told me that Kyiv has come to terms with Washington’s shift from being its leading ally during the Biden administration—when Ukraine’s primary complaint was about the pace, quantity, and quality of the weapons being provided—to being at best a neutral mediator.

“Every revolution has its own logic”

I asked a Trump ally, someone I’ve known for some time, to help me understand the underlying logic of this flurry of activity and the president’s end game. He reminded me of my time as a Wall Street Journal reporter covering the rise of Solidarity in Poland, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the collapse of the Soviet Union.

“What you’re witnessing is a revolution,” he said, “and as you know every revolution has its own logic, its own rules, and its own confusion.” A couple of other acquaintances in Trump world agreed with that assessment, though they added that the more transactional and pragmatic Trump isn’t as revolutionary as some others in the administration who are seeking to drive events.

What we’re experiencing is a revolution against a range of perceived adversaries that vary depending on who you talk to in Trump world. There’s “the Deep State,” which is understood as some mixture of the Central Intelligence Agency, the military, and other long-serving government officials. There’s woke ideology in general in the United States, which is seen to have taken root after eight years of President Barack Obama and four years of President Joe Biden. Similarly, but more pointedly, there is the liberal media. These perceived adversaries also overlap with long-standing grievances, such as those regarding regulatory excesses of the administrative state, federal waste and overspending, and trading partners and military allies that seem to take advantage of US largesse.

Perhaps most important, the revolution is about breaking what Trump administration officials believe needs to be fixed, whether it is foreign assistance or international trade, because previous experience has shown that reforms aren’t possible.

One word of warning here: History shows that revolutions rarely achieve all their goals. But they do inevitably leave behind a great deal of change—some of it lasting and some of it less so. In the short term, the revolutionaries are willing to accept a great deal of intended and unintended harm, whether it be to stock-market values or to federal workers’ livelihoods.

For a deeper understanding of the revolution, a Trump administration official referred me to a new book by Heritage Foundation President Kevin Roberts, with a forward by Vance, called Dawn’s Early Light: Taking Back Washington to Save America. (The more inflammatory original title spoke of “Burning Down Washington to Save America” and included a burning match on its cover.)

The promotional language on the publisher’s website says that Roberts is outlining a peaceful “Second American Revolution” for voters looking to shift power back into the hands of the people. “A corrupt and incompetent elite has uprooted our way of life and is brainwashing the next generation. Many so-called conservatives are as culpable as their progressive counterparts . . . Global elites — your time is up.”

“A grand celebration”

How this Trump “revolution” unfolds, if that’s what it is, will depend on many factors, including how the US economy fares, how US voters respond through the 2026 midterm elections, and how US courts and Congress respond to presidential decisions and executive orders that are contested as constitutional overreach.

One Trump administration official urges me to pay particular attention to next year’s 250th anniversary of the signing of the Declaration of Independence, for which ambitious plans are already coming together that will make the tall ships of the two hundredth anniversary pale in comparison. There’s already an executive order about that, calling for “a grand celebration worthy of the occasion.”

Trump has never been understated about his intentions.

Just three days after his inauguration, Trump announced before the bastion of global elites, the World Economic Forum in Davos, the beginning of “a Golden Age of America.” Said Trump, “What the world has witnessed in the past seventy-two hours is nothing less than a revolution of common sense. Our country will soon be stronger, wealthier, and more united than ever before, and the entire planet will be more peaceful and prosperous as a result of this incredible momentum, and what we’re doing and going to do.”

History, however, won’t judge him on that audacious rhetoric but rather on his results. What’s at stake is whether his unfolding revolution leaves the United States, its allies, and the world in a better place than he found it. That’s a scorecard of generational consequence.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on X: @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points newsletter, a column of dispatches from a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

The post ‘What you’re witnessing is a revolution.’ Making sense of Trump’s head-spinning moves. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Canada is facing economic threats from China and Russia targeting its critical industries and infrastructure. The Business Council of Canada, which consists of CEOs of top Canadian companies, identified cyberattacks, theft of intellectual property, Chinese influence on Canada’s academic sector, and trade weaponization by China among the top economic threats to Canada.

More recently, a new and unexpected threat emerged from the United States, when Washington announced 25 percent tariffs on all Canadian goods except for the 10 percent tariffs on energy. To address threats from Russia and China and reduce trade overdependence on the United States, Canada’s federal government will need to consolidate economic power and devise an economic statecraft strategy that will leverage Canada’s economic tools to mitigate these economic threats and vulnerabilities. This paper covers the following topics and offers recommendations:

• Economic threats to Canada’s national security 
• An unexpected threat: Overdependence on trade with the United States
• Lack of economic power consolidation by Canada’s federal government
• Mapping Canada’s economic statecraft systems: Sanctions, export controls, tariffs, and investment screening

Economic threats to Canada’s national security

Cyberattacks on Canada’s critical infrastructure 

Canada’s critical infrastructure has become a target of state-sponsored cyberattacks. In 2023, Canada’s Communications Security Establishment (CSE)—a signals intelligence agency—said that Russia-backed hackers were seeking to disrupt Canada’s energy sector. Apart from accounting for 5 percent of Canada’s gross domestic product (GDP), the energy sector also keeps the rest of Canada’s critical infrastructure functioning. CSE warned that the threat to Canada’s pipelines and physical infrastructure would persist until the end of the war in Ukraine and that the objective was to weaken Canada’s support for Ukraine. 

Beyond critical infrastructure, Canadian companies lost about $4.3 billion due to ransomware attacks in 2021. More recently in February 2025, Russian hacking group Seashell Blizzard was reported to have targeted energy and defense sectors in Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Russia and other adversarial states will likely continue targeting Canada’s critical infrastructure and extorting ransom payments from Canadian companies. 

Theft of intellectual property

Canadian companies have become targets of Chinese state-sponsored intellectual theft operations. In 2014, a Chinese state-sponsored threat actor stole more than 40,000 files from the National Research Council’s private-sector partners. The National Research Council is a primary government agency dedicated to research and development in science and technology. Apart from undermining Canadian companies, theft of Canada’s intellectual property, especially research on sensitive technologies, poses a threat to Canada’s national security. 

Chinese influence on Canada’s academic sector 

Adversarial states have taken advantage of Canada’s academic sector to advance their own strategic and military capabilities. For example, from 2018 to 2023, Canada’s top universities published more than 240 joint papers on quantum cryptography, space science, and other advanced research topics along with Chinese scientists working for China’s top military institutions. In January 2024, Canada’s federal government named more than one hundred institutions in China, Russia, and Iran that pose a threat to Canada’s national security. Apart from calling out specific institutions, the federal government also identified “sensitive research areas.” Universities or researchers who decide to work with the listed institutions on listed sensitive topics will not be eligible for federal grants. 

Trade weaponization by China

Trade weaponization by China has undermined the economic welfare of Canadians and posed a threat to the secure functioning of Canada’s critical infrastructure. For example, between 2019 and 2020, China targeted Canada’s canola sector with 100 percent tariffs, restricting these imports and costing Canadian farmers more than $2.35 billion in lost exports and price pressure. In Canada’s 2024 Fall Economic Statement, which outlined key measures to enhance Canadian economic security, the Ministry of Finance announced its plans to impose additional tariffs on Chinese imports to combat China’s unfair trade practices. These included tariffs on solar products and critical minerals in early 2025, and on permanent magnets, natural graphite, and semiconductors in 2026. 

However, the imposition of 25 percent tariffs by Washington on both Canada and China could result in deepening trade ties between the two. Canada exported a record $2 billion in crude oil to China in 2024, accounting for half of all oil exports through the newly expanded Trans Mountain pipeline. Increased trade with China would increase Canada’s exposure to China’s coercive practices, and would be a direct consequence of US tariffs on Canada. 

An unexpected threat: Overdependence on trade with the United States

A new and unexpected threat to Canada’s economic security emerged from the United States when the Trump administration threatened to impose 25 percent tariffs on all Canadian goods (except for the 10 percent tariffs on energy imports). The United States is Canada’s largest export market, receiving a staggering 76 percent of Canada’s exports in 2024. Canada relies on the United States particularly in the context of its crude oil trade, shipping 97.4 percent of its crude oil to the United States. 

Canada had already started working on expansion to global markets through pipeline development even before Washington announced tariffs. It has succeeded in the expansion of the Trans Mountain pipeline in May 2024, which has enabled the export of Canadian oil to Asia. Canada is reviving talks on the canceled Energy East and Northern Gateway pipelines—the former would move oil from Alberta to Eastern Canada, and the latter would transport oil from Alberta to British Columbia for export to Asian markets. 

In addition to oil trade, another area where Canada is highly dependent on the United States is in auto manufacturing. Behind oil exports, motor vehicles account for the largest share of Canadian exports to the United States, resulting in exports valued at $50.76 billion (C$72.7 billion Canadian dollars) in 2024. With 25 percent tariffs on all Canadian goods, the automotive industry is expected to take a hit, especially as components cross the border six to eight times before final assembly.

Figure 1

The United States invoked the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to impose tariffs on Canada with the stated objective to curb fentanyl flows to the United States. The measure has plunged US-Canada relations into chaos and could result in a trade war between the two long-standing allies. In response, Canada might reroute oil shipments to China through existing pipelines and increase trade with China in general. Further economic integration with China would increase Canada’s exposure to economic threats emanating from China, including trade weaponization and anti-competitive practices. 

Because of US tariffs, Canada could also face challenges in strengthening the resilience of its nuclear fuel and critical mineral supply chains. In the 2024 Fall Economic Statement, Canada outlined key measures for its economic security that heavily incorporated US cooperation. This included plans to strengthen nuclear fuel supply chain resiliency away from Russian influence, with up to $500 million set aside for enriched nuclear fuel purchase contracts from the United States. Canada also aims to strengthen supply chains for responsibly produced critical minerals, following a $3.8 billion investment in its Critical Minerals Strategy, which relies on the United States as a key partner. Given the tariffs, Canada will need to diversify its partners and supply sources quickly if it wishes to maintain these economic security goals. 

Figure 2: US-Canada overlapping memberships in security organizations and alliances

Lack of economic power consolidation by Canada’s federal government

Canada has a range of economic tools and sources of economic power to respond to emerging economic threats and mitigate vulnerabilities; however, it currently lacks economic power consolidation. Unlike the United States, where the federal government can regulate nearly all economic activity, Canada’s Constitution Act of 1867 grants provinces control over their “property and civil rights,” including natural resources. Section 92A, which was added to the constitution in 1982, further reinforced the provinces’ control over their natural resources. Meanwhile, the federal government has control over matters of international trade including trade controls. However, when international trade issues concern the natural resources of provinces, tensions and disagreements often arise between provinces and the federal government, and the lack of economic power consolidation by the federal government becomes obvious.

This issue manifested when the United States announced 25 percent tariffs on Canada in March 2025 as Canada’s federal government and the Alberta province had different reactions. Canada’s main leverage over the United States is oil exports. Refineries in the United States, particularly those in the Midwest, run exclusively on Canadian crude oil, having tailored their refineries to primarily process the heavy Canadian crude. Since 2010, Canadian oil accounted for virtually 100 percent of the oil imported by the Midwest. Threatening to hike levies on crude oil exports could have been Canada’s way of leveraging energy interdependence to respond to US tariffs. However, Alberta Premier Danielle Smith stated that Alberta, which is Canada’s largest oil producer and top exporter of crude oil to the United States, would not hike levies on oil and gas exports to the United States. Being unable to speak in one voice as a country even during a crisis is a direct consequence of Canada’s regional factionalism, characterized by each province looking out for their own interests. 

The United States-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) trade agreement, which entered into force during the first Trump administration in July 2020, may have also contributed to diminishing the economic power of Canada’s federal government. Article 32.10 of USMCA requires each member of the agreement to notify other countries if it plans to negotiate a free trade agreement (FTA) with a nonmarket economy. Thus, if Canada were to sign an FTA with China, the United States and Mexico could review the agreement and withdraw from USMCA with six months’ notice. After the USMCA was signed, Canadian scholars wrote that this clause would effectively turn Canada into a vassal state of the United States, with the authority to make decisions on internal affairs but having to rely on the larger power for foreign and security policy decisions. Five years later, it looks like the USMCA has put Canada in a difficult position, being targeted by US tariffs and not having advanced trading relations with other countries. 

Figure 3: US-Canada overlapping memberships in economic organizations and alliances

Mapping Canada’s economic statecraft systems

To secure Canada’s critical infrastructure and leverage its natural resources to shape favorable foreign policy outcomes, Canada’s federal government has a range of economic tools and the ability to design new ones when appropriate. Canada’s economic statecraft tool kit is similar to those of the United States and the European Union and includes sanctions, export controls, tariffs, and investment screening. Canada has imposed financial sanctions and export controls against Russia along with its Group of Seven (G7) allies. It has levied tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, in line with US policy, and recently created investment screening authorities to address concerns about adversarial capital. 

Financial sanctions 

Similar to the United States, Canada maintains sanctions programs covering specific countries such as Russia and Iran, as well as thematic sanctions regimes such as terrorism. Global Affairs Canada (GAC), which is Canada’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, administers sanctions and maintains the Consolidated Canadian Autonomous Sanctions List. Canada’s Finance Ministry, the Department of Finance, is not involved in sanctions designations, implementation, or enforcement, unlike in the United States, where the Department of the Treasury is the primary administrator of sanctions. 

The Parliament of Canada has enacted legislation authorizing the imposition of sanctions through three acts: the United Nations Act; the Special Economic Measures Act (SEMA); and the Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act (JVCFOA). 

The United Nations Act enables GAC to implement sanctions against entities or individuals sanctioned by the UN Security Council. When an act of aggression or a grave breach of international peace occurs and the UN Security Council is unable to pass a resolution, Canada implements autonomous sanctions under SEMA; this act is Canada’s primary law for imposing autonomous sanctions and includes country-based sanctions programs. It is also used to align Canada’s sanctions with those of allies. For example, GAC derived its powers from SEMA to designate Russian entities and individuals in alignment with Canada’s Western allies in 2022. Meanwhile, the JVCFOA allows GAC to impose sanctions against individuals responsible for human rights violations and significant acts of corruption, similar to the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act in the United States, with sanctions administered by the Office of Foreign Assets Control. 

Once GAC adds entities and individuals to the lists of sanctions, Canadian financial institutions comply by freezing the designated party’s assets and suspending transactions. GAC coordinates with several government agencies to enforce and enable private-sector compliance with sanctions: 

• FINTRAC: Canada’s financial intelligence unit (FIU)—Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC)—is responsible for monitoring suspicious financial activities and collecting reporting from financial institutions on transactions that may be linked to sanctions evasion. FINTRAC is an independent agency that reports to the Minister of Finance. FINTRAC works closely with the US financial intelligence unit—Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)—on illicit finance investigations and when sanctions evasion includes the US financial system. For example, FinCEN and FINTRAC both monitor and share financial information related to Russian sanctions evasion and publish advisories and red flags for the financial sector in coordination with other like-minded partner FIUs. 

• OSFI: The Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) is a banking regulator that issues directives to financial institutions regarding compliance and instructs banks to freeze assets belonging to sanctioned individuals and entities. FINTRAC also shares financial intelligence with OSFI on sanctions evasion activity under the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act (PCMLTFA). OSFI shares intelligence with Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the national police service of Canada, if there is evidence of sanctions evasion or other financial crimes. 

• RCMP: Once OSFI notifies RCMP about suspicious activity, RCMP investigates whether the funds are linked to sanctions evasion or other financial crimes. If it finds evidence of a violation of sanctions or criminal activity, RCMP obtains a court order to seize assets under the Criminal Code and the PCMLTFA.

• CBSA: Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) is responsible for blocking sanctioned individuals from entering Canada. CBSA also notifies OSFI if sanctioned individuals attempt to move cash or gold through border crossings. 

All four agencies work with GAC and with one another on sanctions enforcement. GAC sets sanctions policy, FINTRAC analyzes financial intelligence and shares suspicious activity reports to inform law enforcement investigations, OSFI enforces compliance in banks, RCMP investigates crimes and seizes assets, and CBSA prevents sanctioned individuals from entering Canada and moving assets across borders. 

While financial sanctions are part of Canada’s economic statecraft tool kit, Canadian sanctions power does not have the same reach as US sanctions. The preeminence of the US dollar and the omnipresence of major US banks allows the United States to effectively cut off sanctioned individuals and entities from the global financial system. Canadian sanctions are limited to Canadian jurisdiction and affect individuals and entities with financial ties to Canada, but they do not have the same reach as US financial sanctions. 

Nevertheless, Canadian authorities have been able to leverage financial sanctions to support the G7 allies in sanctioning Russia. For example, in December 2022, under SEMA, Canadian authorities ordered Citco Bank Canada, a subsidiary of a global hedge fund headquartered in the Cayman Islands, to freeze $26 million owned directly or indirectly by Russian billionaire Roman Abramovich, who has been sanctioned by Canada and other G7 allies. In June 2023, Canadian authorities seized a Russian cargo jet at Toronto’s Pearson Airport pursuant to SEMA. 

Figure 4

Export controls

Canada participates in several multilateral export control regimes, including the Wassenaar Arrangement, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, and Australia Group. When multilateral regimes fall short in addressing Canada’s foreign policy needs, Canada leverages its autonomous export control list, which is administered by GAC under the Export and Import Permits Act. The Trade Controls Bureau under GAC is responsible for issuing permits and certificates for the items included on the Export Control List (ECL).

Canada Border Services Agency plays a crucial role in the enforcement of export controls. CBSA verifies that shipments match the export permit issued by GAC. It can seize or refuse exports that violate GAC export permits through ports, airports, and land borders. CBSA refers cases to the Royal Canada Mounted Police (CRMP) for prosecution if exporters attempt to bypass regulations. 

Separately, FINTRAC monitors financial transactions that might be connected to the exports of controlled goods and technologies. If FINTRAC detects suspicious transactions, it shares intelligence with GAC and other relevant authorities. Canada’s method of leveraging financial intelligence for enforcing export controls is similar to that of the United States, where FinCEN has teamed up with the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security to detect export control evasion through financial transactions. 

While in the United States the export controls authority lies within the Commerce Department, Canada’s equivalent, Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada (ISED), does not participate in administering export controls. That responsibility is fully absorbed by GAC. 

While Canada has mainly used its export control authority in the context of sensitive technologies, Canadian politiciansand experts have recently been calling on the federal government to impose restrictions on mineral exports to the United States in response to US tariffs. The United States highly depends on Canada’s minerals, including uranium, aluminum, and nickel. Canada was the United States’ top supplier of metals and minerals in 2023 ($46.97 billion in US imports), followed by China ($28.32 billion) and Mexico ($28.18 billion). Notably, President Trump’s recent executive order called Unleashing American Energy instructed the director of the US Geological Survey to add uranium to the critical minerals list. Canada provides 25 percent of uranium to the United States. If Canada were to impose export controls on uranium, the US objective of building a resilient enriched uranium supply chain would be jeopardized. 

However, Canada could not impose export controls on the United States without experiencing significant blowback. Export control is a powerful tool. While US tariffs would increase the price of imported Canadian goods by at least 25 percent, Canada’s export controls would completely cut off the flow of certain Canadian goods to the United States. It would be destructive for both economies, so Canada will likely reserve this tool as a last resort and perhaps work on finding alternative export destinations before pulling such a trigger. 

Figure 5

Tariffs

Canada’s approach to tariffs is governed primarily by the Customs Act, which outlines the procedures for assessing and collecting tariffs on imported goods, as well as the Customs Tariff legislation that sets the duty rates for specific imports (generally based on the “Harmonized System,” an internationally standardized system for classifying traded products). The Canada Border Services Agency is responsible for administering these tariffs. Additionally, the Special Import Measures Act enables Canada to protect industries from harm caused by unfair trade practices like dumping or subsidizing of imported goods, with the Canadian International Trade Tribunal determining injury and the CBSA imposing necessary duties. The minister of finance, in consultation with the minister of foreign affairs, plays a key role in proposing tariff changes or retaliatory tariffs, ensuring Canada’s trade policies align with its broader economic and diplomatic objectives. 

Canada has frequently aligned with its allies on tariff issues, as demonstrated in 2024 when, following the US and EU tariffs, it imposed a 100 percent tariff on Chinese electric vehicles to protect domestic industries. However, Canada has also been proactive in responding to US tariffs, employing a combination of diplomatic negotiations, retaliatory tariffs, and reliance on dispute resolution mechanisms such as the World Trade Organization and USMCA. In the past Canada was also quick to align itself with allies such as the EU and Mexico, seeking a coordinated international response, as was the case in 2018 when the United States imposed a broad tariff on steel and aluminum.

Similar to the United States, Canada offers remission allowances to help businesses adjust to tariffs by granting relief under specific circumstances, such as the inability to source goods from nontariffed countries or preexisting contractual obligations. The Department of Finance regularly seeks input from stakeholders before introducing new tariffs. In 2024, a thirty-day consultation was launched about possible tariffs on Chinese batteries, battery parts, semiconductors, critical minerals, metals, and solar panels, though it has yet to result in any new tariffs. 

Canada’s primary weakness regarding tariffs is its lack of trade diversification. The United States accounts for half of Canada’s imports and 76 percent of its exports. This dependency severely limits Canada’s ability to impose tariffs on the United States without facing significant economic repercussions. Canada’s relatively limited economic leverage on the global stage also complicates efforts to coordinate multilateral tariff responses or to negotiate favorable trade agreements. Furthermore, Canada’s lengthy public consultations and regulatory processes for implementing tariffs hinder its ability to leverage tariffs as a swift response to changing geopolitical or economic circumstances. 

Figure 6

Investment screening

Canada’s investment screening is governed by the Investment Canada Act (ICA), which ensures that foreign investments do not harm national security while promoting economic prosperity. The ICA includes net benefit reviews for large investments and national security reviews for any foreign investments which pose potential security risks, such as foreign control over critical sectors like technology or infrastructure.

The review process is administered by ISED, with the minister of innovation, science, and industry overseeing the reviews in consultation with Public Safety Canada. For national security concerns, multiple agencies assess potential risks, and the Governor-in-Council (GIC) has the authority to block investments or demand divestitures.

Criticism of the ICA includes lack of transparency and consistency, particularly in national security reviews, where decisions may be influenced by political or diplomatic considerations. To better mitigate risks to security, critical infrastructure, and the transfer of sensitive technologies, experts have argued that the ICA should more effectively target malicious foreign investments by incorporating into the review process the perspectives of Canadian companies on emerging national security threats. In response to these concerns, Bill C-34 introduced key updates in 2024, including preclosing filing requirements for sensitive sectors, the possibility of interim conditions during national security reviews, broader scope covering state-owned enterprises and asset sales, consideration for intellectual property and personal data protection, and increased penalties for noncompliance. In March 2025, further amendments were made to the ICA, expanding its scope to review “opportunistic or predatory” foreign investments. These changes were introduced in response to the United States’ imposition of blanket tariffs on Canadian goods.

Figure 7

Positive economic statecraft

Apart from coercive/protective tools, Canada maintains positive economic statecraft (PES) tools such as development assistance to build economic alliances beyond North America. For example, Canada is one of the largest providers of international development assistance to African countries. After Ukraine, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo were the top recipients of Canada’s international assistance. Canada’s PES tools lay the ground for the federal governments to have productive cooperation when needs arise. Canadian authorities should leverage PES tools to enhance the country’s international standing and increase economic connectivity with other regions of the world. This is especially important amid the US pause on nearly all US foreign assistance. Canada could step up to help fill the vacuum in the developing world created by the Trump administration’s radical departure from a long-standing US role in foreign aid. 

Canadian authorities have already taken steps in this direction. On March 9, Canadian Minister of International Development Ahmed Hussen announced that Canada would be providing $272.1 million for foreign aid projects in Bangladesh and the Indo-Pacific region. The projects will focus on climate adaptation, empowering women in the nursing sector, advancing decent work and inclusive education and training. Earlier, on March 6, Global Affairs Canada launched its first Global Africa Strategy with the goal of deepening trade and investment relations with Africa, partnering on peace and security challenges, and advancing shared priorities on the international stage including climate change. Through this partnership, Canada plans to strengthen economic and national security by enhancing supply chain resilience and maintaining corridors for critical goods. 

Conclusion

Canada’s federal government maintains a range of economic statecraft tools and authorities to address economic and national security threats. While regional factionalism and provincial equities can hinder the federal government’s ability to leverage the full force of Canada’s economic power, threats to Canada’s economic security, including tariffs from the United States, may prove to further unite and align the provinces. The federal government and provincial premiers should work together to meet this challenging moment, consolidating Canada’s sources of economic power and moving forward with a cohesive economic statecraft strategy to protect the country’s national security and economic security interests.

Canada’s leadership and engagement in international fora including the G7, NATO, Wassenaar Agreement, among others, as well as its bilateral relationships, make it well-placed to coordinate and collaborate with Western partners on economic statecraft. Information sharing, joint investigations, multilateral sanctions, and multilateral development and investment can extend the reach of Canada’s economic power while strengthening Western efforts to leverage economic statecraft to advance global security objectives and ensure the integrity of the global financial system. Canada also has a solid foundation for building economic partnerships beyond the West through development assistance and other positive economic statecraft tools. 

Staff

Kimberly Donovan

Director, Economic Statecraft Initiative

Economic Statecraft Initiative GeoEconomics Center

Digital Currencies Economic Sanctions

Staff

Maia Nikoladze

Associate Director, Economic Statecraft Initiative

Economic Statecraft Initiative GeoEconomics Center

Digital Currencies Eastern Europe

Staff

Lize de Kruijf

Program Assistant, Economic Statecraft Initiative

Economic Statecraft Initiative GeoEconomics Center

Dutch Economic Sanctions

The authors would like to thank Nazima Tursun, a young global professional at the Atlantic Council’s Economic Statecraft Initiative, for research support.

The report is part of a year-long series on economic statecraft across the G7 and China supported in part by a grant from MITRE.

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Housed within the GeoEconomics Center, the Economic Statecraft Initiative (ESI) publishes leading-edge research and analysis on sanctions and the use of economic power to achieve foreign policy objectives and protect national security interests.

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The post Canada needs an economic statecraft strategy to address its vulnerabilities appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On March 26, Andrew Michta, senior fellow in the GeoStrategy Initiative, published an article in 19FortyFive on how the Trump administration’s transatlantic policy could fundamentally alter NATO. He argues that closer relations between Washington and Moscow “risks undoing the last eighty years of US national security strategy” in Europe.

Staff

Andrew A. Michta

Senior Fellow, GeoStrategy Initiative

GeoStrategy Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Central Europe Eastern Europe

The post Michta published in 19FortyFive on uncertainty around NATO’s future and US strategy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Misreading Putin’s aims at this pivotal moment carries risks that could cost the United States in the long term and create a new security crisis in Europe. For the United States, one risk is that the Russian president may, after wringing steep concessions from negotiations, agree to a deal that he has no intention of upholding. Time and again, history has warned against equating concession to Russian demands with a step toward lasting peace. Peace with Russia will require more than just a handshake.

Perhaps the most important starting point for Trump’s negotiations is recognizing this: Russia’s unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine has never been simply about where to draw borders. Moscow’s aggression is motivated more by ideology and regime security than a desire to acquire a bit more land. Going forward, US negotiations must understand this larger picture of what motivates Russia, as it is critical for constructing a durable and lasting peace.

Putin’s ‘Russian world’

For years, the Kremlin has promoted the idea of a “Russian World,” whose “borders do not end anywhere.” It is this ideology that informs Russia’s desire to swallow Ukraine whole and menace Europe. The idea of Ukraine joining the prosperous, democratic club of nations threatens the grip of the Russian government’s imperial, kleptocratic despotism. Today, Russia is a mafia-like state in large part held together by cruelty and fueled by a reservoir of lies and corruption. In many disturbing ways, Russia’s conduct in its war against Ukraine emulates the way its leaders have behaved within their own territory. Russia has abducted thousands of Ukrainian children, killed scores of noncombatants, and adopted military tactics that show little regard for the lives of its own soldiers.

Russia has justified its aggression by touting the supposed “historical unity” of Slavic nations. Putin’s motivation for rule-breaking seems to stem from a desire to return to a more brutish past, when violent spheres of influence, rather than international norms and laws, dictated the terms of occupation for millions of people in Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Belarus, and the Baltic states.

In Russia, foreign policy is often a “tool” of domestic policy, as these civilizational claims better justify Putin’s internal repression at home. For the Russian president, his country’s capacity to menace Europe assists his goal of shaping the Russian populace. Conformity, repression, and nationalism for Russia at home is just as critical to cementing Putin’s power as events unfolding outside Russia’s borders. Putin must continually demonstrate to his own population that Ukraine’s democratic aspirations are hopeless. Otherwise, he seems to fear uprisings of a similar caliber to those in Georgia in 2024, Belarus in 2020, or Ukraine in 2014, which could threaten his kleptocratic grip on power.

Lessons from the Minsk agreements

Throughout the negotiation process, Russia’s war aims are unlikely to change. Putin wants to ensure Ukraine is ungovernable and weak, preventing it from fully integrating with the West and becoming a symbol of self-determination on Russia’s doorstep. Neither latent Russian imperialism nor the Kremlin’s fear of “color revolutions” will go away if the United States chooses to appease Russia.

Stark warnings from top US diplomats and former Russian officials alike emphasize that dealmaking with Putin will be extraordinarily challenging and fraught with the risk of deception. In 2019, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was elected largely on the issue of ending the war with Russia in the Donbas and resisting the slide back into the vortex of Moscow’s dystopian melodrama. The region was still simmering from Russia’s unprovoked attacks in the Donbas and Crimea in 2014, after the Ukrainian people ousted its Russia-friendly president, Viktor Yanukovych, and attempted to look toward Europe.

The 2019 agreements between Russia and Ukraine, which Zelenskyy pursued, failed because they tried to paper over an irreconcilable clash of interests. Russia is on a quest for permanent imperial control of Ukraine, and Ukraine wants to be a democratic sovereign state. As a result, Russia repeatedly broke cease-fire agreements it had signed, and there is no indication, short of credible deterrence, that Russia will honor future agreements.

As Russia’s political levers of control over Ukraine diminished in the years following Yanukovych’s ouster, the Kremlin was emboldened to use larger-scale violence to subdue its neighbor in 2022. Putin’s aims were still to ensure that the secure, sovereign, peaceful, rules-based, democratic, European way of life couldn’t infect his “Russian World.”

In both the Minsk agreements and the lead-up to the full-scale February 2022 invasion, Russian officials never discussed the parameters of arms control or the security of Russia’s pre-existing borders, according to reports. This suggests that they were never really interested in nonviolent remediation measures for their so-called “security concerns.”

Ukraine cannot end Russian aggression by signing a treaty that creates a new border demarcation line. Instead, Ukraine and its partners must reestablish credible deterrence through security guarantees that prevent destabilizing Russian aggression. In preparing for a cessation of hostilities, the United States, as Ukraine’s military partner, should prioritize engaging Ukraine and Europe, rather than focusing on appeasing a lawless, reckless Russian Federation.

Ukrainians, alongside their Eastern European neighbors, warn that Russia’s motives for launching its invasion indicate wider imperial ambitions beyond Ukraine. Ignoring this perspective risks European security, US interests, and global stability. Only security guarantees—or as Lithuanian Defense Minister Dovilė Šakalienė recently put it, only negotiations with a “gun on the table”—will give Russia pause.

Zak Schneider is a young global professional with the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

The post Peace requires more than a handshake: Misreading Russia’s war aims will prolong Putin’s aggression appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Domestic regime type affects both inter-state conflict and alliance formation. Democratic peace theory posits that democracies do not go to war with one another, while democratic alliance theory suggests that they rarely, if ever, join nondemocratic alliances (or alliances led by nondemocratic powers). Empirical evidence strongly supports both theories. The Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Indexes further reinforces the hypothesis that economically prosperous democracies tend to align with one another, whereas authoritarian states gravitate toward similarly nondemocratic and less prosperous partners. 

If these theories hold, they carry significant implications for Western and especially US foreign policy. First, global democratization would reduce the number of potential conflicts, at least among an increasing number of democracies. Second, it would expand the pool of democratic alliance partners, while at the same limiting the alliance options available to nondemocratic powers. This strategic logic underscores the importance of upholding democratic norms abroad and promoting democratization in nondemocratic states. 

However, advocating for democratization of nondemocratic great powers will be perceived as both a geopolitical and domestic political challenge aimed at weakening their international position  and threatening their governments’ domestic grip on power. Efforts to democratize nondemocratic great-power like Russia and China therefore provoke intense countermeasures. If such a strategy is deemed to be too high risk or too difficult to pursue successfully, a less provocative, “peripheral” strategy may focus on fostering democracy and economic development in authoritarian regimes’ weaker, less prosperous partners, thereby depriving them of potential allies. 

Fellow

Markus Jaeger

Senior Advisor

Freedom and Prosperity Center

Central Europe Economy & Business

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Democratic Transitions Freedom and Prosperity

The Freedom and Prosperity Center aims to increase the prosperity of the poor and marginalized in developing countries and to explore the nature of the relationship between freedom and prosperity in both developing and developed nations.

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The post Why democracies stick together: The theory and empirics behind alliance formation appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On March 15, Matthew Kroenig, vice president and senior director of the Scowcroft Center, was quoted in the New York Times on European leaders’ discussion of replacing US nuclear protection with European capabilities. He argues that Europe does not have sufficient resources to replace the nuclear umbrella provided by the United States.  

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig quoted in the New York Times on Europe’s nuclear posture and US deterrence   appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Transformation Admiral Pierre Vandier warned in an interview with Politico in November, NATO must “take more risks, spend more, be faster, and cut bureaucracy.” Important equipment ranging from frigates and armored personnel carriers to ammunition are often delayed or stuck in bureaucratic limbo.

Making these changes will not be easy. Despite past reform efforts, NATO’s common-funded capability development and delivery remains slow, fragmented, and risk-averse. Procedural compliance is often prioritized over effectiveness, and consensus-driven decision-making delays urgent operational needs.

But without urgent reform, NATO risks eroding its credibility and failing to provide warfighters with the tools they need, when they need them. NATO must increase efficiency, maintain its technological edge, improve interoperability, and ensure its forces can fight as a cohesive Alliance.

The case for urgent reform

NATO’s capability development process is structurally misaligned with its operational needs. Here are four ways to reform the capability development and delivery process.

1. Prioritize speed and outcomes over process

NATO’s risk-averse, process-driven culture leads to excessive delays. Capabilities stall not due to technical challenges but because of bureaucratic approvals, redundant reviews, and slow decision-making. Even urgent capability needs must clear multiple layers of approval, leading to delays measured in years instead of months.

These delays hinder NATO’s ability to field critical technologies, such as artificial intelligence-enabled decision support, cyber defense tools, and space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance—capabilities that adversaries are deploying at speed. By the time NATO makes a decision, the operational environment has often already shifted, making some investments obsolete before they are even employed.

NATO must replace its risk-averse, process-driven culture with one that rewards speed, effectiveness, and operational impact. Governance should focus on timely decision-making, with clear, enforceable timelines for capability approvals. NATO should also streamline redundant reviews and adopt commercial-sector best practices, such as rapid prototyping and iterative fielding.

2. Establish a single accountable authority

NATO’s Common-Funded Capability Development (CFCD) process is fragmented across multiple organizations. Therefore, no single entity is accountable for delivering capabilities from concept to fielding. This diffusion of responsibility creates inefficiencies and capability gaps that weaken NATO’s deterrence.

Although Allied Command Transformation’s deputy chief of staff for capability development (DCOS CD) informally coordinates efforts across NATO Headquarters and procurement agencies, the absence of authority to set deadlines, assign priorities, or enforce accountability hampers progress.

Recognizing this challenge, the DCOS CD has begun to strengthen the Capability Management Authority and refine the Strategic Portfolio Review to improve prioritization and coordination. These are positive steps, but they remain dependent on consensus-based decision-making and lack the enforcement mechanisms to accelerate delivery.

One solution is to establish a senior leader—such as an assistant secretary general for acquisition and capability delivery (ASG ACD)—to oversee CFCD execution. Supported by a directorate drawn from existing expertise, this leader would have the power to set priorities, enforce timelines, resolve disputes, and ensure capability gaps are closed on time. Such a role would institutionalize ongoing efforts, ensuring prioritization, sequencing, and execution occur under the necessary accountable and empowered authority to drive results.

3. Align capability development with national force planning

NATO’s CFCD process and the NATO Defense Planning Process (NDPP) operate separately despite being inextricably linked. CFCD funds shared capabilities, while the NDPP ensures nations develop forces that meet collective requirements. When these processes are not aligned, capability gaps and interoperability challenges emerge.

The modernization of NATO’s Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) highlights this misalignment. For nearly a decade, NATO debated whether to sustain, replace, or transition away from AWACS. The Alliance Future Surveillance and Control initiative, launched in 2017, remained a study rather than a structured procurement effort. Meanwhile, CFCD decision-making lacked urgency, leaving allies uncertain about their role in NATO’s future surveillance and control capability. If CFCD investments do not align with NDPP-generated national capabilities, NATO risks funding systems that are incomplete or unable to integrate into broader force structures. The result? Delays, misaligned capabilities, and an Alliance less prepared to fight as a unified force.

To address this, NATO should institutionalize a formal mechanism to synchronize CFCD and NDPP decision-making. The Alliance has recently taken promising steps, such as reestablishing linkages through the introduction of ‘collective targets’ in the next version of NATO’s political guidance document, which is currently in development and slated for approval in 2027. However, deeper and more sustained alignment is necessary to prevent delays and ensure NATO’s investments integrate seamlessly with national force development.

4. Reform industry engagement and procurement agility

NATO’s rigid procurement processes prevent it from rapidly integrating cutting-edge technologies in artificial intelligence, cyber, and space. While adversaries exploit emerging capabilities, NATO remains bound by slow, inflexible acquisition rules.

To overcome these barriers, NATO must overhaul its approach to industry engagement and procurement. The pending Industry Engagement Strategy for Space is a step in the right direction, potentially bringing commercial space capabilities and technology to the Alliance, but further action is required. NATO should establish fast-track acquisition pathways, modeled on successful national defense programs, to accelerate the procurement of emerging technologies. Additionally, NATO Security Investment Program funding mechanisms must become more flexible, allowing for adaptive, needs-driven investments that keep pace with evolving threats.

NATO must act now

The urgency of reform cannot be overstated. NATO’s capability development system is not keeping pace with modern warfare. If the Alliance does not act decisively, its deterrence credibility and warfighting effectiveness will erode while adversaries accelerate their technological and military capabilities.

Reforming decision-making, empowering dedicated leadership, aligning CFCD with NDPP, and modernizing procurement are strategic imperatives. NATO’s ability to deter, respond, and prevail depends on fielding capabilities at the speed of operational need.

NATO must act now to remain ready, relevant, and dominant in the battlespace of tomorrow. Incremental change is no longer an option.

Lieutenant General (Ret.) David J. Julazadeh is a nonresident senior fellow with the Transatlantic Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He most recently served at NATO’s Allied Command Transformation as the deputy chief of staff, capability development.

The post NATO’s capability development: A call for urgent reform appeared first on Atlantic Council.

To bring about a cease-fire in the war in Ukraine, the Trump administration has signaled a willingness to normalize relations with Russia via enhanced economic relations with a heavily sanctioned Moscow.  

This course of action presents a dramatic turn from the prior US policy of unflinching support to Ukraine and opposition to Russian aggression. The Trump administration’s goals are ambitious and multifaceted: secure a rapid end to the war in Ukraine, coerce Europeans to contribute more to their security, and entice Russia into more deeply embracing the United States (instead of China) using economic incentives. Complementing the tentative rapprochement between Washington and Moscow is a minerals deal between the United States and Ukraine that would see the two countries jointly develop Ukraine’s mineral resources. If it goes through, the deal would provide Kyiv with a coveted link to Washington, though no clearly defined security guaranties have been identified in the draft agreement.

The Trump administration’s pursuit of these goals is not without risk. Russian President Vladimir Putin could view Trump’s overtures as signs of weakness, which might lead him to double down on aggressive actions or drag out negotiations to achieve a better bargaining position. Russia has a less-than-stellar record of honoring its agreements with Ukraine, so there is a bad precedent. Russia’s complex, centuries-long security obsessions vis-à-vis the West will not be assuaged by promises of economic collaboration with the United States. And even with a cessation of hostilities, convincing foreign investors to return to Russia may not be easy. Additionally, it is unclear whether better relations and economic concessions from the United States, in some Nixonian grand-strategy coup, will manage to drive Russia to weaken its links with China.

Even if a peace deal is struck, the wider Black Sea region will remain a militarized, unstable, and contested space. The end of hostilities in Ukraine does not necessarily mean the end of conflict; it is possible that Russia will gladly accept Western attention while using the lull to rest and rebuild its armed forces for a rematch with Ukraine. Russia regularly launches hybrid warfare attacks on its neighbors, and the peace deal will likely not bar the Kremlin from continuing to meddle elsewhere. Vulnerable non-NATO states Moldova and Georgia are already under extreme pressure from Moscow. Longtime regional competitors Russia and Turkey, despite their uneasy rapprochement in recent years, could see renewed friction along one of many traditional fault lines. Finally, more than just traditional littoral states are now deeply involved in the Black Sea region’s security, as shown by the introduction of North Korean forces into the war.

Trump has repeatedly stated his desire to quickly resolve the war in Ukraine. But the United States can’t stop there. Since the region is in proximity to major trade routes—such as the Suez Canal, the Middle Corridor, and routes that transport Middle Eastern energy—the United States may not have the luxury of walking away from the Black Sea without consequences for US trade and commerce that would require Washington’s attention later.

This creates even more reason for the Trump administration to develop a Black Sea security and development strategy, the pillars for which are enshrined in the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act. Those pillars are designed to increase coordination with NATO and the European Union, deepen economic ties (particularly in energy), and bolster democratic principles and good governance. While those pillars lack detail, they provide a solid framework that emphasizes economic development, energy security, and infrastructure support that provides investment opportunities for US firms. That all aligns with the administration’s priorities.

The president’s desire to fashion his own policy initiatives and to distance himself from his predecessor could drive him to revise the existing strategy framework to emphasize economic development or produce clear security guarantees. Such a Black Sea strategy, if fully developed, could act as a hedge should Russia continue its regional adventurism.

Assuming a Trump-negotiated cease-fire takes hold, the United States has allies in the region, notably Turkey and Romania, which are natural staging areas for Ukraine’s reconstruction and other efforts that would be part of a comprehensive Black Sea strategy. Turkey, which is home to the Incirlik Air Base and provides access to the Black Sea via the straits, is positioning itself as a regional military, economic, and political power. Romania has a growing strategic footprint, centered on the Mihail Kogălniceanu Air Base and the Port of Constanța on the Black Sea. Furthermore, Romania is rapidly improving its defense capabilities, particularly through the acquisition of US weapons systems. Bucharest has consistently met the requirement to spend 2 percent of its GDP on defense and could reach 3 percent by 2027.

The wider Black Sea region will continue to be a fragile geopolitical environment and the threats to US interests there will not subside with the cessation of hostilities in Ukraine. Trump understands the region’s importance and its value for US commercial and strategic interests. In July 2017, early in his first administration, Trump expressed support for the Three Seas Initiative (a forum of countries located along the Baltic, Adriatic, and Black Seas), noting that it “will not only empower your people to prosper, but it will ensure that your nations remain sovereign, secure, and free from foreign coercion.” That vision for peace and prosperity in the region will require more than a cease-fire in Ukraine; it will require a new Black Sea security and development strategy that unleashes economic development and greater private-sector activity under US leadership.

Arnold C. Dupuy is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and chair of the NATO Science and Technology Organization’s SAS-183, “Energy Security Capabilities, Resilience and Interoperability.” Follow him on LinkedIn.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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On March 7, Matthew Kroenig, vice president and senior director of the Scowcroft Center, was quoted in the Wall Street Journal on European leaders “overreacting” to US President Donald Trump’s foreign policy. He argues that, on balance, the NATO alliance “emerged stronger” at the end of the first Trump administration.   

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

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Trump administration officials will better achieve a just and lasting end to Russia’s unprovoked, illegal, and murderous (all facts) war in Ukraine if they first agree on what motivated Russian President Vladimir Putin to act. It was a revanchist desire to regain a lost empire that begins but doesn’t end with Ukraine. For Putin, any agreement he signs must serve that purpose.

Second, Trump administration officials need to be clear on what Putin is trying to achieve beyond that, beginning with the subjugation of other countries that once belonged to the Soviet bloc, including current members of NATO.

Putin is determined, working in a “no limits” partnership with Beijing, to roll back US global influence and replace it with a world order of Russia and China’s own making. Putin has said so plainly, as has Chinese President Xi Jinping, who has remarked to the Russian leader, “Now there are changes that haven’t happened in a hundred years. When we are together, we drive these changes.”

Peace through strength

With that as context, the best war-ending formula publicly available, one that begins with a deep understanding of those immutable facts, was published in Foreign Affairs this past Friday as “A Plan for Peace Through Strength in Ukraine.” Its authors are consistently wise voices on the United States’ role in the world: Stephen Hadley, a former US national security advisor; Daniel Fried, a former US ambassador to Poland; and Franklin D. Kramer, a former senior Pentagon official.*

The essay’s two most crucial paragraphs suggest a course correction in the Trump administration’s current approach, one involving both Europe and the possibility of NATO membership for Ukraine. This shift is necessary, the authors argue, if the president wants to avoid the fate of “the Biden administration’s disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan.” 

President Donald Trump was factually correct in his recent address to Congress in saying that then President Joe Biden’s botched withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 demonstrated weakness, which then encouraged Putin to launch his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in early 2022. One can draw a clear line. Building on that lesson, the authors argue that Trump accepting Russia’s “apparent terms for ending the war” risks demonstrating a similar weakness with similar outcomes.

“The best path to end the war will instead follow a ‘peace through strength’ approach,” write the authors. “Such an approach would substantially enhance Europe’s role in supporting Ukraine militarily and economically, with a limited but important backup role for the United States; accept the current lines of control between Russian and Ukrainian forces, without recognizing Russian annexation or sovereignty over Russian-occupied areas; and prepare the path for a negotiated settlement—all while considering, in the likely event that negotiations fail, how to achieve a cease-fire through unilateral action.”

Those last few words regarding the potential need for unilateral action are significant, as Putin is unlikely to accept any deal that would ensure outcomes that would serve Ukrainian, US, and allied interests. 

So, it’s not too early for Trump administration officials to conjure a robust war-ending option absent Russia’s agreement, if Trump wants his place in history to be that of a global hero, worthy of a Nobel Peace Prize. The alternative is to risk falling into the trap of emboldening Putin, à la Biden.

“To pave this path,” the authors write, “Ukraine, Europe, and the United States must focus on four priorities: strengthening Ukraine militarily, applying additional economic pressure on Russia (but relaxing sanctions if it complies with an agreement), addressing Ukrainian security and economic needs through EU membership, and deterring Russia by granting Ukraine NATO membership.”

Nothing in the Foreign Affairs essay is more controversial or necessary than the deterrence value of offering Ukraine NATO membership if the country’s lasting security can’t be guaranteed through a ceasefire and peace agreement—or if Russia breaks an agreement that it signs, which it has a habit of doing.

The authors don’t mention that US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth seemed to take Ukraine’s NATO membership off the table on February 12. It’s unclear whether US negotiators have yet done the same. If so, they should put NATO membership back into the mix, both because history has shown it is the region’s most effective security guarantee and because it provides Trump with powerful leverage.

The author of Trump: The Art of the Deal recently lectured Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in the Oval Office that he was playing weak cards. No one understands better than Trump how foolish it would be to throw away your best cards at the beginning of a negotiation.

The Foreign Affairs authors are arguing that it is only the prospect of Alliance membership, should Putin continue to threaten Ukraine or not live by any agreement’s requirements, that would compel him to comply with peace terms. Finnish President Alexander Stubb has made a similar argument.

Write the authors: “A negotiating position based on these four priorities”—Ukraine’s military strength, economic pressure on Moscow, EU membership for Ukraine, and the deterrence value of NATO membership—“will give Ukrainians the confidence to negotiate and Putin the incentive to make negotiations successful.”

Beyond that, they write, to reach an agreement, “U.S. negotiators will have to avoid falling into a Russian trap that focuses first on improving U.S.-Russian relations while deferring the issue of Ukraine so that Russian forces have more time to take more Ukrainian territory.” 

The hard truth about hard power

It’s worth considering other facts as US negotiators proceed.

There is a false notion that NATO provoked Russian intervention in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 by agreeing in Bucharest in 2008 that both countries would someday become Alliance members. 

Hadley was on the ground in Bucharest negotiating the agreement on behalf of the Bush administration with recalcitrant German and French officials, who balked at giving those countries firmer and faster guarantees. It was that mushy middle ground that doomed them.

Want proof? Look at the former Soviet bloc countries that did become NATO members after the Cold War. They have remained stable and secure ever since, and they will do so as long as Russia believes that the United States and its NATO allies stand by their “all for one and one for all” security guarantee under the North Atlantic Treaty’s Article 5.

Under the headline “The real reason Russia invaded Ukraine (hint: it’s not NATO expansion),” the Atlantic Council’s Andrew A. Michta writes that much of the public debate about the war in Ukraine “seems increasingly disconnected from reality. The responsibility for the invasion and the carnage is unequivocally Russian President Vladimir Putin’s, and this simple fact ought to be the departure point for any rational path to ending the conflict.”

Michta argues, “The West is responsible not because it sought to redefine the security architecture of Europe’s historical crush zone in a way that favors its interests and the region’s stability and security, but rather because it failed to take the second fundamental step: the West failed to back up the new security architecture with hard power.”

Unlike in the aftermath of World War II, Michta writes, when the United States brought massive amounts of power to stabilize and rebuild Europe and deter any attempts at Soviet aggression against the free world, “the post-Cold War settlement was accompanied by a bewildering degree of disarmament across the collective West.”

Michta worries about a Ukraine deal that not only confirms Russia’s territorial gains, possibly allowing it to absorb the country over time, but also frees Russia to seek further gains, regionally and elsewhere, in its increasingly close partnership with China. 

“Add to this the strategic myopia of key European politicians who, instead of recognizing what their weakness has wrought, speak instead about ‘being abandoned by America,’ and you have the perfect storm brewing just over the horizon,” writes Michta.

Michta usefully reminds readers that deterrence requires both military capabilities and the willingness to use them. “If you have neither,” he writes, “the correct term is ‘appeasement,’ with all that this is likely to entail down the line.”

Put most simply, the Trump administration’s negotiations with Russia will either deter or appease Putin’s well-telegraphed ambitions. The peace plan outlined in Foreign Affairs is a good place to start if Trump wants to avoid appeasement. 

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on X: @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points newsletter, a column of dispatches from a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

Note: Stephen Hadley is an executive vice chair of the Atlantic Council board of directors, Daniel Fried the Council’s Weiser family distinguished fellow, and Franklin D. Kramer a board member.

The post Here’s a Ukraine peace plan Trump can use to deter—not appease—Putin appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The increasingly fraught endgame to the Russia-Ukraine war reflects a larger ongoing debate in the US policy community about who is ultimately responsible for the conflict. 

US President Donald Trump has asserted on several occasions that the war happened mostly because of the incompetence of the Biden administration. Several commentators have stepped forward, opining that the United States is ultimately responsible for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine because, allegedly, Washington broke the promise given to Moscow in the waning months of the Cold War that if the Soviets agreed to the unification of Germany, there would be no NATO presence east of the German border.  

By this logic, even the first round of NATO enlargement in 1999 that brought Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary into the Alliance should be seen as the cause of the subsequent devastation unleashed by Russia against Ukraine. Of late, academics with impeccable credentials have been repeating this argument in lectures and podcasts. 

In short, much public debate over the war in Ukraine seems increasingly disconnected from reality. The responsibility for the invasion and the carnage is unequivocally Russian President Vladimir Putin’s, and this simple fact ought to be the departure point for any rational path forward to ending the conflict.  

Here are the fundamentals: In 1991, the Soviet Union lost the Cold War, as it could no longer compete either in the economic, political, or military spheres. The Lenin-Stalin empire simply imploded, collapsing under its own weight, ripped asunder by the very contradictions Marxist ideologues claimed would be the West’s ultimate undoing. The West prevailed and was thus positioned to shape the post-Cold War order in ways that favored its interests and priorities.  

There is nothing untoward, immoral, or “treacherous” in this simple statement of fact. Had the reverse happened, the Russians would have claimed the right to do the same, i.e., shape the post-Cold War order according to their interests and priorities. Of course, one key difference in 1999 and beyond compared to such a putative Soviet victory scenario was that NATO enlargement (not “expansion” as Moscow prefers to call it) reflected the wishes and desires of the nations finally liberated from under the Soviet yoke.  

Victory in a war has consequences—this is what realism in international affairs has always looked like. 

Simply put, what happened after the Cold War was not a devious US plot to betray Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his successors but a simple consequence of the Soviet Union’s defeat. And the logic of this was perfectly understood by Yeltsin and Putin, notwithstanding the fact that the latter would subsequently bemoan the disintegration of the Soviet empire as the “greatest geopolitical tragedy of the twentieth century.” Post-1991, the United States exercised its victor’s prerogative, together with its democratic allies, to structure the post-Soviet space in Central Europe and the Baltics in a way that stabilized the region and served the United States’ interests and those of its European allies.

This is what the NATO and European Union enlargement cycles were all about. These are the basics of great power politics, and a country can only forget them at its own peril.   

What, then, explains the hand-wringing today about the West’s alleged responsibility for triggering the Russian invasion of Ukraine? Let me concede that the West is in part responsible for what happened, but not for the reasons the current preferred narrative suggests. The West is responsible not because it sought to redefine the security architecture of Europe’s historical crush zone in a way that favors its interests and the region’s stability and security, but rather because it failed to take the second fundamental step: the West failed to back up the new security architecture with hard power. 

Unlike in the aftermath of World War II, when the United States brought massive amounts of power to stabilize and rebuild Europe and to deter any attempts at Soviet aggression against the free world, the post-Cold War settlement was accompanied by a bewildering degree of disarmament across the collective West.  

NATO enlargement was treated as a political exercise, in which the NATO flag and a few liaison officers were supposed to complete the process, while the “end of history” crowd veered left in pursuit of its neoliberal global economic agenda. And while Europe disarmed at speed and scale, the United States launched its global war on terror after the 9/11 attacks, expending trillions of dollars on democracy-building and nation-building projects that had virtually zero prospects for success.  

The real reasons for conflict

In short, it was not the West’s aggressive pursuit of an anti-Russian agenda, but rather the weakness and lack of strategic clarity it communicated at every turn post-Cold War that encouraged Moscow’s revisionism. It was not the West’s alleged geostrategic assertiveness, but its timidity each time Putin used military power to occupy territory—first in Georgia in 2008, then in Ukraine in 2014, in Syria in 2015, and finally in Ukraine for the second time in 2022—that set the stage for the unfolding tragedy in Eastern Europe.  

If the West is responsible for the Russian invasion of Ukraine, it’s not for the reasons its critics now propound, i.e., because of its allegedly aggressive behavior, but because of its inability to grasp the basics of power politics as it swam into an ideological soup of its own making that bore no resemblance to how the world really works.  

The West is poised to communicate weakness once again, only this time unabashedly and without pretense that it is doing so because of norms or the “rules-based international order.” If the final peace agreement on Ukraine simply ratifies the status quo on the battlefield, the Trump administration will hand Moscow a major win, in effect undoing the consequences of the Western victory in the Cold War.

It will communicate in no uncertain terms that Russia can structure its sphere of domination in Eastern Europe at will, and that the West will accept Moscow’s role as an imperial power shaping the future of Europe as a whole. And as the tragedy of Ukraine reaches its denouement, it should be said that the culpability for defeat in Ukraine—a defeat that will effectively reverse the gains made by the West in the twentieth century—falls in part on the United States, through the diffident “escalation management” policy in Ukraine pursued by the Biden administration.  

The United States’ key allies in Europe are also to blame, especially Germany, the very country that benefitted most from the collapse of the iron curtain, and then proceeded to do more than any other European power to bring Russia back into European politics through the nefarious Nord Stream energy deals and Berlin’s policy of engaging with Moscow irrespective of Washington’s warnings—including from the first Trump administration—and above the heads of the countries threatened by Russia along the Eastern flank of NATO.  

What history teaches us

Defeat always carries with it structural changes when it comes to regional and global power distribution. For the past twenty years, Russia has been pursuing a revisionist policy with the goal of relitigating the end of the Cold War. In the fields of Ukraine, it has fought not just Kyiv, but every Western capital. In fact, Putin has stated outright that he is waging a civilizational war against NATO and the West. Russia is now poised to score an unequivocal civilizational victory, the consequences of which will reverberate not only in Europe, but also in the Middle East, the Korean Peninsula, and in the Indo-Pacific.  

A “deal on Ukraine” that in effect confirms Russia’s territorial gains and allows it to claim the right to shape Ukraine’s systemic transformation going forward—and possibly even to absorb the country altogether down the line—will be 1991 in reverse, freeing Russia to leverage the new power distribution and its alliance with China to its own advantage. Add to this the strategic myopia of key European politicians who, instead of recognizing what their weakness has wrought, speak instead about “being abandoned by America,” and you have the perfect storm brewing just over the horizon.  

Deterrence is both about military capabilities and the willingness to use them. If you have neither, the correct term is “appeasement,” with all that this is likely to entail down the line. 

Andrew A. Michta is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft GeoStrategy Initiative. The views expressed here are his own.

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On February 27, Theresa Luetkefend, an Assistant Director in the Forward Defense program, co-authored an essay with Jeff Rathke, the President of the American-German Institute, through the US Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute. Luetkefend’s essay, titled “The International Dimension: NATO, the EU, and Multinational Cooperation,” was featured in a broader report called Assessing the Zeitenwende: Implications for Germany, the United States, and Transatlantic Security. The essay examined the institutional aspects of the Zeitenwende—Germany’s foreign policy shift in response to Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Staff

Theresa Luetkefend

Assistant Director

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy German

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

Learn more

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European countries lack vital logistical interoperability with infrastructural bottlenecks and regulatory inconsistencies hindering military mobility across the continent. They duplicate many military platforms but, at the same time, fail to acquire critical capabilities such as air defense. A still highly fragmented European defense technological and industrial base is protected by narrow national interests and is thus unable to address capability gaps, replenish dwindling arms stocks, and compete on the global level on defense innovation.

In the current extremely demanding times, a refined NATO-EU alignment on defense would provide a critically needed burden sharing to eliminate these vulnerabilities and prepare Europe to withstand potential contingencies.

The NATO-EU nexus

The recent public remarks by representatives of the Trump administration, who repeatedly claimed that Europe must take ownership of conventional security on the continent, mean that an effective burden sharing must be established between European NATO members and the EU to meet the challenge. Both organizations have complementary roles in defense to play, and despite the recent shockwaves that the emerging new transactional American foreign policy has sent to its allies in Europe, the requirement for complementarity in the NATO-EU defense effort remains crucial.

NATO has highly integrated structures and procedures and has developed regional defense plans, predetermined capability targets, and military standards. These assets are the result of decades-long work and would not be easy to replace anytime soon. The United States remains a crucial member of the Alliance, especially in such areas as command and control (C2), intelligence, and long-range strike that would be difficult to replace in the short and medium term.

Strategically vital EU and NATO eastern flank member states—Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland—insist on their reliance on NATO as the primary security guarantor. So do the Nordic countries including the newest NATO members, Finland and Sweden.

However, the ongoing dynamics of the past several weeks show clearly that the modus operandi of NATO is about to change with the shifting role of the United States in it. Working through flexible formations of “coalitions of the willing” will most likely replace the rather bureaucratic and, therefore, slow-working methods of past decades. This is not the first time that NATO has undergone a transformation, which is a natural process in a changing world. Working toward the same goal of keeping the Euro-Atlantic area safe is what counts. A repeated assurance will be needed from the United States on this.

The EU, for its part, still lacks both formal competencies and a unified political ambition to step deeper into the defense planning and execution field. At its core, the EU is susceptible to singular member states’ malfunction, as seen in Hungary under Viktor Orbán and Slovakia under Robert Fico, who constantly put brakes on such otherwise widely supported processes as tightening sanctions on Russia. Russia puts enormous effort into expanding the malfunction to other EU members as well: The latest example is the for-now-failed attempt to install a pro-Russian president in Romania. To become autonomous in defense, as repeatedly demanded by France, the EU must first reform internally.

Russia’s main objective is to divide and weaken its most significant strategic rival, NATO. Any attempts to offer alternatives to the Alliance’s primacy in European defense would eventually play into Putin’s hands, undermining deterrence and putting the frontline EU countries at immediate risk. Russia’s continuous rejection of Ukraine’s membership in NATO is—although void—an indication that NATO retains its deterrence power. Allies on both sides of the Atlantic should continue working on this credible deterrence to stay in place—with the EU being an important partner in this regard.

The answer to the current situation is a stronger European pillar in NATO, with the EU bearing a larger and better aligned burden with the Alliance by internalizing and fully embracing its distinct and unique role in security and defense as a defense enabler. Through its budgetary and regulatory authority, the EU can and must ensure that the necessary conditions for implementing NATO’s defense plans in Europe are completely satisfied. This particularly applies to critical areas such as military mobility and defense industrial readiness.

The EU’s role in military mobility

It is alarming that despite their commitment since 2017 to improve military mobility across the EU, European countries still have insufficient cross-border logistical interoperability and face immense bureaucratic obstacles when preparing military convoys for transportation across the EU. Germany and the Baltic states are the two most obvious cases in this regard, both because of the challenges they face and the strategic roles they play.

Due to its central location in Europe, Germany is considered Europe’s key hub in military logistics. Germany is home to major NATO bases including the Headquarters Allied Air Command in Ramstein, the Airborne Warning and Control System’s main base of operation in Geilenkirchen, and the Strategic Air Lift Interim Solution base in Leipzig, among others. Its territory stretches between Europe’s main seaports—Rotterdam, Antwerp, and Hamburg, which are crucial for incoming allied military supplies and reinforcements—and NATO’s and EU’s eastern flank countries Poland and the Baltic states. Germany’s inland waterways—the Rhine and Danube—provide the north-south transportation corridor toward Romania. What stretches in between is Europe’s longest railway network, which, as of 2022, had a total length of 38,836 kilometers of railway lines.

From a military logistics perspective, railways are considered crucial because they allow the transport of numerous pieces of heavy military equipment in one load. However, because of many years of underinvestment and neglect, Germany’s railways, roads, and bridges are in dire shape and often technically incapable of handling such heavy transport. Shortages in special railway wagons, which often have to be supplied by commercial providers, add to the existing problem. Finally, there are immense bureaucratic hurdles remaining within the EU (and even among Germany’s federal states) when it comes to documentation and permits to be acquired before military cargo can move from one state to another.

Thus, the EU should increase its efforts to speed up Europe-wide infrastructure upgrades, increase the state-owned fleets of railway wagons for military transport, and take decisive steps to implement a “Military Schengen” regime. Based on the experience of the free movement of passengers and goods within the EU, this regime is crucial to minimize the paperwork—and thus valuable time—involved in moving troops and military equipment across the EU.

The Baltic states’ logistical accessibility is another key issue in implementing NATO’s defense plans in this strategically vital gateway region. Their railways are primarily of a wide Russian gauge (1,520 millimeters), which is incompatible with the European standard gauge (1,435 mm) rail tracks. Thus, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia remain better connected to Russia and Belarus than to their NATO and EU allies.

The RailBaltica project, designed to connect the Baltic capitals with Warsaw via an 870 km long European standard-gauge rail track, is facing significant cost overruns and delays. Now scheduled for completion by 2030, RailBaltica is crucial for the deterrence and defense of the Baltic states—especially considering potential obstacles in sending allied reinforcements and military supplies by ship through the congested Baltic Sea, given the substantial Russian military presence in the Kaliningrad exclave. The EU has already provided financial support for this project, but more assistance—and institutional clarity—is needed, particularly in terms of an EU-level centralized management oversight of this and other military mobility projects. After more than fifteen years of planning, the RailBaltica project, just like other infrastructural upgrades in the EU, must finally be prioritized politically, providing a necessary push and support to the implementing member states.

Europe needs a defense industrial revamp

Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has exposed Europe’s dysfunctional defense industrial landscape. The issue involves three factors: the status quo situation (current capability gaps and insufficient ammunition stocks), demand-side shortcomings, and supply-side risks. Whereas NATO’s main—though not sole—instrument to address this issue is to increase the target for member states’ defense spending, the EU has signaled the ambition to employ a more comprehensive approach. What started with the European Defense Fund to finance joint research and development projects in defense is now to be expanded through the still-under-negotiation European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) to the areas of defense production and joint procurement. Action is urgently needed, but there is a risk of overstretching and losing focus on what really matters now and in the future.

What matters now is closing capability gaps, particularly in air defense, and filling Europe’s depleting ammunition stocks. It has been estimated that at the current production levels, Europe would need ten years to replenish its ammunition stocks in order to be prepared to defend itself. This timeline is far too long, considering German intelligence warnings about a potential Russian attack on European NATO member states by the end of this decade. While NATO sets its stockpile targets, the EU must utilize its regulatory powers and funding initiatives to push its member states to reach them.

Some short-term measures, such as the Act in Support of Ammunition Production, have already been implemented and are set to be transformed into long-term financing instruments through the EDIP. The proposal from the EU’s commissioner for defense and space, Andrius Kubilius, to implement mandatory ammunition stockpiles for EU member states, requiring them to meet NATO’s targets by 2030, would mirror similar EU measures in other critical areas, such as energy.

The discussion surrounding the increase of defense industrial production and joint procurement is closely tied to questions about potential adjustments to the current defense industrial supply and demand dynamics.

In terms of supply, the EU seeks to promote the purchase of arms manufactured by the European defense industry to strengthen and consolidate it while also avoiding restrictions on the use of weapons produced by foreign companies. Financial considerations are directly linked to this matter. Currently, the EU is divided into two main factions: one advocating for this European solution, and the other arguing that non-EU NATO allies—primarily the United States, UK, and Norway—who are major players in the defense industry, along with other key partners such as South Korea, should not be excluded from the EU’s funding mechanisms. On the demand side, the EU seeks to incentivize joint procurement by its member states to allow for bigger, cheaper, and more predictable orders, which would also lead to better standardization and interoperability of military equipment in use by the Europeans.

Keeping the non-EU NATO allies in the loop when contemplating new funding options is crucial for sustaining their commitment to Europe’s defense and accessing currently available off-the-shelf purchases of ammunition and legacy military platforms urgently needed in Europe in the short term. European countries such as Poland and the Baltic states are increasing their defense spending faster than any other European NATO member and are willing to spend the money on military platforms that meet three basic criteria—made by an allied country, proven to be of good quality, and available in the near future—making them eager buyers of US and South Korean production. Given their proximity to a potential future front line and their commitment to securing it for the sake of a free Europe, these choices should not be neglected in future EU funding schemes.

In the short term, instead of supply-side isolationism, demand-side corrections should be prioritized in the EU’s effort to play a more active role in strengthening the European defense technological and industrial base. With the EU’s support, favorable arrangements can be negotiated with foreign arms manufacturers, including fulfilling some parts of their contractual obligations in the EU, for example, in the areas of production, assembly, or servicing, and thus contributing to local economies, skill development, and sustainment of purchased arms’ life cycles locally while also securing the delivery of best quality, battlefield-proven military platforms for the European armed forces.

Thoughts on harsher supply-side interventions should be directed toward fostering the consolidation of emerging defense technology hubs in Europe. The defense industry is experiencing major tectonic shifts, with AI, drones, and robots entering the battlefield more rapidly than ever imagined. This is the area where the EU still has a chance to enter the global innovation race in defense and thus should focus on funding local defense and dual-use start-ups. It is high time to shift attention to niche technologies being developed in smaller EU member states, such as laser technologies in Lithuania and cyber technologies in Estonia, not to speak of the vast defense tech laboratory emerging in Ukraine, an EU candidate country. If properly funded, these EU-made technologies could soon bolster Europe’s deterrence and defense as crucial force multipliers.

Aligning NATO’s targets with EU defense initiatives

For the EU to embrace the role of a defense enabler means working out common NATO-EU mechanisms for transforming NATO’s targets into complementary EU defense initiatives in areas requiring increased cross-border European cooperation. Better interorganizational communication is crucial in this respect to avoid any potential duplication. At the same time, paying attention to non-EU allies’ involvement in EU defense industrial efforts is vital. The allied defense technological and industrial base must be interoperable across the Euro-Atlantic security area and should even look more proactively outward to provide a response to the growing strategic competition with the Russia-China-Iran-North Korea axis that—through involvement in Russia’s war against Ukraine—are also consolidating their military technological base.

The goal for both priority areas—military mobility and defense industrial revamp—is to scale up European rearmament, speed up allied deployment and reinforcements, and send a clear message to our strategic competitors: NATO and the EU are mutually reinforcing entities that aim to expand, not retreat. While a more far-reaching burden sharing with the United States on European defense is surely a huge challenge, it also is an opportunity for Europe to finally become a strategic player in defense.

Fellow

Justina Budginaite-Froehly

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Europe Center Transatlantic Security Initiative

Defense Industry European Union

Report Jan 15, 2025

Securing a free and open world: A US-EU blueprint to counter China and Russia

By Kaush Arha, Peter Harrell, and Jörn Fleck

An enhanced strategic partnership between the United States and the European Union can advance interests for both sides amid immense geopolitical challenges.

China Defense Industry

Issue Brief Dec 20, 2024

Europe needs a coalition of the resolute

By Léonie Allard and Elie Tenenbaum

Europe must develop a “coalition of the resolute” to provide security guarantees to Ukraine and to show resolve to take more responsibility for their own security.

Conflict Europe & Eurasia

Report Oct 7, 2024

Unleashing US-EU defense cooperation

By Rachel Rizzo

Instead of pushing back against European defense efforts as it has done in the past, Washington must fully embrace the steps the European Union is now taking.

Defense Industry Defense Policy

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post The EU must become a strategic player in defense—alongside NATO appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On March 3, Rob Murray, non-resident senior fellow at Forward Defense, appeared on Bloomberg News to discuss the Defence, Security and Resilience (DSR) Bank. As the founder of DSR, Murray emphasized the need for a global multilateral financial institution dedicated to defense funding, addressing the critical gap that is believed to be threatening Western security.

Fellow

Rob Murray

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Defense Policy

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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The post Murray on Bloomberg News on the Defence, Security, and Resilience Bank appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Pınar Dost talked to Al Monitor on Turkey’s role on Russia-Ukraine ceasefire. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Calls for a demilitarized Ukraine have remained a central feature of Russian rhetoric throughout the past three years of the invasion, and have been accompanied by demands that Kyiv accept permanent neutrality and rule out the prospect of joining NATO or concluding military alliances with any Western powers. Russian officials have also consistently stated that postwar Ukraine must be banned from receiving weapons or training from the West. Most recently, the Kremlin has rejected the idea of deploying Western troops in Ukraine as peacekeepers to monitor a potential ceasefire agreement. In other words, Putin’s preferred peace terms envision a disarmed and defenseless Ukraine with virtually no army of its own and no chance of receiving any meaningful military aid from the international community.

Putin may currently find it advantageous to entertain talk of peace, but his insistence on Ukraine’s unilateral disarmament reveals what he really has in mind for the country. The Russian dictator is obviously preparing the ground for the eventual resumption of his current invasion, which he fully intends to continue as soon as he has rearmed and circumstances allow. Why else would the demilitarization of Ukraine be seen in Moscow as such a priority?

No serious military analyst would argue that Ukraine poses a credible security threat to Russia itself. Likewise, no Ukrainian politician or public figure has ever harbored any territorial ambitions against their country’s far larger and wealthier neighbor. On the contrary, the sole purpose of the Ukrainian Armed Forces is to defend the country against Russian attack. The Kremlin’s emphasis on disarming Ukraine should therefore be seen as a massive red flag for the Trump White House and the wider international community that signals Putin’s determination to complete his conquest and extinguish Ukrainian statehood altogether.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

There are worrying signs that this is not yet fully understood in Western capitals. Instead, US President Donald Trump and senior members of his administration have recently begun shifting responsibility for the war away from Russia and echoing the Kremlin’s own longstanding efforts to blame the invasion on NATO expansion. Predictably, Russian officials including Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov have welcomed this dramatic change in the US position regarding the causes of the war. However, Russia’s whole NATO narrative suffers from a number of obvious flaws that should spark skepticism among even the most credulous consumers of Kremlin propaganda.

According to Putin, Ukraine’s deepening ties with NATO forced him to launch the full-scale invasion of February 2022. In reality, Ukraine’s prospects of joining the alliance were virtually nonexistent at the time, and had not significantly improved since Kyiv was first fobbed off with platitudes at a landmark NATO summit way back in 2008. Even the Russian seizure of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2014 failed to produce any change of heart among alliance members, with key NATO countries including the United States and Germany openly expressing their opposition to Ukrainian accession. Indeed, on the eve of the full-scale invasion, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz assured Putin that Ukrainian NATO membership was out of the question for at least the next 30 years. This makes it difficult to accept Moscow’s claims that Ukraine’s NATO aspirations represented some kind of immediate danger to Russia.

There are also good reasons to question whether the Kremlin genuinely views NATO as a threat to Russian national security. Thanks to founding member Norway, the alliance has shared a border with Russia ever since its establishment in 1949. More recently, the accession of Poland and the Baltic states at the turn of the millennium dramatically expanded Russia’s shared border with NATO and placed the alliance a few hundred kilometers away from Moscow and Saint Petersburg. This close proximity to Russia’s two biggest cities did not lead to any discernible rise in border tensions.

The most revealing evidence of Russia’s true attitude toward NATO came in 2022 when Finland and Sweden reacted to the invasion of Ukraine by ending decades of neutrality and announcing plans to join the alliance. Putin responded to this landmark decision by declaring that Russia had “no problem” with the accession of the two Nordic nations, despite the fact that Finnish membership would more than double Russia’s border with NATO, while Swedish membership would turn the Baltic Sea into a NATO lake. Putin has since underlined his indifference to this expanded NATO presence on his doorstep by withdrawing most Russian troops from the Finnish frontier and leaving this supposedly vulnerable border zone largely undefended.

So far, nobody has been able to adequately explain the glaring inconsistency in Putin’s logic. He appears to be unfazed by the presence of NATO troops along the Russian border in Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. And yet at the same time, he expects us to believe that the faint prospect of Ukraine joining the alliance at some point in the distant future is sufficiently alarming to justify the largest European invasion since World War II. Militarily, this makes no sense. The only reasonable conclusion is that Putin’s objections relate specifically to Ukraine and not to NATO in general. He knows perfectly well that the alliance poses no security threat to Russia itself, but does not want to risk a growing NATO presence that might prevent him from achieving his expansionist objective of subjugating Ukraine.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Tue, June 17, 2025 • 1:00 pm ET

Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

Conflict Defense Technologies Europe & Eurasia Politics & Diplomacy

While Putin moans to foreign leaders about the inequities of NATO expansion, when speaking to domestic audiences he is typically far more candid about the imperial ambitions that shaped his decision to invade Ukraine. For much of his reign, Putin has insisted that Ukrainians are really Russians (“one people”), and has repeatedly accused modern Ukraine of being a invented nation occupying historically Russian lands. On the eve of the full-scale invasion, he published a rambling 5,000-word history essay that many likened to a declaration of war against Ukrainian statehood. During the first summer of the war, he compared his invasion to the eighteenth century imperial conquests of Russian Czar Peter the Great.

Putin’s frequent denials of Ukraine’s right to exist have set the tone throughout Russian society. Poisonous anti-Ukrainian rhetoric has become so commonplace in the Kremlin-controlled Russian media that UN investigators believe it may constitute “incitement to genocide.” Meanwhile, senior Kremlin officials have sought to demonstrate their loyalty to Putin by echoing his vicious attacks on Ukraine. Former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev has declared that “the existence of Ukraine is mortally dangerous for Ukrainians,” while top Putin aide Nikolai Patrushev recently suggested Ukraine may soon “cease to exist.” These are not the words of rational politicians addressing legitimate national security concerns.

This genocidal rhetoric is being more than matched by the actions of the Russian army in Ukraine. Wherever the Kremlin has been able to establish control, Russian troops have systematically detained local officials, military veterans, journalists, religious leaders, civic activists, Ukrainian patriots, and anyone else deemed to be a potential threat. Thousands have disappeared into a vast network of prisons amid a climate of fear that has been described by Britain’s The Economist as a “totalitarian hell.” Many more, including thousands of children, have been subjected to forced deportation and sent to Russia. Those who remain are being pressured to accept Russian citizenship, while all reminders of Ukrainian statehood, culture, and national identity are being methodically removed. Needless to say, anyone who dares speak the Ukrainian language risks severe punishment.

These horrors make a complete mockery of attempts to appease the Russians with limited territorial concessions. US negotiators need to recognize that Putin is not fighting for land. He views the current invasion in far broader terms as an historic mission to erase Ukraine from the map of Europe. In Putin’s chilling worldview, extinguishing Ukrainian statehood is a vital step toward the reversal of the Soviet collapse and the revival of the Russian Empire. He has pursued this messianic vision with increasing violence ever since Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution, and is now closer than ever to realizing his goal.

This is why peace negotiations with Russia must focus primarily on establishing long-term security guarantees that are sufficiently credible to convince the Kremlin. Anything less will be viewed in Moscow as yet more proof of Western weakness and interpreted as a tacit invitation to go further. After all, that has been the pattern ever since the Russian invasion first began in 2014. Putin’s campaign to destroy Ukraine has been gradually unfolding in plain sight for over a decade and already ranks among the worst crimes of the twenty-first century. If Western leaders choose to ignore this and push ahead with a bad peace while leaving Ukraine without the support and security it needs to survive, they will be complicit in all that follows.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Feb 25, 2025

Will a new Russia reset prove more successful than earlier attempts?

By Leah Nodvin

The Trump administration is seeking to reset relations with Russia as part of a comprehensive shift in US foreign policy, but successive past Russia resets have ended in failure, writes Leah Nodvin.

Conflict Economic Sanctions

UkraineAlert Feb 20, 2025

Ukrainians are proudly democratic but resoundingly reject wartime elections

By Peter Dickinson

Ukraine’s fight for democracy has been at the heart of the country’s struggle against the past two decades of escalating Russian aggression, but Ukrainians overwhelmingly reject the idea of staging dangerous wartime elections before peace is secured, writes Peter Dickinson.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Feb 27, 2025

The Finlandization fallacy: Ukrainian neutrality will not stop Putin’s Russia

By Brian Mefford

Donald Trump seeks to broker a peace deal with Vladimir Putin but any attempt to impose neutrality on Ukraine could set the stage for further Russian aggression, writes Brian Mefford.

Conflict European Union

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Putin uses NATO as an excuse for his war against Ukrainian statehood appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The Cold War status of Finland reflects the realities of the country’s relationship with the USSR. In the aftermath of the August 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact and the outbreak of World War II, the Soviet authorities began demanding territory from the Finns. The Kremlin accompanied this with a disinformation campaign referring to Finland’s leaders as a “reactionary fascist clique.”

In November 1939, the Red Army attacked Finland. The Finns fought bravely in a three-month winter war, inflicting over 300,000 Soviet casualties while suffering around 70,000 themselves. Nonetheless, the USSR eventually prevailed and annexed more than ten percent of Finnish territory. This history will sound eerily familiar to today’s Ukrainians.

In the decades after World War II, Finland was handcuffed to neutrality via a treaty with Moscow, but remained an independent state with a market economy. The constraints placed on Finland during this period prevented the country’s integration into the Euro-Atlantic community and came to be known as Finlandization. In essence, Finland was forced to cede land and accept a Kremlin-friendly form of geopolitical neutrality in exchange for nominal independence.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Some in Washington DC and elsewhere now see the Finlandization format of neutrality as a suitable model for Ukraine. This includes influential members of the Trump administration. However, supporters of this approach ignore the obvious differences between Soviet policy toward Finland and the Putin regime’s objectives in Ukraine. While the USSR had limited territorial ambitions in Finland and was far more focused on the Cold War competition with the United States and Western Europe, today’s Russia is fully committed to erasing Ukrainian statehood and national identity.

The most powerful indictment of Finlandization has come from Finland itself. Following the fall of the Soviet Union, the Finns moved quickly to end decades of neutrality, joining the European Union in 1995. When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the Finnish authorities went even further and applied for NATO membership. Finland’s accession to the alliance in 2023 marked the final stage in the country’s rejection of Finlandization.

Instead of imposing neutrality on Ukraine, the country’s partners should seek to create a security environment that will prevent further Russian aggression and allow Ukrainians to define their own future. After eleven years of Russian military aggression and three years of full-scale invasion, pressuring Ukraine to accept Finlandization on the Kremlin’s terms would be the equivalent of forcing a victim of abuse to live with their abuser. Such an unjust settlement would be doomed to fail and could also significantly undermine the international standing of the United States for years to come.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Tue, June 17, 2025 • 1:00 pm ET

Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

Conflict Defense Technologies Europe & Eurasia Politics & Diplomacy

Despite the evident problems with a peace deal that imposes neutrality on Ukraine, the new US administration has begun the negotiating process with Russia by proactively offering a series of concessions to the Kremlin such as ruling out Ukrainian NATO membership. US officials appear intent on avoiding anything that might offend the Russians as they seek to provide Putin with a face-saving off ramp. This approach is unlikely to result in a viable long-term peace deal. On the contrary, it risks emboldening Putin and encouraging him to increase his demands.

The alternative to Kremlin-friendly neutrality is clear. Ukraine seeks binding security guarantees from its Western partners and an invitation to join NATO. Kyiv’s vision for a sustainable peace offers obvious advantages for the West. At a time when the US is calling on Europeans to take greater responsibility for their own security, closer defense ties with Ukraine would be a major asset. With more than a million soldiers and unique combat experience on the twenty first century battlefield, the inclusion of Ukraine would dramatically increase the size and effectiveness of NATO forces in Europe while enabling the US to potentially withdraw troops.

Integrating Ukraine into the Western security architecture would bring lasting peace to Europe because it would project strength to Russia, which is the only language Vladimir Putin understands. Striking a temporary peace deal by appeasing aggression is easy, as Neville Chamberlain demonstrated at Munich in 1938. However, the long-term consequences are likely to be disastrous. The Trump administration appears well aware of this and says it is committed to achieving peace through strength. The question is whether this principle will now be applied to negotiations with Russia over the fate of Ukraine.

Brian Mefford is a senior nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council. He has lived and worked in Ukraine since 1999.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Feb 25, 2025

Will a new Russia reset prove more successful than earlier attempts?

By Leah Nodvin

The Trump administration is seeking to reset relations with Russia as part of a comprehensive shift in US foreign policy, but successive past Russia resets have ended in failure, writes Leah Nodvin.

Conflict Economic Sanctions

UkraineAlert Feb 25, 2025

US sides with Russia against Ukraine and Europe at the United Nations

By Shelby Magid

A diplomatic clash at the UN has illustrated the dramatic divide that has emerged between the United States and Europe since the inauguration of US President Donald Trump just over one month ago, writes Shelby Magid.

Conflict Freedom and Prosperity

UkraineAlert Feb 20, 2025

Ukrainians are proudly democratic but resoundingly reject wartime elections

By Peter Dickinson

Ukraine’s fight for democracy has been at the heart of the country’s struggle against the past two decades of escalating Russian aggression, but Ukrainians overwhelmingly reject the idea of staging dangerous wartime elections before peace is secured, writes Peter Dickinson.

Civil Society Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post The Finlandization fallacy: Ukrainian neutrality will not stop Putin’s Russia appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On February 21, Andrew Michta, senior fellow in the GeoStrategy Initiative, published an article in 19FortyFive on the so-called “transatlantic drift” as President Trump changes how the United States “traditionally engages with [European] allies.” This piece was featured in RealClearWorld.  

Staff

Andrew A. Michta

Senior Fellow, GeoStrategy Initiative

GeoStrategy Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Central Europe Eastern Europe

The post Michta in 19FortyFive and RealClearWorld on Washington’s evolving relationship with Europe  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On February 23, Matthew Kroenig, vice president and senior director of the Scowcroft Center, was interviewed on BBC World Service on the emerging Trump 2.0 foreign policy doctrine. He shares his analysis of President Trump’s negotiation tactics for the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, including the president’s idea for a “two-track NATO” and his plan to involve regional states in Gaza’s post-war construction.  

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig interviewed on BBC World Service on the emerging Trump 2.0 foreign policy doctrine   appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Warrick joins Times Radio to discuss Putin’s objections to NATO peacekeepers on the ground appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Americans alongside allies defeated Imperial Germany in World War I and Nazi Germany in World War II, only thereafter to help rebuild and democratize West Germany, or the Federal Republic, laying the groundwork for its peaceful reunification in 1990 as both a NATO and European Union member.

It’s only with that as context that one hears the weight of likely next German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s election-night mention of the need for “independence” from Washington, even before the final vote results were in. It’s worth reading his full quote.

“My absolute priority will be to strengthen Europe as quickly as possible so that, step by step, we can really achieve independence from the USA,” said Merz, one of the most authentic Atlanticists I’ve known. “I never thought I would have to say something like this on a television program. But after Donald Trump’s statements last week at the latest, it is clear that Americans, at least this part of the Americans, this administration, are largely indifferent to the fate of Europe.”

It’s also with an understanding of Germany’s centrality to European history over the past two centuries—both its worst and best parts—that one can fully digest Merz’s warning the day after the election that it is “five minutes to midnight” in Europe.

With that, Merz underscored the immediacy of the economic, security, and geopolitical challenges facing Germany and Europe.

Merz may be the most pro-business chancellor Germans have elected since World War II, but his Christian Democrats face the country’s near-zero growth with just 28.6 percent of the vote, their second worst outcome since the war. Their likely coalition partners, the Social Democrats, at 16.4 percent, scored their worst result since 1887, even worse than March 1933, when Adolf Hitler came to power.

The real winners this week were the far-right Alternative for Germany party, or AfD, which doubled its vote to 20.8 percent, and the far-left Die Linke, with 8.8 percent. With a third of all the votes in the Bundestag resting with the far right and the far left, they have the power to block the sort of constitutional changes Merz would need to spur the growth and defense spending Germany can only achieve through lifting its debt brake.

Are things as bad in the transatlantic relationship as Merz suggests? 

One hopes not, and US President Donald Trump can change rhetoric and policy on a pfennig. However, it would be short-sighted for European leaders not to grasp the urgent need for greater self-reliance, particularly as the United States today voted against a United Nations General Assembly resolution condemning Russia on the third anniversary of its war of aggression on Ukraine—going against all the European allies and siding with Russia and its friends. 

Is the clock ticking down as fast as Merz says on European security and economic threats? 

Merz is a keen enough observer to know the severity of the situation. He’s also a good enough politician to realize that he’ll only have the leverage to address it if voters recognize the gathering dangers.

Most importantly, Merz knows that if he and his prospective coalition partners don’t act decisively now, those far-right and far-left numbers will grow, and German history shows us where that leads. 

What Merz has identified is the historic moment. The coming months will determine how he rises to it.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on X: @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points newsletter, a column of dispatches from a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

The post History’s clock is ticking (again) in Germany appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Looking at the European security architecture—built for the most part by NATO, the EU Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)—there is much bolstering to be done. Türkiye,* as a country that is both a significant partner for the European Union and a major NATO ally, could help play a role.

Dents in the NATO armor

NATO has implemented several important measures to enhance European security, particularly following the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014. For example, it has enhanced its forward presence in Poland and the Baltic states, added new members (Sweden and Finland), increased its focus on the Arctic, and modernized its strategies and defense plans. Additionally, many NATO allies have made progress on reaching and even surpassing the goal of spending 2 percent of their gross domestic product on defense.

NATO continues to adapt to the evolving European security situation. However, as shown by the war in Ukraine, NATO must do more to enhance its defense industrial base, modernize its command and force structure, and revise its NATO defense planning process.

Additionally, NATO depends heavily on the United States. If the United States pulls back on its support for Ukraine, European countries would need to increase their support in order to maintain the level of aid committed by NATO. However, in such a scenario, European allies may be reluctant to fill the gap, feeling that they need to increase their own defense capabilities in the face of the Russian threat. This would be the case even if Russia’s war in Ukraine ends, particularly for Baltic and Scandinavian allies who feel the threat from Russia more often than other NATO members. Such a dynamic could negatively affect Europe’s collective defense efforts.

NATO has placed much focus on the threat Russia poses to Eastern Europe. However, Russia is also slated to cause new problems in the Arctic. Melting ice is unlocking new transportation routes and raw materials, making the region another hot spot for great-power competition. And even in the absence of conflict, Russia and other actors could deploy hybrid warfare tactics in the region, similar to approaches taken in the Baltic Sea. While NATO has taken some measures—such as Operation Baltic Sentry, which uses naval vessels and surveillance systems to protect undersea infrastructure—NATO may take up additional efforts to scale up its response.

A glaring hole in the CSDP

The CSDP was designed by the European Union to carry out non-Article 5 missions (such as crisis management and conflict prevention) in the post-Cold War era. Considering the new security situation and new missions geared toward fortifying collective defense, non-EU countries play an important role in what the CSDP strives to achieve. As former NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has stated, security in Europe is “impossible to envisage,” without the work of non-EU NATO allies. Thus, it would be wise to establish an EU security mechanism that includes non-EU countries. It would also be cost effective to have a more integrated security and defense system with NATO.

The OSCE’s shrinking effectiveness

The OSCE, a security-oriented body with fifty-seven participating countries (including Russia), has played a part in several processes and agreements that have shaped European security, including the Helsinki Final Act, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the Vienna Document on Confidence and Security-Building Measures, and the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security. It has also led a monitoring mission in Ukraine and the Forum for Security Co-operation, which hosts dialogue between OSCE participating countries on military conduct and security building.

However, these agreements and processes have proven ineffective, and some (such as the Minsk agreements) have outright failed, as demonstrated by Russia’s war in Ukraine.

The OSCE should consider new agreements and processes based on the lessons learned from these ineffective or failed examples—and it should ensure that such agreements and processes adequately take new threats and technologies into account. The OSCE, in revisiting its old measures and pursuing new efforts, will need to consider how European security may be impacted by, for example, artificial intelligence, pandemics, cyber warfare, aggression in space, climate change, and migration.

For example, one of the OSCE’s strengths is its ability to conduct field missions and observations in crisis regions. Going forward, such missions and observations must take into account the needs of the digital age. To do so, the OSCE will need the support of its member countries. Yet, technology also has great potential in helping these missions and observations.

Türkiye’s potential

Beyond this framework for European security, Türkiye has the potential to help strengthen the European security architecture.

The country has many advantages: its geopolitical position, defense industry, role in the energy system, renewable energy opportunities, access to strategic transportation routes, infrastructure, and young population.

Türkiye has gained significant experience in resolving crises. Such experience has come from Türkiye’s efforts regarding crises in Ukraine, the Middle East, the Balkans, and the Horn of Africa. Backed by this experience, Türkiye has the ability and potential to contribute to global peace and stability efforts. This capability can be another important contribution to the European security architecture.

Additionally, Türkiye’s defense capabilities could help shore up the European security architecture. The Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), which participates in efforts to address regional conflicts and continues to perform important tasks in the fight against terrorism, has significant combat experience and high operational readiness. As a NATO ally, Türkiye—via the TAF—continues to fortify NATO activities including air policing (over Bulgaria, Romania, and the Baltic states), maritime activities, missile defense, and peacekeeping operations. While most countries in the post-Cold War era focused on peacekeeping missions, the Turkish Armed Forces adeptly balanced between maintaining its regular warfare capabilities while contributing to counterterrorism and peacekeeping missions. This experience can be helpful not only to NATO but also to the CSDP (if widened to non-EU allies) as Russia poses a challenge for security in Europe.

In addition, the Turkish defense industry has managed to react quickly to TAF’s combat experiences. TAF has designed a defense planning system through which the force defines operational requirements and defense industry stakeholders define the technology needed. The TAF and defense industry work together to achieve Turkish defense and security goals. Such collaboration between the force and defense industry can help support European security needs.

Finally, seeing as warfare and defense will be shaped by emerging and disruptive technologies, Türkiye’s innovation, particularly in automated systems, can prove useful for Europe. The Turkish defense industry is currently developing unmanned aerial, naval, and ground vehicles. With such technologies, and the military concepts the TAF is developing for these new systems, the Turkish defense industry and TAF have together positioned the country to respond to the needs of the digital age. Europe could harness the advantages of this position.

There is now a new security situation in Europe. Thus, Europe will need to look outside of its current framework for security solutions that can realistically and effectively address today’s challenges amid increasing threats and the evolution of the digital age. Türkiye may be one source of much-needed solutions.

Yavuz Türkgenci is a recently retired three-star general in the Turkish Armed Forces whose career spanned several offices, including western European Union and NATO posts and as the commandant of the Turkish Third Field Army. He holds a doctorate in security strategy design and management.

*This article refers to “Türkiye,” the country name that the Turkish government and United Nations officially adopted in 2022.

The post In strengthening its security architecture, Europe shouldn’t discount Türkiye’s role appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russia is “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security.” So states the NATO Strategic Concept promulgated at the Alliance’s Madrid Summit in June 2022, just four months after Russia’s massive escalation of its invasion of Ukraine.¹ The concept and NATO declarations not only underscore the illegality and brutality of that ongoing attack but also highlight Moscow’s use of nuclear and conventional military aggression, annexation, subversion, sabotage, and other forms of coercion and violence against NATO allies and partners.

Ever since its invasion of Georgia in 2008, Russia’s aggression against the Alliance has steadily intensified. This led NATO leaders at their 2024 Washington Summit to task the development of “recommendations on NATO’s strategic approach to Russia, taking into account the changing security environment.”² The Alliance’s “Russia strategy” is due for consideration at NATO’s next summit at The Hague in June 2025.³ This issue brief reviews Moscow’s actions affecting the security of the Euro-Atlantic area and presents the enduring realities, objectives, and actions that should constitute the core of an effective NATO strategy to counter the threat posed by Russia.

Intensified and globalized Russian aggression

Russia’s objectives go far beyond the subordination of Ukraine. Moscow seeks to reassert hegemony and control over the space of the former Soviet Union, diminish the power of the democratic community of nations, and delegitimize the international rules-based order. Moscow aims to subjugate its neighbors and to weaken—if not shatter—NATO, the key impediment to its European ambitions.

Toward these ends and under the leadership of President Vladimir Putin, Russia:

• Has illegally occupied Moldova’s Transnistria region since the early 1990s.
• Invaded Georgia in 2008, has continued to occupy portions of that country, and recently increased its influence, if not control, over the nation’s governance.
• Invaded Ukraine in 2014 and significantly escalated this ongoing war in February 2022.
• Militarized the Arctic by increasing its military presence in the region, including through reopening Soviet-era bases and building new facilities to buttress Russian territorial claims over Arctic waters.
• Leveraged trade and energy embargoes and other forms of economic pressure to intimidate and coerce its European neighbors.
• Conducts an escalating campaign of active measures short of war against NATO allies and partners, including information warfare, election interference, sabotage, assassination, weaponized migration, cyberattacks, GPS jamming, and other actions.
• Expanded its conventional and nuclear military capabilities, an effort that was part of President Putin’s preparations to invade Ukraine.
• Violated, suspended, and abrogated international arms control agreements, including New START Treaty, the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Open Skies Agreement, and others.⁴

Enduring realities

A NATO strategy to counter Russia’s aggression is long overdue. Its absence cedes to Russia the initiative, leaving the Alliance too often in a reactive, if not indecisive and passive, posture in this relationship. An effective strategy requires recognition of nine enduring realities:

First, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a failure of deterrence. The weakness of the Alliance’s response to Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine, NATO’s failure to respond forcefully to Russia’s months long mobilization of forces along Ukraine’s frontiers in 2021, and NATO’s acquiescence to Putin’s exercise of nuclear coercion emboldened and facilitated Putin’s actions against Ukraine. As a result, the credibility of the Alliance’s commitment to defend resolutely its interests and values has been damaged.

Second, Russia is at war, not just against Ukraine. It is also at war against NATO. The Alliance can no longer approach the relationship as one of competition or confrontation considering the military invasions, active measures, and other forms of violence and coercion Russia has undertaken against NATO allies and partners.⁵ As former US Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun has written, “Quite simply, Putin has declared war on the West, but the West does not yet understand we are at war with Russia.”⁶ By failing to recognize this reality, NATO has ceded escalation dominance to Russia as evidenced by its limiting of support to Ukraine and its inaction against repeated Russian aggression and provocations. The Alliance must recognize and act upon the reality that Moscow has pushed the NATO-Russia relationship into the state of war.

Third, NATO faces long-term conflict with Russia. Putin cannot be expected to abandon his ambitions, even if defeated in Ukraine. Ever since Putin’s speech before the February 2007 Munich Security Conference in which he railed against the international order and NATO’s expanding membership, Russia’s campaign to subjugate its neighbors and to intimidate, divide, and weaken the Alliance has been unceasing and relentless. Nor can the Alliance assume that Putin’s successor will significantly diverge from the objectives and policies that drive Russia’s actions today. Peaceful coexistence with Russia is not attainable in the short to medium term and will be difficult to attain in the long term.

Fourth, Russia will continue efforts to increase the size and capability of its armed forces. While Russian land forces have suffered significant losses in its invasion of Ukraine, Moscow has reconstituted that force faster than expected. Russia’s land forces were estimated to be 15 percent larger in April 2024 than when Russia attacked Kyiv in February 2022.⁷ Earlier this year, Russia announced new ambitious plans to restructure and expand its ground forces to 1.5 million active personnel.⁸ Moreover, the Russian air force and navy have not been significantly degraded by the war against Ukraine. Russia’s air force has only lost some 10 percent of its aircraft. While Russian naval ships have been destroyed in the Black Sea, Russian naval activity worldwide has increased.⁹ Similarly, Russian nuclear forces have been unaffected by the conflict in Ukraine. Russia retains the world’s largest arsenal of deployed and nondeployed nuclear weapons and continues to develop new models of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM), hypersonic boost-glide vehicles, nuclear-powered cruise missiles, nuclear-powered subsurface drones, antisatellite weapons, and orbital space weapons.¹⁰ With some 6 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) being directed to its military, Moscow is investing to increase its defense-industrial and research and development capacities.¹¹ Russia’s industrial base produces more ammunition than that produced by all NATO members and is fielding new high-tech weapons systems, such as the nuclear-capable multiple warhead IRBM Oreshnik Russia, which was demonstrated in combat against Ukraine last November.¹² In April 2024, NATO SACEUR General Christopher Cavoli testified to the US Congress that:

• “Russia is on track to command the largest military on the continent and a defense industrial complex capable of generating substantial amounts of ammunition and material in support of large-scale combat operations. Regardless of the outcome of the war in Ukraine, Russia will be larger, more lethal and angrier with the West than when it invaded.”¹³

Fifth, Moscow’s aggressive actions short of war will continue and escalate. Putin has yet to face a response from the Alliance that will dissuade him from further exercising information warfare, cyber warfare, energy and trade embargoes, assassination, GPS jamming, sabotage, fomenting separatist movements, and other forms of hybrid warfare. These actions are intended to intimidate governments; weaken the credibility of the Alliance’s security guarantee; create and exacerbate internal divisions; and divide allies, among other objectives. Left unchecked, they threaten to undermine the Alliance’s ability to attain consensus necessary to take decisive action against Russia.

Sixth, Moscow’s exercise of nuclear coercion will continue as a key element of Russia’s strategy and should be expected to intensify. Threats of nuclear warfare are a key element of Putin’s strategy to preclude NATO and its members from providing Ukraine support that would enable it to decisively defeat Russia’s invasion. This repeated exercise of nuclear coercion includes verbal threats from President Putin and other senior Russian officials; the launching of nuclear capable ICBMs; the use of a nuclear capable IRBM against Ukraine, the first use of such a system in a conflict; nuclear weapons exercises; and the deployment of nuclear weapons to Belarus, according to both Russia and Belarus.¹⁴ NATO allies have repeatedly rewarded this coercion by expressing fear of nuclear war; declaring that NATO forces will not enter Ukraine; restricting NATO’s role in assisting Ukraine; limiting the flow of weapons to Ukraine; and restricting their use against legitimate military targets in Russia. Rewarding nuclear coercion encourages its repeated exercise and escalation. It risks leading Russia to conclude it has attained escalation dominance. A key challenge for NATO going forward will be to demonstrate that Russia’s threats of nuclear strikes are counterproductive, and the Alliance cannot be deterred by nuclear coercion.

Seventh, Moscow is conducting a global campaign of aggression to weaken the democratic community of nations and the rules-based international order. Over the last two decades, Russia has exercised its military, informational, and economic assets to generate anti-Western sentiment across the globe, including in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific region. This has included military support to authoritarian, anti-Western regimes well beyond Europe, including Venezuela, Syria, and Mali. The most concerning element of Russia’s global campaign is the partnerships it has operationalized with China, Iran, and North Korea. Russia’s “no limits partnership” with China enables Putin to mitigate the impacts of Western sanctions on his war economy. Both Iran and North Korea have provided Russia with weapons and ammunition, and North Korean soldiers have joined Russia’s fight against Ukraine. In return, Russia has supplied missile and nuclear technologies, oil and gas, and economic support to these nations that enables them to stoke violence across the Middle East, threaten the Korean Peninsula, and drive forward Beijing’s hegemonic ambitions in the Indo-Pacific region.

Eighth, an effective Russia strategy will require a coordinated leveraging of all the instruments of power available through the Alliance, its member states, and its key partners, including the European Union. This includes the application of diplomatic, economic, ideological, informational, and other elements of power—none of which are the Alliance’s primary capacity, military power—that can be marshaled through its members states and multinational institutions, such as the European Union, where the Alliance and its member states have influence and authority.

Ninth, NATO significantly overmatches Russia in military and economic power.
NATO Headquarters estimates the combined GDP of Alliance member states to be $54 trillion, more than twenty-five times Russia’s estimated GDP of more than $2 trillion.¹⁵ The combined defense budget of NATO members amounts to approximately $1.5 trillion,¹⁶ more than ten times that of Russia’s publicly projected defense budget of $128 billion for 2025.¹⁷ This imbalance of power favoring the Alliance will be enduring and makes the execution of an effective Russia strategy not a matter of capacity, but one of strategic vision and political will.

Core objectives

To counter the direct and significant threat posed by Moscow, a NATO strategy for Russia should be structured around four core objectives:¹⁸

• Defeat Russia in Ukraine: NATO must defeat Russia’s war against Ukraine. This is its most urgent priority. Failure to do so—and failure includes the conflict’s perpetuation—increases the risk of a wider war in Europe and will encourage other adversaries around the world to pursue their revisionist and hegemonic ambitions. Russia’s decisive defeat in Ukraine is essential to return stability to Europe and to reinforce the credibility of the Alliance’s deterrent posture.

• Deter aggression by Russia: A key Alliance priority must be the effective deterrence of Russia aggression against the Alliance. A robust conventional and nuclear posture that deters Russian military aggression is far less costly than an active war. Deterrence must also be more effectively exercised against Russia’s actions short of war. Failure to deter aggression in this domain can undermine confidence in the Alliance and increase the risk of war.
• Contain Russia’s influence and control: The Alliance must actively contain Russia’s efforts to assert influence and control beyond its borders. The Alliance must assist Europe’s non-NATO neighbors in Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and in Central Asia to strengthen their defenses and resilience to Russian pressure. NATO and NATO allies should also work to counter and roll back Russia’s influence and engagement around the globe.
• Degrade Russia’s capabilities and determination: A core objective for the Alliance should include weakening Russia’s capacity and will to pursue its hegemonic ambitions. Denying Russia access to international markets would further degrade its economy, including its defense-industrial capacity. Active engagement of the Russian public and other key stakeholders should aim to generate opposition to Putin and the Kremlin’s international aggression.

Achievement of these objectives would compel the Kremlin to conclude that its revanchist ambitions, including the diminishment or destruction of NATO, are unachievable and self-damaging. It would diminish Russia’s will and ability to continue aggression in Europe and weaken the impact of Russia’s partnerships, including with China, Iran, and North Korea. In addition, achieving these objectives would return a modicum of stability to Europe that in the long-term would enhance the prospects for NATO’s peaceful coexistence with Russia.

Recommended actions

A NATO strategy to defeat, deter, contain, and degrade Russian aggression and influence should effectuate the following actions by the Alliance, its member states, and partners:

• Defeat Russia in Ukraine and accelerate Ukraine’s accession into the NATO alliance Defeating Russian aggression against Ukraine requires its own strategy, which should feature five key elements: adopting Ukraine’s war objectives, including total territorial reconstitution (i.e., the Alliance must never recognize Russian sovereignty over the territories it illegally seized from Ukraine); maximizing the flow of military equipment and supplies to Ukraine, free of restrictions on their use against legitimate military targets in Russia; imposing severe economic sanctions on Russia; deploying aggressive information operations to generate opposition in Russia against Putin’s aggression; and presenting a clear, accelerated path for Ukraine to NATO membership. NATO membership, and the security guarantee it provides, would add real risk and complexity to Russian military planning. NATO membership for Ukraine is the only way to convince the Kremlin that Ukraine cannot be subject to Russian hegemony and would provide security conditions needed for Ukraine’s rapid reconstruction and economic integration into Europe.
• Fulfill and operationalize NATO’s regional defense plans. To establish a credible and effective deterrent against Russian military aggression, NATO allies must:
  • Build and deploy the requisite national forces. Military plans are no more than visions in the absence of required capabilities. NATO’s European and Canadian allies need to generate more forces, with requisite firepower, mobility, and enabling capacities. In short, given European allies’ obligations under NATO’s new regional defense plans, they must act with urgency.
  • Strengthen transatlantic defense industrial capacity. High intensity warfare, as seen in Ukraine, consumes massive amounts of weapons stocks, much of which have to be in a near constant state of modernization to match the technological adaptations of the adversary. Today, the Alliance has struggled (and often failed) to match the defense-industrial capacity of Russia and its partners. NATO’s defense industrial base must expand its production capacities and its ability to rapidly develop, update, and field weapons systems.
  • Increase allied defense spending to the equivalent of 5 percent of GDP. To facilitate the aforementioned requirements and to address emerging challenges beyond Europe that could simultaneously challenge the transatlantic community, NATO allies need to increase the agreed floor of defense spending from 2 percent to 5 percent and fulfill that new commitment with immediacy. NATO members cannot allow themselves to be forced to choose between defending against Russia and another geopolitical challenge beyond Europe.

• Terminate the NATO Russia Founding Act (NRFA). Russia has repeatedly and blatantly violated the principles and commitments laid out in the Founding Act. Russia’s actions include having invaded Ukraine both in 2014 and in 2022, using nuclear coercion and escalatory rhetoric to pressue the Alliance, and deploying nonstrategic nuclear weapons to Belarus, as both Russia and Belarus have affirmed. Consequently, NATO should formally render the NRFA defunct, including the Alliance’s commitments to:
  • Adhere to the “three nuclear no’s” that NATO member states “have no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspect of NATO’s nuclear posture or nuclear policy – and do not foresee any future need to do so.”¹⁹
  • Abstain from permanently stationing “substantial combat forces” in Central and Eastern Europe.²⁰

• Update NATO’s nuclear force posture. In response to Russia’s modernization of its nuclear arsenal, exercise of nuclear coercion, and adjustments to its nuclear strategy that lowers the threshold for first use of nuclear weapons, the Alliance must update its own nuclear posture. The objectives should be to provide NATO with a broader and more credible spectrum of nuclear weapons options. An updated force posture would improve NATO’s ability to manage, if not dominate, the ladder of conflict escalation, complicate Russian military planning, and thereby weaken Moscow’s confidence in its own military posture and its strategy of nuclear “escalation to de escalate.” Toward these ends, the Alliance should:
  • Increase the spectrum of NATO’s nuclear capabilities. This should include a nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) and a ground-launched variant. The breadth and number of NATO nuclear weapons exercises, such as the yearly Steadfast Noon, should be expanded and further integrated with exercises of conventional forces.
  • Expand the number of members participating in the Alliance’s nuclear sharing agreements. Doing so will expand the tactical options available to NATO and underscore more forcefully Alliance unity behind its nuclear posture.
  • Broaden the number and locations of infrastructure capable of hosting the Alliance’s nuclear posture. The Alliance’s nuclear posture still relies solely on Cold War legacy infrastructure in Western Europe. Given the threat posed by Russia, NATO should establish facilities capable of handling nuclear weapons and dual capable systems, including nuclear weapons storage sites, in NATO member states along its eastern frontier.

• Reinforce NATO’s eastern flank. Russia’s assault on Ukraine and its growing provocations against NATO member states and partners underscore the need to further reinforce the Alliance’s eastern frontier. To date, NATO’s deployments along its eastern flank amount to more of a trip-wire force rather than one designed for a strategy of defense by denial. To give greater credibility to the Alliance’s pledge not to “cede one inch” when considering a potential attack by Russia, NATO should:
  • Establish a more robust permanent military presence along the Alliance’s eastern frontier. NATO is expanding its eight multinational battlegroups deployed to Central and Eastern Europe. But each of these deployments should be further upgraded to full brigades that are permanently stationed there. These elements should feature robust enabling capacities, particularly air and missile defenses and long-range fires. If the United States is expected to sustain a presence of 100,000 troops in Europe, the least Western Europe and Canada can do is to forward station some 32,000 troops combined in Central and Eastern Europe.
  • Conduct large-scale, concentrated exercises on NATO’s eastern flank. The Alliance has commendably reanimated its emphasis on large-scale joint military exercises. However, those exercises have yet to be concentrated on NATO’s eastern flank. Doing so would enhance readiness, reassure the Alliance’s Central and Eastern European member states, and demonstrate resolve and preparedness in the face of Russian aggression.
  • Upgrade the Alliance’s air defense and ballistic missile defense systems to more robustly address Russian threats. In its attacks on Ukraine, Russia has demonstrated with brutality its emphasis on missile and long-range drone strikes against military and civilian targets. As part of its efforts to upgrade its air and missile defense capacities, NATO should direct the European Phased Adaptive Approach to address threats from Russia.²¹

• Expand the NATO SACEUR’s authority to order deployments and conduct operations along NATO’s eastern frontier. The Alliance’s regional defense plans are said to provide SACEUR with greater authority to activate and deploy NATO forces before crisis and conflict situations. Due to the aggressiveness of Russia’s ambitions, NATO should consider further expanding those authorities as they relate to the deployment and missions of forces along the Alliance’s eastern frontier. The actions of a deterrent force can be even more important than the magnitude of their presence.
• Augment the Alliance’s posture in the Arctic. Russia has heavily militarized the Arctic, upgraded the status and capability of its Northern Fleet, and deepened its military cooperation with China in the region while the Kremlin continues to assert Arctic territorial claims that conflict with those of NATO allies. While NATO has been increasing the tempo of its Arctic operations and improving its Arctic capabilities, Russia continues to pose a significant threat in the region and possibly outmatches the Alliance in the High North. To further reinforce deterrence against Russian aggression in the Arctic, the Alliance should:
  • Develop a comprehensive NATO strategy to defend its interests in the High North. Such a document would underscore the Alliance’s commitment to the region and help foster allied investments in infrastructure, capabilities, and training needed to defend and deter Russian threats in the High North.
  • Establish a NATO Arctic Command and Joint Force. The Arctic poses a unique set of geographic and climatic challenges requiring tailored operational capabilities. A command and air-ground-naval force focused specifically on the High North would provide the Alliance a dedicated and tailored deterrent to counter Russian aggression in the Arctic.²²

• Bolster deterrence against Russian actions short of war by strengthening resilience and through more assertive and punitive counteractions. NATO and NATO member states’ failure to respond robustly to Russia’s hybrid warfare—whether it is information warfare, cyberattacks, sabotage, assassinations, or other forms of aggression — has resulted in Russia’s intensification and escalation of these actions. The transatlantic community must strengthen its resilience against such attacks but also take stronger punitive measures against Russia if it is to persuade Russia to cease these attacks. While much of what needs to be done falls beyond the remit of NATO’s military capabilities, greater consideration should be given to how military assets can be leveraged to gather intelligence about Russian activity and provide a military dimension to the transatlantic community’s response to such provocations. For example, when a Russian ship fired a warning shot directed at a commercial Norwegian fishing boat within Norway’s exclusive economic zone or when Russia pulled out Estonian navigation buoys from the Narva River,²³ an immediate show of force from NATO could have been an appropriate response.
• Strengthen the deterrence and resilience capacities of non-NATO nations in Europe and Russia’s periphery. Recent elections in Georgia, Moldova, and Romania reflect the intensity of Russia’s determination to claw back control and influence over the space of the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. A key priority of a Russia strategy should be to strengthen efforts by the Alliance, its member states, and key institutional partners, such as the European Union, to reinforce the resilience and defense capabilities of non-NATO nations in Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. NATO’s programs, such as the Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative, warrant even greater emphasis and resources, particularly in those regions.
• Intensify Russia’s economic and diplomatic isolation. The current set of measures taken against Moscow in these realms have failed to sufficiently degrade Russia’s war economy and its ability to sustain its invasion of Ukraine and provocations elsewhere in the world. A key priority for NATO and its member states should be to significantly escalate economic sanctions, including the exercise of secondary sanctions to eliminate Moscow’s ability to generate international revenue from energy exports and attain critical technologies needed by its defense industrial sector.
• Increase efforts to generate internal Russian opposition to the Kremlin’s revanchist objectives and greater support for democratic principles and governance. Russia has undertaken aggressive campaigns to influence the politics of NATO allies and partners. In the recent elections of Moldova and Romania, Russian intervention nearly effectuated regime change. For too long, the transatlantic community has remained on the defensive in this realm. NATO and its member states need to shift to the offensive and weaponize the power of truth to illuminate the brutal realities of Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, the corruption of Russian officials, and other realties of Russian governance. NATO allies must more actively support Russian stakeholders—particularly civil society—that are more aligned with transatlantic values. This is critical to degrading the political will of the Russian state to continue its aggressions.
• Modulate dialogue with Russia, limiting it to what is operationally necessary. The Alliance should formally disband the NATO-Russia Council—which last met in 2022—until Moscow has demonstrated genuine commitment to a constructive relationship. Nonetheless, the Alliance should establish and/or maintain lines of communication between the NATO secretary general and the Kremlin, as well as between Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and the Russian General Staff, to enable crisis management and provide transparency needed for military stability. This would not preclude NATO allies from dialogues with Russia deemed necessary, for example, to assist Ukraine or pursue arms control measures.

The bottom line

As noted, NATO possesses an overmatching capacity to defeat Russia in Ukraine, deter Russian aggression, contain Russian influence beyond its borders, and degrade Russia’s ability and will to accomplish its revisionist agenda. Today, there is no better time to achieve these objectives by fully marshaling the Alliance’s assets and potential. Moscow cannot undertake an all-out military attack on NATO without risking the viability of Russia’s armed forces and thus its regime. The accomplishment of these objectives would provide stability to Europe’s eastern frontier and establish the best foundation for an eventual relationship with Moscow that is minimally confrontational, if not cooperative and constructive. However, this will take political will and resources. Russia today is determined to prevail in Ukraine, expand its military capabilities, and further leverage its partners, particularly China, Iran, and North Korea, to defeat the community of democracies and, particularly, the Alliance. Russia already envisions itself as being at war with NATO.

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The Transatlantic Security Initiative, in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, shapes and influences the debate on the greatest security challenges facing the North Atlantic Alliance and its key partners.

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Until now, NATO’s deterrent power has been largely based on an article of faith, or more precisely on Article 5 of the alliance’s charter document, the “all for one and one for all” commitment to mutual defense. Americans would do well to remember that Article 5 has only ever been invoked once in the alliance’s history, by the United States in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. NATO members responded on that occasion by giving their unanimous support, with many member countries sending troops to fight alongside the United States in Afghanistan.

French President Emmanuel Macron responded to last week’s US statements by hosting an emergency meeting of his European colleagues in Paris. While this impromptu summit did not produce any major decisions, participants did agree on the need for the continent to take far greater responsibility for its own security. If US President Donald Trump’s objective is to ensure bigger European defense budgets, his approach may be working.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The recent change in tone from across the Atlantic has certainly jolted many European leaders out of their complacency, but awareness of the need for Europe to transition from trading bloc to military and geopolitical power has actually been growing for some time.

Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 and annexation of Crimea in 2014 galvanized the nations of Eastern Europe and the Nordic region, but did not dissuade other European countries from increasing their dependence on Russian oil and gas. It was only after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 that the European political establishment finally heard the alarm bells and begin to take concrete action, at least in the economic sphere. However, despite an overall rise in European defense spending over the past three years, the continent has remained largely dependent on the United States for its security.

Coming to terms with a new reality and doing something about it are two very different things, of course. Europe now appears to acknowledge its own vulnerability in the face of the threat posed by a revanchist and expansionist Russia, and recognizes the need to act in response to the apparent US foreign policy pivot away from Europe toward Asia. However, the questions raised by that epiphany are manifold.

Are Europeans really willing to vote for larger defense budgets at the expense of the social safety nets that so many rely on? Are European leaders ready to consolidate their defense manufacturing industries and eliminate wasteful redundancy in weapons programs by forming EU-wide consortia? Indeed, will any new collective European defense strategy be structured around the EU, with its notoriously cumbersome decision-making processes, or would it be more efficient to form some kind of new grouping specifically for military-related matters? The answers to these questions will provide an indication of Europe’s true commitment to defending itself.

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Europe’s leaders are not the only ones who must answer tough questions. US policymakers should also carefully consider the implications of a new European security strategy. The United States, Britain, Germany, and most of the new NATO members in Eastern Europe have long opposed calls for a more autonomous European defense capability. Their reasoning has typically been that a separate European command would undermine NATO guarantees, dilute available military resources, and create a top-heavy bureaucratic structure that would add nothing to the continent’s security. Many in Europe now believe those arguments have been rendered moot by the stance of the new Trump administration.

How comfortable would the United States be with an independent European security policy? The US usually calls the shots within NATO, with European armies generally acquiescing to American weapons standardization. Could European defense manufacturing pose a challenge to US dominance? How would Washington react if an autonomous European military force chose to act independently in a regional crisis, such as in 2020 when France sent warships to back up Greece and Cyprus against Turkey over Aegean gas field discoveries?

The last major example of European powers acting independently of the United States was the 1956 Suez Canal Crisis, which illustrated the potential costs of a weakening in the transatlantic partnership. US President Dwight Eisenhower demanded the withdrawal of Anglo-French forces from Egypt, leading to the humiliation and resignation of British Prime Minister Anthony Eden. While the Suez crisis was underway the Soviet Union invaded Hungary, putting down a popular revolt against the country’s Kremlin-installed communist leadership. The divided West did nothing to support the Hungarian freedom fighters.

Edward Verona is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center covering Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe.

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Critics decried Trump’s call with Putin, which, in Trump’s own social media post, had an effusive tone not merited by Russia’s war against Ukraine and Moscow’s pressure and sabotage against the United States and its allies. That the call with Putin preceded the call with Zelenskyy suggests some Trump administration favoritism for Russia. But Trump’s style usually includes a warm tone directed at counterparts, especially authoritarian ones. That can change fast. And the call with Zelenskyy also seemed to be warm, at least in the Ukrainian readout. The two calls signaled the beginning of negotiations, but not their substance. Hopefully, any Trump meeting with Putin, an adversary, will take place only along with a parallel meeting with Zelenskyy, a friend.

We will learn more in the coming days as top administration officials, including Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, descend on the Munich Security Conference. Vance’s scheduled meeting with Zelenskyy, in particular, will be closely watched. But Hegseth’s comments to his counterparts at the NATO defense ministers’ meeting in Brussels were revealing.  

Hegseth made three substantive statements that raised immediate objections from Ukrainians and many of Ukraine’s friends. He:

• called restoration of Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders established in 1991 “unrealistic”;
• asserted that Ukraine’s NATO membership is not a “realistic outcome of a negotiated settlement”; and
• said that while robust postwar security guarantees for Ukraine are needed, these must be backed by European and (unspecified) non-European troops, not US troops deployed to Ukraine, and not part of a NATO mission.

Critics, including Ukrainians, quickly decried Hegseth’s statements as representing undeserved unilateral concessions to Russia that undermined US negotiating leverage before any talks began. These concerns are understandable, but a closer reading of Hegseth’s remarks supports a more nuanced and possibly stronger approach from the Trump administration.

Restoration of Ukraine’s 1991 borders is not in fact achievable through military means in the near term. Ukraine’s leaders and most of Ukraine’s friends have acknowledged as much. Hegseth seemed to be suggesting that the immediate US objective is a cease-fire in place, something that has been clear for some time. Hegseth, happily, did not push Ukraine to cede territory. Neither did he suggest that the United States is prepared to recognize Russia’s occupation of about 20 percent of the country. This is not a pleasant message, but if it means simply a recognition of the need for a cease-fire and not a surrender to Russia’s demands, it is consistent with a reasonable cease-fire to end the fighting.

Second, there is no universe in which Russia will agree to NATO membership for Ukraine in a negotiation. That is what Hegseth said, and saying so is not the same as saying that Ukraine will never become a NATO member. Closing the door for Ukraine’s NATO membership would be an unrequited concession to Russia, weakening the US position for no good reason. But that is not yet the administration’s position and hopefully will not become its position.  

Third, it has been clear for some time that the United States would not put boots on the ground in Ukraine and that European countries would have to stand up a force to back up a cease-fire. It has also been clear that the Europeans would insist on US backup, including military backup, if their forces in Ukraine were under attack from Russia. Such backup could include air power and other means that would not cross Hegseth’s redline of deploying US troops inside Ukraine. Hegseth threw the ball to the Europeans in public, but that was coming in any case.

The administration’s emerging Ukraine strategy could still be the basis for a decent outcome if the United States resists recognition of Russian illegal aggression against Ukraine, if it keeps NATO membership for Ukraine on the table and refuses to negotiate it with Russia, and if the United States and Europe can work out a military plan to support a backup force inside Ukraine. A robust cease-fire that preserves a “free” Ukraine independent from Russian occupation, this era’s version of West Germany, could become a strategic defeat for Putin and a success for Ukraine, Europe, and the free world.

Hegseth spoke of the need to be realistic. Ukraine recovering its Russian-occupied territories may not be realistic in the short run. Likewise, for many years, it was not realistic to imagine the Baltic countries regaining their independence from Moscow, German reunification, or an end to the Iron Curtain. But all three happened. So can Ukraine’s restoration, if Ukraine’s friends remain committed and persistent.

The Trump team’s rollout of its Ukraine strategy had its failings, but it is not as bad as some fear. At least not yet.

Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and former US assistant secretary of state for Europe.

The post What to make of the unfolding Trump strategy on Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.